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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3E.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations", "Failure
to register a vacant building in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3", an
infraction, and of "Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC, Chapter
8, Section 16.8B-5", an infraction "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002".
1. The chief issue in this case is did the Court err in determining that Ogden City
Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Title 16, Article B is not void for Ogden City's failure to
comply with enabling statute Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 and or § 10-9-403 and or
failed to consider that said ordinance is void?
Whether the ordinance is void is a question of law. Ogden City charged
Defendant with multiple violations of "Zoning Ordinance". Ogden City failed to comply
with Utah Code §§ 10-9-401-405 when the City adopted said ordinance. The applicable
standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
2. If said ordinance is valid under Utah Code then said ordinance as applied to
Appellant, deprived Appellant of numerous rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States and required that Appellant waive Appellants constitutional rights, if
Appellant was to acquiesce to Ogden City's demands in violation of the Constitution of
the United States. Can Appellant be convicted of a crime predicated on unconstitutional
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actions or prior restraint of Constitutional rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the
United States by Ogden City?
This issue is fundamental to a democratic society and the violations Appellant was
charged with in the first information by Ogden City was "Zoning Violations" for
"unlawful signs". The Second Judicial District Court of Weber County ruled that Ogden
City Vacant Building Ordinance 16.8B-9.G was unconstitutional on its face and violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The applicable
standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
3. Did the Court err in concluding that the Appellant's buildings were "vacant"
and came within the registration requirement of Ogden Municipal Code, 16.8B-3?
This issue involves a determination of whether the trial court could have found the
building to be "vacant" under the language and interpretation of the ordinance. The
applicable standard of appellate review is one of abuse of discretion. State v. GallU 967
P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
4. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant of failure to register and failure to
file a vacant building plan "on or about January 1st through 12th, 2002", when Ogden
City by its own written notification allowed Appellant to "register the building within ten
days of this notification, and otherwise begin to comply with the requirements of the
ordinance", when Appellant received the required notice on January 13,2002?
Whether the defendant could have been guilty of criminal behavior within the time
that Ogden City alleged defendant was in violation ("on or about January 1st through
2
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12th, 2002") is a question of law. The applicable standard of appellate review is
correctness of error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah
Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
5. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant for failure to file a vacant
building plan, when Ogden City motivation was retaliation against Appellant for having
signs on Appellant's property that stated in part "Ogden City Administration has no
integrity" as part of Appellant's petition to Ogden City to redress grievances when no
other charges against any other parties have been filed by Ogden City for the same
violations?
Whether the defendant was guilty of criminal behavior when Ogden City's
motivation was retaliation against Appellant is a question of law. The applicable
standard of appellate review is correctness of error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
6.. Did the Court err in determining that Ogden City Code 16.8B was not in
violation of Utah State Code Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming Uses and Structures?
The applicable standard of appellate review is one of abuse of discretion. State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App.
1997)6
7. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant for "Failure to Register a Vacant
Building in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3" and
"Failure to Provide Vacant Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code,
Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5" when filing a plan is predicated on registering?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
3 may contain errors.
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Whether the defendant could have been guilty of multiple charges of criminal
behavior for the same offense is a question of law. The applicable standard of appellate
review is correctness of error. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley,
371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
8. Did the Court err in its order determining "The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and
2 is granted, b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied."
when the Second Amended Information and controlling Information filed by the
prosecuting attorney makes no reference to a count 3 or 4?
Whether the defendant can be guilty of a charge that defendant was not charged
with is a matter of law. The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of
error. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(Utah Ct. App. 1999).
The issues were preserved in the trial Court in appellant's Motion to Dismiss and
Vacate [Legal Index 055 and 078] and related proceedings.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Many constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant to this appeal. The most
salient are the following and are attached to Appendix 12
United States Constitution, Amendment I.
United States Constitution, Amendments V.
United States Constitution, Amendments XIV.
Utah Constitution Article I, § 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
Utah Constitution Article I, § 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.]
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-102. Purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401. General powers.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402. Preparation and adoption.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-404. Temporary regulations.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405. Zoning districts.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2. Zoning Regulations Purpose
Ogden City Code § 16.8A-3. Definitions.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-2. Purpose and Intent Vacant Building.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-3. Obligation to Register Vacant Buildings.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-5. Vacant Building Plan.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-9.G. Maintenance Standards. Signage.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-9.J. Maintenance Standards. Obscuring Of Windows.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On January 23, 2002, Ogden Cityfiledtwo, two count informations against
Appellant, for "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations"; (1) "The windows and glass
doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs
visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9J OMC, Class
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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B", and (2) "Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent
properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9.G
OMC Class B", "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002", in the Second Judicial District
Court. Attached hereto as Addendum 5; R. 001.
Ogden City on January 23,2002, filed two separate informations against
Appellant case number 021900315 and 021900420. Each information was for a separate
property that Appellant owned. The properties are adjacent to each other and located in
the Downtown Historic District of Ogden City. The informations are identical, the facts
are identical, with the exception of one broken window on one property that was covered
with plywood in case number 021900420. The trial and all hearings in the District Court
were at all times consolidated. On May 5,2002, the Utah Court of Appeals consolidated
case No. 20030988 and case No 20030989 for the purpose ofjudicial economy. The
legal index used is for case number 021900315.
Arraignment was on January 31,2002. R. 003-004.
On March 5,2002, Ogden City filed an Amended Information charging Appellant
with having violated the "Ogden City zoning ordinances"from"on or about January 1st
through 12th, 2002" and included 2 additional charges; "(3) Failure to register and
provide a vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3 Class B" and
"(4) Failure to maintain vacant building in accordance with Vacant Building Standards
OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-9.J". Attached hereto as Addendum 6; R. 006.
Again on October 2,2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information
charging Appellant with "zoning ordinance violations", "on or about January 1st through
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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12th, 2002", and changing the charges to infractions because Appellant had demanded a
jury trial. The Second Amended Information also eliminated the fourth charge of the
Second Information and bifurcated the third charge to include; "Failure to provide vacant
building plans in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5" and "Failure to register
a vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3 Class B". Attached
hereto as Addendum 7; R. 017-018.
The charges were bifurcated on August 16,2002. R 012-013. Ogden City in
addition to the criminal charges filed a civil suit against Appellant on February 5,2002,
to restrain Appellantfromhaving signs located on the interior of Appellant's property
that stated that "Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity". The ACLU of Utah
represented Appellant in the civil case. The ACLU of Utah challenged the
constitutionality of Ogden Municipal Code, 16.8B-9.G, hereafter the "sign ordinance".
On October 18,2002, following a nonjury trial held in the Second Judicial
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ernest Jones presiding, Appellant was
found guilty of "Failure to Register a Vacant Building in violation of Ogden Municipal
Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and "Failure to Provide Vacant
Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5, an
infraction" on each of Appellant's properties. R. 021-025.
Appellant filed a timely appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 20020957CA. R. 28-029. On August 21, 2003, the order of the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it is not takenfroma
final judgment of conviction. The dismissal is without prejudice to a timely
appeal after a final, appealable judgment is entered by the trial court.
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R. 050-051.
On October 1st, 2003, in the case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards, Civil No.
020900777, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, before the Honorable
Parley R- Baldwin, the Court ruled, on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G, was
unconstitutional on its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. In said Memorandum the Court stated the Ordinance was
"overbroad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction". Attached
hereto as Addendum 9.
On October 9,2003, Appellant filed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Vacate and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate with the Second
Judicial District Court. Attached hereto as Addendum 10, R. 055-064.
On November 10, 2003, the case was set for review and disposition at which time
Ogden City moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2 due to the ruling of October 1, 2003,
holding that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional. Ogden City's Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the Court. R. 054.
On November 10, 2003, the Court advised Appellant that there was no copy of
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate in the file and Appellant presented a brief
summary of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss to the Court that the previousfindingsof the
Court should be vacated and or dismissed. Appellant's Motion to Vacate and Dismiss
and Memorandum in Support was docketed on October 9,2003, with the Second Judicial
District Court but as of November 18,2003, said Motion and Memorandum was still not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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located or in the file. That Appellant refiled said Motion and Memorandum with the
Second Judicial District Court on November 20,2003. R. 078-087.
Ogden Cityfiledno responsive pleading to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and
Vacate, which was personally delivered to Ogden City Prosecuting Attorney office on
October 9,2003 and on November 21,2003.
Appellant requested oral argument on November 24,2003, to Appellant's Motion
to Dismiss and Vacate but the Court submitted its order on November 26,2003, ruling on
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate. R. 092-94.
The Order of the Court of November 26,2003, stated:
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's memorandum of Law and having
heard oral argumentsfromboth parties, enterers the following ruling:
1.

In the case of #0219000315:
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied.

2.

In the case of #0219000420:
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied."

Attached hereto as Addendum 11, R. 098.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on December 1,2003. R. 099-101.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ogden City Council, on December 4, 2001 adopted #2001-69 amending Chapter
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden
City Code for the abatement of dangerous buildings, and, in particularly, repealing
Article B, concerning temporary boarding of buildings and temporary boarding
permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration of vacant
buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan, adopting
standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing additional fees
for re-registration when there the owner does not comply with the plan and for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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each month that a vacant building is boarded; by revising Subsection 16-12-3
regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to reflect the changes in the
regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and increasing the civil
penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations.
Attached hereto as Addendum 1.
The notice amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal code was posted
on 30th day of November, 2001, by the Ogden City Recorder, Gloria J. Berrett in three
public places. Attached hereto as Addendum 2.
Ogden Standard on December 4,2001, published "The city will vote on the new
ordinance at its 5 p.m. meeting today. There is not a public hearing scheduled."
Appellant had no prior knowledge and or notice of the zoning ordinance prior to
January 2,2003.
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16 was approved as to form by Andrea
W. Lockwood, Chief Deputy City Attorney Civil Division, on December 5,2001.
Addendum 1, p. 14.
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16, was transmitted to Matthew Godfrey,
Mayor of Ogden, and approved on December 6,2001. Addendum 1, p. 14.
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16; was published on December 9,2001,
and became effective on December 9,2001. Addendum 1, p. 14.
No other notice to the public took place prior to the posting on the 30th day of
November, 2001, by the City Recorder, of said amended ordinance. Addendum 10, p. 2.
Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated 10-9-403-l.B, in amending Chapter 8, Title 16, in that Ogden City Council
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failed to submit said amendment to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval
or recommendations.
Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah
Code Annotated § 10-9-403-2, in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the
procedure specified in Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402, in preparing and adopting an
amendment to the zoning ordinance.
Ogden City Council failed to have a public hearing pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 10-9-402-2.A, or pursuant to § 10-9-403-2, in amending Chapter 8, Title 16
of the Ogden Municipal Code.
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2.B or pursuant to § 10-9-403-2 in
amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code.
On January 9,2002, Michael McDonald, Ogden City Building Inspector,
inspected the property at 207 25th Street arriving between 12-1 and prepared an
inspection report. The inspection report comments were that the building vacant, sign in
window and prepared letter. Attached hereto as Addendum 8.
On January 9, 2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager, Wayne
Glover, mailed Appellant a written notice to register his building within 10 days of
Appellant's notification. Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002. As a
condition of registering Ogden City had determined that the signs on the interior of
Appellant's property, that stated "Ogden City Administration has no integrity" etc., were
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"unlawful" and had to be removed and any window that was obscured had to be
unobscured. Attached hereto as Addendum 3.
Appellant personally delivered to Ogden City Building Services Manager, Wayne
Glover, on January 15, 2002, a letter that stated that Appellant's ""unlawful signs" are
protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution". Attached hereto
as Addendum 4.
Appellant and Ogden City entered into an agreement on October 12,2001,
whereby Appellant would remove the signs on the interior of Appellant's building that
petitioned Ogden City Administration for a redress of grievances for a period of 60 days
to provide Ogden City the opportunity to redress Appellant's grievances with Ogden
City. The agreement to remove the signs was entered before the Honorable Judge West,
in the Second Judicial District Court. Tt p. 138-139.
Ogden City failed to redress Appellant's grievances or meet with Appellant,
pursuant to the October 12th agreement during the 60 days that Appellant had agreed to
remove said petitions. On December 31,2001, Appellant placed several of the signs that
were removed in October 2001 back in the windows of Appellant's property. Tt p. 139.
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed two informations charging Appellant "on
or about January 1st through 12th, 2002" with "2 counts Ogden City Zoning Ordinance
Violations:" "1. The windows and glass doors on the building are painted or otherwise
obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building, in
violation of Section 16.8B-9.J OMC, Class B", and "2. Unlawful signs visible from
adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9-G OMC Class B" for each of Appellant's
properties. Addendum 5 R.001.
These buildings have been largely used by the defendant for storage of
construction materials and personal property, for a wood shop, for office use for himself
and as a political forum. Tt 53-58, 68,126.
Appellant's property was not empty "on or about January 1 thru 12 ,2002".
Appellant's property was occupied on a regular basis by an occupant and the property
was used on a on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for which the
building(s) were designed and lawfully permitted by Appellant "on or about January 1st
thru 12th, 2002". Tt 53-58, 68, 126.
Appellant was personally served on January 24,2002, and arraignment was on
January 31, 2002. R. 0023. The case jvas continued to February 20, 2002, to allow
Appellant to obtain counsel. R. 003-004.
On February 5, 2002, Ogden City filed a civil complaint in the Second Judicial
District Court of Weber County in the case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards Civil No.
020900777. On February 6, 2002, in the case Ogden City v. Edwards before the
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, Ogden City sought and obtained a restraining order
requiring Appellant to remove all signs on the interior of Appellant's property.
Appellant's signs located on the interior of Appellant's property were for the purpose to
petition Ogden City Administration, for redress of grievances, protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. R 012-013.
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On March 5,2002, Ogden City filed an Amended Information charging Appellant
with having violated the "zoning ordinance"from"on or about January 1st through 12th,
2002", and included 2 additional charges; "Failure to register and provide a vacant
building plan in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, Class B" and "Failure to
maintain vacant building in accordance with Vacant Building Maintance Standards
OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-9 J Class B". Addendum 6.
Again on October 2,2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information
charging Appellant with having violated "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance", "on or about
January 1st through 12th, 2002", and changing the charges to infractions because Affiant
had demanded a jury trial. In addition, the Second Amended Information was a 2 page
information with 2 charges on each page that were identified as 1 & 2 on each page
eliminating the fourth chargefromthe Second Amended Information and amending the
third charge of the Second Amended Information into two separate charges. Addendum
7.
Ogden City moved to bifurcate the issues of January 23, 2002 and the two charges,
which were amended on October 2,2002, that were served on Appellant, the day of trial,
because Appellant requested a jury trial. R. 012-013.
On October 18, 2002, following a nonjury trial held in the Second Judicial
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ernest Jones presiding, Appellant was
found guilty of; "Failure to Register a Vacant Building in violation of Ogden Municipal
Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and "Failure to Provide Vacant
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Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16-8B-5, an
infraction". R. 023-025.
On October 1st, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in the
case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards Civil No. 020900777, the Honorable Parley R.
Baldwin, ruled on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiff Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The Memorandum stated that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G OMC,
was unconstitutional on its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. In said Memorandum, the Second Judicial District Court,
stated the Ordinance "is overbroad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner
restriction". Addendum 9.
Ogden City thereafter sought to dismiss the remaining charges against Appellantbecause the remaining charges were unconstitutional.
On November 26,2003 the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
Vacate and the Order of the Court was:
In the case of #0219000315:
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied.
Addendum 11,R. 098.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The chief issue is whether Ogden City complied with enabling legislation in
adopting its zoning ordinance, to regulate and restrict the erection, construction,
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and structures, those of vacant
buildings. Ogden City Municipal Code Chapter 8 Title 16 Article B is void. Clearly
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Ogden City failed to perform any of the duties required by § 10-9-402, § 10-9-403 or
§ 10-9-404 and therefore said ordinance is void.
Ogden City required Appellant, as a condition to file a vacant building plan, to
remove signs in the interior window of Appellants property that were petitions to redress
Appellants grievances with Ogden City in violation of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Appellant is not legally required to defeat Appellant's constitutional
rights as a matter of law and any law that requires any citizen to do so is not law. Ogden
City can not deprive any citizen their rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. Said Ordinance deprived Appellant of numerous constitutional rights guaranteed
Appellant under the Constitution of the United States and the State of Utah.
Appellant's buildings were not empty, were occupied on a regular basis and were
designed for the use that Appellant was using Appellant's property for. Appellant's
buildings were not "vacant" and therefore did not come within the registration
requirement of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16-8B-3.
Appellant was convicted of failure to register and failure to file a vacant building
plan "on or about January 1st through 12th, 2002", when Ogden City by its own written
notification allowed Appellant to "register the building within ten days of this
notification" that Appellant received on January 13, 2002. Appellant received the notice
requiring registration on January 13,2002, the day after Appellant was charged with not
registering (January 1st thru 12th) denying Appellant hisrightsof due process guaranteed
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I ,
Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
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Ogden City's motivation for filing the informations against Appellant was
retaliation against Appellant for having signs on Appellant's property that stated in part
"Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity", as part of Appellant's petition to Ogden
City to redress grievances when no other charges against any other parties have been filed
by Ogden City, for the same violations in violation of Appellant's rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Ogden City Municipal Code Chapter 8, Title 16 Article B provided for the
termination of all nonconforming uses, removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and
anything that would obscure a window which would include curtains, blinds, shades, etc.,
in or on vacant building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable time
period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in
the nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Ann. 10-9-408.
The Court erred in convicting the Appellant for "Failure to register a vacant
building" and "Failure to provide vacant building plans". Filing a plan is predicated on
registering and constitutes one criminal activity.
The Court erred in its order determining "The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is
granted? b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied." when
the Second Amended Information filed by the prosecuting attorney, makes no reference
to a count 3 or 4 and count 3 and 4 of the Amended Information are not the same as count
1 and 2 of the second page of the Second Amended Information. There is nothing in the
record or the docket that clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt would identify what
Appellant was found in violation of.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
-ORDINANCE IS VOIDTHE ADOPTION OF ZONING ORDINANCE WAS ILLEGAL AND VOID
BECAUSE OGDEN CITY FAILED TO PROVD3E PUBLIC NOTICE AND
HEARING PRIOR TO ADOBTION OF ZONING ORDINANCE
PURSUANT TO STATE LAW
A

- OGDEN CITY CODE 16-8B IS A ZONING ORDINANCE

Ogden City filed its original information of January 23,2002 charging Appellant
with "unlawful signs" and "obscuring windows" in that Defendant committed the offense
of "zoning ordinance violations". Addendum 5, R. 001.
On March 5,2002 Ogden City amended its information to include two additional
charges including "Failure to Register a Vacant Building" and "Failure to File a Vacant
Building Plan" in that Defendant committed the offense of "zoning ordinance
violations". Addendum 6, R. 006.
Again on October 2,2002 Ogden City amended its information to infractions in
that Defendant committed the offense of "zoning ordinance violations" Addendum 7.
Chapter 9, also known as The Municipal Land Use Development and Management
Act, is comprised often separate parts, each of which deals with land use regulations.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003 (2003). These parts include the Planning
Commission (sections 10-9-201 to -205), General Plans (sections 10-9-301 to -307), and
Zoning (sections 10-9-401 to 409). Together these parts set up a framework for
governing how land is used and developed within a municipality.
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10-9-405. Zoning Districts.
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction
into zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of
buildings and structures, and the use of land.
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class
or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district
may differ from those in other districts.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405.
Under Utah Code Ogden City Ordinance, 16-8-B, is provided for under "The
Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act" or Chapter 9, Zoning (sections
10-9-401 to-409).
Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, "regulate(s) and restrict(s) the erection,
construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings," those of vacant
buildings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405-LB.
Ogden City provided Appellant with 2 notices on January 23, 2002,2 notices on
March 5,2002 and 4 notices on October 2,2002, for a total of 8 notices that stated that
Appellant, "committed the offense...Ogden City zoning ordinance violations" on
Appellant's properties.
Ogden City ordinance § 16-8B is a zoning ordinance. (Emphasis added).
B. PURPOSE AND INTENT OF VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE
Ogden City Code Zoning Regulations § 15-1-2 states;
15-1-2: Purpose:
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety,
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morals and the general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of Ogden City,
state of Utah, including, amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in the
streets, securing safety from fire, panic and other dangers, encouraging energy
efficient patterns of development, the use of energy conservation, solar and
renewable energy sources, and assuring access to sunlight for solar energy
devices, providing adequate light and air, preventing the overcrowding of land,
avoiding undue concentration of population, facilitating adequate provision for
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements,
providing for the classification of land uses. These regulations shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value
of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the city.
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2.
Ogden City Code Vacant Buildings § 16.8B-2 states;
16.8B-2: Purpose and Intent:
It is the purpose and intent of this article to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare by establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and requiring
responsible parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to
remedy any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and
consequent adverse impact on the value of nearby property, and to establish
minimum maintenance standards for vacant buildings. To such ends, it is the
specific purpose and intent of this article:
A. To minimize the period of time a building is boarded;
B. To provide alternative procedures for the abatement of dangerous buildings,
which, if adequately secured and maintained against entry in accordance with the
requirements of this article, will not constitute an immediate danger to the life,
limb, health, property or safety of the public;
C. To prevent vacant buildings from becoming a public nuisance; and
D. To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings, in order to protect
surrounding properties.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-2.
Addendum 1.
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Clearly the purpose and intent of Ogden City Code § 16-8B, the Vacant Building
Ordinance, is predicated on and is a significant part of the purpose of Ogden City Code
§ 15-1-2, Zoning Purpose which is predicated on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102.
C. PUBIC HEARING AND NOTICE REQUIRED
Utah Code § 10-9-402 states
10-9-402. Preparation and adoption;
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the
legislative body a proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the
zoning ordinance and maps, that represents the commission's recommendations
for zoning all or any part of the area within the municipality.
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed
zoning ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission.
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public
hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails
notice of a proposed zoning change to property owners within that municipality
within a specified distance of the property on which the zoning change is being
proposed, it shall also mail equivalent notice to property owners of an adjacent
municipality within the same distance of the property on which the zoning change
is being proposed.
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may:
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed;
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning
ordinance as amended; or
(c) reject the ordinance
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402 (l)-<3) (Emphasis added).
Ogden City Council failed to hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning
ordinance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2-A.
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2-B. The notice posted by the City Clerk
on 30th day of November, 2001, at three public places, provided just 3 days notice of the
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Ogden City Council meeting that took place on December 4, 2001, instead of the
minimum 14 days as required by Utah law.
"Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001, adopted #2001-69 amending
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the
Ogden City Code..." Addendum 1. Any amendment or rezoning requires the same
statutory procedures as Utah Code § 10-9-402 as required by Utah Code § 10-9-403.
10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings.
(1) (a) The legislative body may amend:
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district;
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance,
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this
subsection unless the amendment was proposed by the planning commission
or is first submitted to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval, or
recommendations.
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section
§ 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance
or the zoning map.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-403.
Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah
Code Annotated § 10-9-403-2 in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the
procedure specified in Section § 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the
zoning ordinance.
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing at
least 14 days before the date of the hearing and failed to have public hearing as provided
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 pursuant to § 10-9-403-2 in amending
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code.
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In Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1979), the court stated:
[w]e hold that because the statute calls for a public hearing our legislature
contemplated something more than a regular city council meeting held, so far
as the record here discloses, without specific advance notice to the public that the
proposed ordinance would be considered. See 1 R. Anderson, American Law of
Zoning § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effective, must alert the public to the
nature and scope of the ordinance that isfinallyadopted. Id. at 200. Failure to
strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it
invalid. Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975); Anderson at
199. This well established rule is followed by the great majority of jurisdictions.
Annot, 96 A.L.R.2d 449 (1964); Town of Beverly Shores Plan Commission v.
Enright 463 N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required municipality to publish two
notices in newspaper within ten days of hearing-ordinance invalidated where first
notice appeared in newspaper eleven days before hearing); Kalakowski v.
Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development Co. v.
Tulsa, 596 P.2d 1255 (Okla.1979) (city ordinance establishing flood control
districts invalidated because of failure to follow statutory requirements).
Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court has held:
Moreover, the record indicates that the City Council may have accomplished this
zoning change by circumventing the notice and public participation requirements
of sections 10-9-303 to -304 and 20-11-24 of the Utah Code. Utah law grants
citizens therightto be informed of the current permitted uses of land and of
proposed or actual governmental changes in those uses. They also have the
right to comment on and, under certain circumstances, negate or affirm those
changes via the referendum process. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-303 to -304, 2011-24. Further, if citizens are dissatisfied with the specific implementation of a
zoning plan, they have the option of voting out the leaders who implemented it.
Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 25 1, 253 (Utah 1982) (recognizing that voters may
control basic policy decisions through the electoral process) (citing Shriver v.
Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329,313 P.2d 475,479 (1957)). However, citizens cannot
take advantage of these rights if they are not privy to the activities of their
elected representatives.
The trial court must consider adequate notice as a threshold matter when
petitioners claim that the enacting authority did not give citizens proper
notice of the zoning change in question. The rationale behind this procedural
requirement is obvious. Voters are statutorily granted the right to be notified of
changes and developments in their community's zoning laws. Utah Code Ann. §§
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
23 may contain errors.

10-9-303 to -304. Furthermore, if a particular zoning change constitutes a
legislative-type change, voters must be given adequate notice of its enactment so
that they may institute referendum procedures promptly. See Utah Code Ann. §
20-11-24. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251.251-52 (Utah 1982) (zoning dispute
arose after timely referendum petitionfiled);Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394
P.2d 808, 808 (1964).
Under this requirement, the trial court must determine if the enacting authority
followed the notice and public participation requirements mandated by sections
10-9-303 and -304 of the Utah Code. The trial court should also consider whether
the enacting authority provided sufficient notice of the change through proper
labeling and an accurate description of the contents of the labels in question. If the
notice was inadequate, the trial court must invalidate the zoning change,
leaving the enacting authority free to reinstate the proceedings in proper fashion.
However, if the trial court concludes that the notice was adequate, it must then
determine whether the change was legislative or administrative using the three
policy elements.
Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah, 1994),
In Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001) the court
explained:
The purpose of section 10-9-402 is to ensure that members of the public receive
adequate notice of ordinances that may affect their property. In Call v. City of
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
regularly scheduled city council meeting did not meet the "public hearing"
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-25 (1991), a predecessor statute to section
10-9-402. See Call 727 P.2d at 183. The court stated that "[n]notice, to be
effective, must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that is
finally adopted." Id. (emphasis added).
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001).
The notice that was provided to the public that was posted by the Ogden City
Clerk, in 3 public places failed to alert the public to the nature and scope of the
amendment to Chapter 8, Title 16, Article B. Addendum 2.
This change was not a common, everyday zoning change but was a rare or unusual
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change that significantly altered the basic nature of the community. The preamble to
Ordinance No. 2001-69 states "Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001 adopted
#2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive
revisions to the Ogden City Code..." In addition to repealing Article B and adopting a
new article B Ogden City Council modified 16.8A, 16.8-C and 16.8-D. Addendum 1.
The amendment of Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code was of sufficient
magnitude to constitute a material variance of Ogden City's Zoning Ordinance.
D. RECOMMENDATION BY PLANNING COMMISSION
Submitting the proposed zoning ordinance to the Planning Commission is a
crucial, mandatory first step. Since there was no referral to the Planning Commission,
the public was robbed of its initial opportunity to participate in the decision making
process for a very important public decision, i.e. the enactment of a zoning ordinance that
regulate(s) and restrict(s) the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or
use of buildings and structures, those that Ogden City may deem empty, or not used on a
regular basis and or not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary
purposes for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted.
Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 10-9-403-1-B, in that Ogden City Council failed to submit said amendment
to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or recommendations
Since there was no referral, the Ogden City Council did not receive back a
"recommendation" from the Planning Commission, as contemplated by the Act. Had it
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received the required recommendation, Ogden City Council was required to either
approve or disapprove of the proposed vacant building ordinance
These requirements are manifestly jurisdictional and without absent strict
compliance, the adoption of the Vacant Building Ordinance would be void. Longley v.
Leucadia Financial Corp., 9 P 3d 762, 7 66 _ 18 (Utah 2000); Hatch v. Boulder v. Town
Council 21 P. 3d 245 12, 2001 Utah App.55 (Utah App, 2001).
E. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ENABLING STATUTE REQUIRED
In Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001) stated:
The authority to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is conferred on
municipalities by the state through enabling statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9401-409 (1999). As such, ff[c]ities must strictly comply with the statute
delegating them the authority to act." Jachimek v. Superior CU 819 P.2d 487,
489 (Ariz. 1991). Consequently, "[fjailure to strictly follow the statutory
requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid." Call v. City of
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180,183 (Utah 1986). Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 950
P.2d 167,169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("Municipalities must strictly follow the
statutory procedure to enact a zoning ordinance."); Stockwell v. City of Ritzville,
663 P.2d 151, 151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding trial court's determination
that "the ordinance was invalidity enacted due to the Council's failure to comply
strictly" with the enabling statute).
In Osborne v. City of Camden, 784 S. W.2d 596 (Ark 1990) the court stated:
Municipal zoning authority is conferred solely by State enabling legislation.
Taggart v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570. 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983). Failure to
comply with a mandatory procedural requirement of the enabling statute
renders a zoning ordinance invalid. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 224 Ark. 344,
273 S.W.2d26(1954). A zoning ordinance "shall consist of both a map and a
text." Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-416(a) (2) (1987). Compliance with this provision
of the statute is mandatory, and failure to comply with it will render a zoning
ordinance void. City of Benton v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 961. 88 S.W.2d 828 (1936):
City [301 Ark. 422] of Searcy v. Roberson, supra. The purpose of this provision
is to give notice of the city's zoning proposal so that, before adoption,
residents may object or make suggestions, and after adoption, land
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purchasers may acquaint themselves with the zoning restriction. City of
Benton v. Phillips, supra.
Because municipal zoning authority comesfromthe state, "the power must be
exercised within the limits and in the manner prescribed in the grant and not otherwise."
City ofScottsdale v. Scottsdale [169 Ariz. 319] Associated Merchants, Inc., 120 Ariz. 4,
5, 583 P.2d 891, 892 (1978) (citing City ofScottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204,
439 P.2d 290 (1968)); Hart v. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379,384,346 P.2d
1101,1105 (1959). Cities must strictly comply with the statute delegating them the
authority to act. Scottsdale Associated Merchants, 120 Ariz, at 5, 583 P.2d at 892; see
Hart, 86 Ariz, at 390,346 P.2d at 1109. Any attempt to exercise the zoning authority
without complying with the statutory conditions is void. Hart, 86 Ariz, at 384, 346
P.2datll05.
Ogden City had a statutory duty of notice and public hearing to the public at large.
This notice and public hearing are jurisdictional, and the ordinance is void, as if it never
took place. Utah case law supports the conclusion that the ordinance is void for failure to
strictly comply with statutory notice and hearing requirements. This Court must rectify
Ogden City'sfraudon its citizens and property owners.
F. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES NOTICE AND HEARING
Failure of public notice and hearing defeats the purpose of the statutory scheme. It
deprived the Ogden City Council, of significant information that might well have been
important in deciding whether to approve, modify or dispose of said ordinance. Failure
of public notice in addition denies the public its role in the process of equitable zoning
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ordinances contemplated by the statute. Ogden City Council, failure for strict compliance
corrupted the entire process. Such actions of the Ogden City Council, understandably
raised a storm of public protest, created suspicions of favoritism and dishonesty.
Failure to void Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, would encourage
concealment-not giving public notice on controversial zoning ordinances. This unsound
policy would only encourage and reward the non-compliance with statutes. In the end, it
would surely encourage concealment of the public's business from the public. This Court
should treat public notice requirements in a similar manner as personal notice where
individual property rights are at issue.
This would be good public policy. InW.&G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals explained:
It is well-established that "[tjimely and adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness."
...Notice must be given in compliance with the statutory scheme and must be
sufficient.
Id. At 761-2 (quoting Nelson v Jacobsen, 669 P2.d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983), other
citations omitted; emphasis added).
If adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard are not given, the
proceedings are void and those not properly notified are not bound by the
proceedings because the giving of such notice is jurisdictional.
W.&G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency ofSalt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755.
Ogden City failed to provide Appellant, property owners and the citizens of Ogden
City with reasonable notice of proceedings and or an opportunity for a hearing as
provided by Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402.
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Every Citizen has two dimensions ofrights,private and public. Therightto notice
with respect to a citizen's private property rights is guarded by the Constitutional right of
procedural due process. However, that same citizen has very important concerns dealing
with zoning ordinances, that may affect property owned by that same citizen, and those
rights are protected by statutory notice and public hearings. The passage of such
regulations and restrictions on private property must be a public process, open to strict
scrutiny.
In Toone, v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103 (2002):
When we interpret a statute, we lookfirstto its plain language; only if the statute's
language is ambiguous do we rely on other methods of statutory interpretation.
City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, % 36,28 P.3d 697; State v. Burns, 2000 UT
56, f 25,4 P.3d 795; Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, % 13, 993
P.2d 207. Subsection 17-27-305(2)(a) mandates that the county's legislative body
shall submit a proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations when "accepting, widening, removing, extending, relocating,
narrowing, vacating, abandoning, changing the use, acquiring land for, or selling
or leasing any street or other public way, ground, place, property or structure."
(Emphasis added.) This language is unambiguous, clearly stating without
qualification that a proposed sale must be submitted to the planning
commission before county land is sold.
Ordinance #2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code,
adopted by the Ogden City Council on December 4,2001 is void (Toone et al, v. Weber
County, 2002 UT 103). Ogden City failed to satisfy any of the conditions required under
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 to enact amendments to 16-8B. This language is
unambiguous, clearly stating without qualification that a proposed zoning ordinance must
be submitted to the planning commission before the city can amend any zoning ordinance
that a public hearing be held and reasonable notice be provided to the public at least 14
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days before the date of the hearing. That the violation of any of the conditions set out in
Utah State Code would be sufficient to void said ordinance.
Section §10-9-405 gives cities the authority to zone; section § 10-9-403 mandates
that zoning amendments be accompanied by certain procedural requirements. Ogden
City failed to follow the Utah State Code requirements, to amend zoning ordinance 16.8,
therefore ordinance 16.8B is void. The right to public notice is entitled to protection by
the law, similar to the type of protection afforded private property rights. That is the
purpose of statutory notice and public hearings. It is a reflection of the fact that zoning
ordinances affect us all and affect very important values. We do not want them being
made in haste or in secret, as this one was. The applicable statutes unambiguously
required Ogden City, to provide notice and hearing, before adopting the vacant building
ordinance 16.8B.
This Court should sustain the integrity of this important public process. Public
notice and a hearing on the regulation of private property are the public's equivalent of
individual constitutional due process rights and must be carefully safeguarded.
POINT II
-ORDINANCE REQUIRED APPELLANT TO SURRENDER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTSTHE ORDINANCE AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT REQUHtED
APPELLANT TO SURRENDER APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNTBED STATES IN VIOLATION THEREOF.
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT
As a condition of the letter of January 9,2002, from Ogden City, to register
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Appellant's properties as vacant, Appellant was required to comply with Ogden City
Maintenance Standard and remove the "unlawful signs" on Appellant's property, in
violation of the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. Addendum 3.
The "unlawful signs" were located on the interior of Appellant's building and
were petitions to redress Appellant's grievances with the Administration of Ogden City.
Appellant's arraignment was on January 30,2002, before the Second District
Court, at which time the Court continued the case to February 20,2002, for Appellant to
obtain counsel. R. 003-004.
Because Ogden City failed on January 30,2002, to obtain relief to have
Appellant's signs in Appellant's property removed, Ogden City on February 5,2002,
filed a civil complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in the case
Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards, Civil No. 020900777 before the Honorable Parley R.
Baldwin, seeking a restraining order against Appellant to remove any and all signs on the
interior of Appellant's property.
On February 6,2002, the Winter Olympic torch came down 25th Street Ogden,
were Appellant's properties are located, and where Ogden City hosted the 2002 Winter
Olympic party and events. On February 6,2002, a hearing took place in the Second
Judicial District Court, before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, and the Court entered an
order that Appellant was restrainedfromhaving any sign on any "vacant property" in
Ogden City and was ordered to remove Appellant's petitions located on the interior of
Appellant's property located on 25th Street.
The enforcement of the ordinance and prosecution of Appellant was done in an
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arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory fashion.
On October 1st, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court, of Weber County in the
case Ogden City v. Edwards, Civil No. 020900777 the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin,
ruled on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiffs, motion for partial summary judgment,
the Court stated that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G OMC was unconstitutional on
its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. In said Memorandum the Court stated the Ordinance was "overbroad and
content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction." Addendum 9.
In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah, 1985):
In any event, good intentions do not justify denying a person those rights
established by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this
state. Denial of one's constitutional rights, even though by well-intentioned
persons sworn to uphold the Constitution, may be as damaging to our institutions
as the denial of those rights by those who have illicit intentions.
It is well settled that, Ogden City, has no right to deny Appellant, Appellant's
constitutional rights.
"If any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the
conviction cannot be upheld". Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed a two count information against Appellant
for 2 counts "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations": "1. The windows and glass
doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs
visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9J OMC, Class
B", and "2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent
properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in violation of Section
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,32
may contain errors.

16.B-9.G, OMC Class B". Addendum 5.
Prior to the information filed by Ogden City, Appellant filed a letter on January
15,2002, with Ogden City stating that Appellant's "unlawful signs", were protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Addendum 4, Tt p. 21.
Appellant refused to comply with the letter of January 9,2002, from Ogden City
and register Appellant's buildings and remove the "unlawful signs" in that Appellant's
property was not vacant and Appellant was certain and assured that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and Appellant was dismayed at the unconstitutional actions of Ogden
City.
On October 1,2003, the Second Judicial District Court, Civil No. 020900777 in
the case Ogden City v Edwards the court ruled that 16.8B-10.G was unconstitutional on
its face and stated:
The sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average
American, who, given this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect
for individual liberty and private property, would be surprised to learn that he
could not displayflags,religious symbols, political placards, or even bumper
stickersfromthe windows of his vacant building.
Ogden vs. Edwards Addendum 9, p. 19.
At the time the original information wasfiled,charging Appellant with "unlawful
signs" on January 23, 2002, for the time period of "on or about January 1 thru 12 2002",
Ogden City was interested only in the "unlawful signs". There was no charge to register
or file a plan for a vacant building and the charge for failure to do so was not raised until
March 5,2002, almost 2 monthsfromthe time period Appellant is alleged in violation.
Appellant can not be required as a prerequisite of compliance, with 16.8B to waive
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Appellant's constitutional rights. Therefore Appellant was not required to register a
vacant building under 16.8B and remove the "unlawful signs", pursuant to Ogden City
Code, to assist Ogden City in the depravation of the Appellant's rights, under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Appellant was required by the restraining order of the court to remove the signs on
the interior of Appellant's property from February 6,2002, to October 1, 2003. At all
times during the course of the criminal charges pending against Appellant, Ogden City,
sought to restrain Appellant from petitioning for redress of Appellant's grievance, with
Ogden City Administration, pursuant to the original charges against Appellant on January
23, 2002. The charges that Appellant was convicted of are directly related to the charges
that were filed on January 23,2002, that were unconstitutional and therefore cannot be
enforced against Appellant, as applied to Appellant.
The Appellant reviewed the conditions that required registration and concluded
that the properties in question, did not meet the criteria of being vacant and if they were
registered that Appellant would be deprived of numerous rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah and therefore declined to
register the building(s) as a vacant building(s).
POINT III
-BUILDING(S) WERE NOT VACANTAPPELLANT'S SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE NOT VACANT AND
THEREFORE DID NOT COME UNDER THE REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENT OF THE VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE
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A. DEFINITION OF VACANT
On December 9,2001, Ogden City enacted a municipal ordinance directing that
vacant building within the city be registered by their owners, that a vacant building plan
befiledwith Ogden City and that the property meet maintance standards that Ogden City
set forth. The Appellant is the owner of two adjoining buildings located in the central
business district of Ogden City. Each building has accessfromthe interior into the
adjacent building.
These buildings have been largely used by the Appellant for storage of
construction materials and personal property, for a wood shop, for office use for himself,
for special events and as a political forum and were used "on or about January 1st thru
12th*. Tt Pp. 53-58, 68,126.
16.8A-3: DEFINITIONS:
VACANT:
A. Empty;
B. Not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or
C. Not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for
which a building is designed and lawfully permitted.
Ogden City Code § 16.8A-3
B. INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE
The evidence before the Court did not meet the states burden of proof tofindthat
Appellant's building was vacant. The buildings were not empty; the buildings were
occupied on a regular basisfromJanuary 1st thru January 12,2002. Appellant's
testimony was the buildings were occupied on a daily basis. The buildings were used for
the usual and customary purposes for which Appellant had designed them for and said
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use was lawfully permitted. Storing Appellant's personal property in Appellant's real
property is not a commercial storage unit pursuant to Ogden City's suggestion that it is
not a lawful use of Appellant's property.
The only evidence before the court for the time period of January 1st thru 12th was
the testimony of Mr. Michael McDonald, Ogden City Building Inspector, who stated that
he inspected 207 25th Street on January 9,2002 between 12-1. Addendum 8, Tt 35-42.
Mr. McDonald further stated that "Just nobody appeared to be in there...". When asked
if he inspected the Elborracho (this case) Mr. McDonald stated "yes, I believe I did go by
that, probably - it should have been around the same time". Mr. McDonald did not have
any inspection report on the Elborracho. The only violation that the Building Inspector
stated in his inspection report was "sign in window" which is not a violation.
There was evidence before the court that one window in one building, the Helena,
had been boarded up which the court considered significant. The issue was raised only
after closing arguments and therefore no facts were established as to mitigating
circumstances. Ttp. 134.
Ogden City's definition of vacant is vague that it "fails to inform an ordinary
citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be proscribed", State
v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975).
Judge Baldwin in the case Ogden v. Edwards found;
Ogden argues that, in fact, the ordinance does not prohibit on-site noncommercial
speech because the ordinance covers only vacant buildings, and, by definition,
there is no on-site activity at the premises of a vacant building. However, the
ordinance's broad definition of "vacant" would cover a building where
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noncommercial activities, for example, perhaps religious or political
gatherings, may be held sporadically but not regularly.
Ogden v. Edwards (Utah 2003) Addendum 9.
Ogden City argues on one hand that the building is vacant because there is no
occupancy permit or building permit. The definition of vacant is not predicated on an
occupancy permit or building permit. Ogden City then argues that by definition, there is
no on-site activity at the premises of a vacant building. It was uncontested that Appellant
was using Appellant's property for a variety of activities including storage, office,
woodshop and political forum, all of which are legally permitted.
In the closing statement prosecuting attorney states "[t]hat he's again maybe there
on a regular basis, but it's not for the usual and customary purpose for these particular
buildings and what is set up in the zoning ordinances" and further "Well, I guess there are
clutter and things in it." Ogden City evidence, pictures taken on February 21,2002,
showed that there was furniture, building materials, signs and construction equipment.
Appellant's property has not been used for commercial purposes for over 30 years.
Tt Pp. 91-92,119. The usual and customary use and historical use of the subject property
was as a bordello. Tt Pp. 55,91. But the usual and customary use and the historical use
of the subject property is no longer a "lawful use". Ogden City failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the properties were empty, not occupied on a regular basis, or not
used for its customary use and vacant.
If there has been no commercial use in said building(s) for 30 years or any other
use besides Appellant's use, then the usual and customary use is the use of the Appellant
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and that use has been used by Appellant for 6 or more years. Tt Pp. 91-92, 119.
POINT IV
-BUILDING REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED
IN 10 DAYS FROM NOTIFICATIONVACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE REQUIRES 10 DAY NOTICE TO
OWNER. OGDEN CITY FAILED TO PROVIDE ADQUATE NOTICE.
16.8B-3.A: OBLIGATION TO REGISTER VACANT BUILDINGS:
A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, whenever a building
is vacant for more than ninety (90) days, or whenever any building is
vacant and such building or premises thereof contains one or more "public
nuisance violations", as defined herein, then the owner of such building
shall, within ten (10) days of notification, register such building as a
vacant building and submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is
granted under subsection E of this section.
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-3. Addendum 1.
On January 9,2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager, Wayne
Glover, mailed Appellant a written notice to register Appellant's building(s) within 10
days of Appellant's notification. Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002.
Addendum 3.
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed an information against Appellant for 2
counts "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations" "on or about January 1st thru 12th,
2002". Addendum 5.
Appellant had not received the required notice under Ogden City Code, 16.8B3.A, providing Appellant the 10 day notice when Ogden City charged Appellant with
Zoning Ordinance Violations", "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002".
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Ogden City original information was filed January 23,2002. Appellant was
served on January 24,2002. Appellant received the letter from Ogden City pursuant
16.8B-3.A on January 13,2002. Appellant was served the criminal information for
failure to file before Appellant, was required to file any plan pursuant to 16.8B-3.A.
On March 5, 2002, Ogden City filed its Amended Information charging Appellant
with having violated the zoning ordinances from January 1st through 12th, 2002 and
included 2 additional charges "Failure to register and provide a vacant building plan in
violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3" and "Failure to maintain vacant building
in accordance with the Vacant Building Maintenance Standards OMC, Chapter 8, Section
16.8B-9.J".
Again on October 4,2002 Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information
reducing the charges to infractions with having violated the zoning ordinances from "on
or about January 1st through 12th, 2002".
At no time during the trial did Ogden City move to amend the charges pursuant to
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 d.
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a defendant is entitled to know
"the nature and cause of the accusation against him," Utah Const, art. I, § 12, and "to
sufficient time to prepare adequately for trial." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1221
(Utah 1984). Rule 4 protects a defendant's rights by requiring an indictment or
information setting forth the offense and supporting facts and allowing a defendant to
request a bill of particulars if desired. Utah R. Crim P. 4.
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In order to protect a defendant's right to know the nature of the accusation, several
courts have stressed the importance of providing defendants with sufficient notice and
time to adequately prepare a defense. See, e.g., State v. Seiber, 791 P.2d 18,20 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1989) (noting that amendment of information "must not deprive a defendant of his
due process right to notice and opportunity to prepare a defense").
Appellant was not adequately notified of the theory being used by prosecuting
attorney until closing argument. At all times the prosecuting attorney claimed by
of

tV»

information (8 separate informations) that Appellant "on or about January 1 thru 12 ,
2002" committed the offense but in closing argument states "He's never cured that
particular problem, and therefore we can go forward." Tt p. 17. Thus the court allowed
Ogden City to change the information to charge a different theory than expressed in the
information which violated the procedural safeguards in the criminal process. The
information does not provide for the right to "cure" and Ogden City never expressed that
if Appellant was to cure that Ogden City would dismiss the charges.
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he
was not charged. The reason is apparent: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a
defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Appellant was convicted of a crime which Appellant was not charged. Emphasis Added.
Although it was not necessary to allege the time of the offense under Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 4(b), the prosecutor did include in the information an allegation that
the offense took place "on or about January 1st thru 12,2002." This certainly put
Appellant on notice as to when Ogden City contended the alleged crime(s) had occurred.
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It would be a mockery of the constitutional rights of Appellant to allow Ogden
City to falsely state the particulars of the offense charged and then without amendment
and without giving a Defendant additional time to meet new evidence beyond those
particulars obtain a conviction founded on said evidence.
TIME WAS A CRITICAL ISSUE
Previous cases have permitted a one- to four-day variance where the
approximation "on or about" is used. E.g., In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333,1335 (Utah
1979); State v. Wadman, 580 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Utah 1978); State v. Middelstadt, 579
P.2d 908,910 (Utah 1978). A greater variance is permissible where time is not a critical
issue at trial. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 540-41, 201 P.2d 764, 769-70 (1949) (tenday variance permitted where alibi defense not asserted and where no danger of double
jeopardy existed).
Time was a critical issue at trial. Time is an express statutory element of 16.8B-3.
Appellant was provided with actual notice, letter dated January 9, 2002, that Appellant
received on January 13,2002 that expressly stated that Appellant had 10 days from
notification to register Appellant's properties.
The information(s) charged Appellant with "on or about January 1st thru 12th,
2002" committed "zoning ordinance violations" when in fact Appellant would not have
been in default under the terms of the ordinance until January 24, 2002. Even if the
prosecution was liberally given the benefit of the doubt and a variance often days were
applied Ogden City is still outside the timeframewhen Appellant could have been in
violation of the vacant building ordinance.
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The testimony of Wayne Glover, Building Service Manager, stated that Appellant
was not required to register Appellant's buildings until January 23,2002. Tt p. 114.
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed... by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of
time begins to run shall not be included
When the period of time prescribed or
allowed . . . is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
Appellant received the notice on Sunday, January 13,2002 and therefore the
vacant building plan would not be due till Friday, January 25,2002 or Monday 28, 2002
pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ogden City failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was in
violation of the Vacant Building Ordinance. Ogden City failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant's properties were vacant. Ogden City Amended Ogden
City's information on two occasions and Appellant relied on the information in
establishing Appellant's defense to Ogden City's accusations against Appellant.
Ogden City failed to carry its burden of proof as to the time of the offense;
McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (Utah 1983). In McNair, the Court stated that "time is
always an essential element of a crime" id.
McNair limited this phrase by stating that time is an element only "in the sense
that due process requires that an accused be given sufficiently precise notification of the
date of the alleged crime [so] that he can prepare his defense."
There was a prejudicial variance between the dates alleged in the information and
the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial. By definition, the right to
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constitutionally adequate notice requires that the information given by the prosecution
must be such that the defendant can confidently rely on it in preparing for trial.
Therefore, an essential corollary of the defendant's right to obtain information on the
alleged offense from the prosecution is some rule or doctrine which assures that the
information given is reliable.
Due process requires that an accused be given sufficiently precise notification of
the date of the alleged crime so that he can prepare his defense. Another and more
specific source of a notice requirement is Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
which provides that an accused has the right "to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof." This provision has been held to
require that the accused be given sufficient information "so that he can know the
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his defense."
State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260,262 (Utah 1985); State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 107,108-09,
378 P.2d 352, 353 (1963); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276,280 (1956).
The crux of both theories is that a criminal defendant must be sufficiently apprised
of the particulars of the charge to be able to "adequately prepare his defense." State v.
Burnett, 712 P.2d at 262; McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d at 326.
Appellant was apprised by the information(s) of the allegations of Ogden City that
Appellant was in violation of Ogden City Zoning Ordinance "on or about January 1st thru
12*2002".
Appellant had no notice that there may exist a defect in said information or any
amended information. If the information was defective Appellant had no duty to inform
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the prosecution or to incriminate himself. If the information was defective, the defect
was only established after the fact, after the prosecuting attorney changed Ogden City's
allegations against Appellant in the prosecuting attorney's closing statement.
The prosecution's failure to sufficiently notify Appellant of the factual basis for its
allegations contained in the information left Appellant unable to make pretrial
preparation for a defense or to counter the Ogden City's evidence and arguments at trial.
The right of the nature and cause of the accusation against Defendant, is not just a
right of notice of the prosecution's evidence; more importantly, it is the right of a
defendant not to be confronted with a case that presents a moving target.
The right to adequate notice in the Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to
state the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple
prosecutions for the same crime and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to
prepare a defense. Id. at 1214; State v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425,427 (Utah 1986); State v.
Bundy, 684 P.2d 58,62 (Utah 1984); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 371, 302 P.2d 276,
279 (1956).
POINT V
-RETALIATION—
OGDEN CHARGES AGAIST APPELLANT WERE FOR RETALIATORY
PURPOSES BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS PETITIONING OGDEN FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AND PROTESTING IN VIOLATION OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
Appellant is the only party to be charged with any violation under 16.B. Appellant
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and
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that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
Ogden City entered into an agreement in Second District Court ,whereby
Appellant agreed to remove the signs petitioning Ogden City for redress of grievances for
at period of 60 days. Tt Pp. 139 & 141. Instead of acting in good faith Ogden City,
attempted to suppress and oppress Appellant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States and State of Utah. Ogden City passed a zoning
ordinance without following the statutory procedures, because Ogden City could not do
so before Appellant's deadline of December 12,2001.
Appellant had one sign that stated "Why would anyone do business in Ogden" as
part of Appellant's petition to redress Appellant's grievances to boycott Ogden City.
Said sign was protected by the Constitution of the United States and of Utah.
Because Appellant's properties were located were the 2002 Winter Olympic party
was taking place in Ogden, the Administration of Ogden retaliated against Appellant, for
Appellant's petition for redress directed at the Administration of Ogden City.
Ogden City irrationally and arbitrarily enforced and prosecuted Appellant for
Appellant's, petition for redress with the Administration of Ogden City in violation of
Appellant's rights of equal protection and right to petition guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States. Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
POINT VI
-NONCONFORMING USES AND STRUCTURESOGDEN CITY ORDINANCE PROVIDED FOR THE TERMINATION OF
ALL NONCONFORMING SUES AND FAILED TO PROVIDE A
FORMULA ESTABLISHING A REASONABLE TIM PERIOD DURING
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WHICH THE OWNER CAN RECOVER OR AMORTIZE THE AMOUNT
OF HIS INVESTMENT IN THE NONCONFORMING USE AS PROVIDED
IN UTAH CODE 10-9-408 AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
In addition the ordinance is in violation of Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408,
Nonconforming uses and structures.
Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming uses and structures
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure
may be continued
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building,
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for the
purpose of the extension.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to
a building is not a structural alteration.
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for:
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration,
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions
set forth in the zoning ordinance;
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which the
owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use, if any; and
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring
the billboard and associated property rights through:
(i) gift;
(ii) purchase;
(iii) agreement;
(iv) exchange; or
(v) eminent domain.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 (l)-(2).
That Ogden City's ordinance provided for the termination of all nonconforming
uses, including the use, removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and anything that
would obscure a window which would include curtains, blinds, shades, tenting, partitions
etc., in or on vacant building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable
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time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment
in the nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408.
Ogden City's ordinance failed to provide that a nonconforming use may be
extended through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building is
proposed or made for the purpose of the extension.
That the termination of Appellant's use, signs and window covering that became a
nonconforming use on or about December 9,2001, were not acquired by Ogden City by
either gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent domain.
That Ogden City's ordinance required Plaintiff to remove all signs, on the interior
of Appellant's property including anything that would obscure any window without
providing compensation as provided by Utah Code Annotated. 10-9-408.
Ogden City Code 16.8-B is in violation of Utah Code Annotated. 10-9-408, the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
POINT VII
-PLAN CONDITIONED ON REGISTERINGAPPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF MULTD7LE VIOLATIONS
OF CODE FOR SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE.
On October 18,2002, Appellant was found guilty of "Failure to register a
vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and of
"Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B5, an infraction". R. 023-025
Filing a Vacant Building Plan is predicated on registering a Vacant Building.
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The conduct for each offense is identical and or is so closely related in time and was
incidental to any criminal objective. Therefore failure to register a Vacant Building
would subject the party to multiple punishments.
Proof of failure to file a plan is clearly established by proof of failing to register.
Appellant's violation constitutes a single criminal episode pursuant to 76-1-402.
POINT IIX
-COURT DISMISSED CHARGESTHE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED CHARGES ONE & TWO. THERE
WAS NO CHARGE THREE & OR FOUR IN OGDEN CITY'S SECOND
AMENDED INFORMATION THAT IS THE CONTROLLING
DOCUMENT.
On October 2, 2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information that was
served on Appellant's counsel the day of the trial, (Tt Pp.1) charging Appellant with
having violated the zoning ordinances,from"January 1st through 12th, 2002" and
changing the charges to infractions. In addition the Second Amended Information, was a
2 page information with 2 charges on each page that were identified as 1 & 2 on each
page, eliminating the fourth charge from the Amended Information and amending the
third charge of the Amended Information into two separate charges. Addendum 7.
On November 10, 2003 a review sentencing hearing took place and the court
docket states:
This is the time set for Review of Sentencing after the decision from Appeal Court
received. City will comply with Court of Appelee, Memorandum Decision. By so
doing City moves to dismiss counts 1 and 2. Motion granted. Count 1 and 2
dismissed.
The Memorandum Decision the Court relied on in dismissing count 1 and 2 surely
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must be the Memorandum Decision of Judge Baldwin. This case is replete with errors,
lost documents, errs of the court, amended informations that do not reflect the docket as
to what Appellant was charged with.
On November 26, 2003 the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
Vacate and the Order of the Court was:
In the case of #0219000315
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied.
R. 098, Addendum 11.
Ogden City's Second Amended Information, the final information, is the
controlling document that informs Appellant and the public of Appellant's crimes against
society. Because Appellant was charged with two "count l's" and 2 "count 2's on two
cases and the Court dismissed count 1 and 2 on both cases and Appellant convictions as
to "count 3 and 4" were denied when there was no count 3 or 4 in the Second Amended
Information the Court erred. Since there is no count 3 or 4 and count 1 and 2 of "page 2
of 2"of the Second Amended Information are not the same as count 3 or 4 of the
Amended Information there is no information in the docket that clearly, without a
reasonable doubt would identify the "crime9' Appellant was alleged to have committed,
therefore this Court should dismiss count 1 and 2 for pages 1 and 2 of the Second
Amended Information. Failing to clearly establish what Appellant was convicted of
clearly denies Appellant of due process and denies Appellant, Appellant's rights under
the Constitution of the United States.
The prosecuting attorney on October 17,2002, explained to the Court that
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MR JUNK: maybe I can just explainTHE COURT: All right.
MR. JUNK:- a little bit, maybe make it a little clearer. We did file both of
the informations on 315 and 420. They have four counts, but we've
separated those counts.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JUNK: Two on-and it may not be clear because we have as one and
two, and then one and two, and we probably should have had them as THE COURT: Three and four?
MR. JUNK: -three and four, butThe court having failed to adequately inform Appellant, from the order of the
court, as to the charges and the Second Amended and final information as to Ogden City
Charges against Appellant denies Appellant, Appellant's rights under the Constitution of
the United States.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully request that this Court
strike Ogden City's Vacant Building Ordinance, Ogden City Code 16.8B, as void and
vacate the order of the District CourtfindingAppellant in violation of Ogden City's
Vacant Building Ordinance.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ a y of June 2004.

Bruce C. Edwards
Appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Bruce Edwards, Appellant, hereby certify that on June 14, 20041 served two copies of
the attached Appellants Brief upon Attorney Paul Junk, Counsel for the Appellee in this
matter, by personally hand delivering it to him at the following address:
Mike Junk
Ogden City Attorney
2525 Grant Ave,
Ogden, Utah 84401
Dated: June 14,2004

^

Bruce Edwafcts
Appellant
ProSe
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ORDINANCE NO. 2001-69
AN ORDINANCE OF OGDEN CITY, UTAH, AMENDING CHAPTER 8, TITLE 16 OF THE
OGDEN MUNICIPAL CODE MAKING EXTENSIVE REVISIONS TO THE OGDEN CITY CODE
FOR THE ABATEMENT OF DANGEROUS BUILDINGS, AND, IN PARTICULARLY,
REPEALING ARTICLE B, CONCERNING TEMPORARY BOARDING OF BUILDINGS AND
TEMPORARY BOARDING PERMITS, AND ADOPTING A NEW ARTICLE B REQUIRING THE
REGISTRATION OF VACANT BUILDINGS AND THE SUBMISSION AND APPROVAL OF A
VACANT BUILDING PLAN, ADOPTING STANDARDS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF
VACANT BUILDINGS, AND IMPOSING ADDITIONAL FEES FOR REREGISTRATION WHEN
THE OWNER DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE PLAN AND FOR EACH MONTH THAT A
VACANT BUILDING IS BOARDED; BY REVISING SUBSECTION 16-12-3 REGARDING
CIVIL PENALTIES FOR UNFIT PREMISES VIOLATIONS TO REFLECT THE CHANGES IN
THE REGULATION OF BOARDED BUILDINGS AND VACANT BUILDINGS, AND
INCREASING THE CIVIL PENALTIES TO BE THE SAME AS OTHER FIT PREMISES
VIOLATIONS; AND PROVIDING THAT THIS ORDINANCE SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY UPON PUBLICATION AFTER FINAL PASSAGE.

The Council of Qqden City hereby ordains:
SECTION 1.

Section amended. Section 16-8A-3 of the Ogden Municipal Code is

hereby amended by amending the definitions of "Building Official" and "Boarding or Boarded" to
read and provide as follows:
BUILDING OFFICIAL:

The Manager of the [Inspection] Building Services Division of the
Community and Economic Development Department of the City or
the Manager's duly authorized representative.

BOARDING OR BOARDED: The secured covering of openings to a building or structure to
prevent entrance pursuant to the provisions and standards of
[Article B of] this Chapter due to the nonoccupancy of the building
or structure, which openings are boarded up or secured bv any
means other than conventional methods used in the design of the
building or permitted for new construction of similar type.

SECTION 2. Section amended. Section 16-8A-3 of the Ogden Municipal Code is
hereby amended by adding the following definitions to read and provide as follows:
OPEN:

The condition of a building or structure when not secured against unauthorized
or unlawful entry.

VACANT:

fA) Empty: (B) Not occupied on a regular basis bv an occupant: or (C) Not used
bv a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for which a
building is designed and lawfully permitted.
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SECTION 3. Section amended. Section 16-8A-5 of the Ogden Municipal Code is
hereby amended to read and provide as follows:

16-8A-5.
[Enforcement; Inspections; Right of Entry.]
A.
[Enforcement] The Building Official is hereby authorized to enforce the
provisions of this Chapter. The Building Official shall have the power to render interpretations of
the provisions of this Chapter and to adopt and enforce rules and supplemental regulations in
order to clarify the application of its provisions. Such interpretations, rules and regulations shall
be in conformity with the intent and purpose of this Chapter.
B.
[Inspections.] The Building Official, [tho Building Offioiaro duly authorized
representative,] the Fire Marshal, assistant fire marshals, and health officers of the [Wobor
Morgan] County Health Department are hereby authorized to make such inspections and take
such actions as may be required to enforce the provisions of this Chapter.
C.
[Right of Entry.] When it is necessary to make an inspection to enforce the
provisions of this Chapter, or when the Building Official [or tho Building Official's outhorizod
roprooontativo] has reasonable cause to believe that there exists in a building or upon a
premises a condition which is contrary to or in violation of this Chapter which makes the building
or premises unsafe, dangerous or hazardous, the Building Official* may enter the building or
premises at reasonable times to inspect or to perform the duties imposed by this Chapter,
provided that if such building or premises be occupied that credentials be presented to the
occupant and entry requested. If such building or premises be unoccupied, the Building Official
shall first make a reasonable effort to locate the owner or other persons having charge or
control of the building or premises and request entry. If entry is refused or the Building Official
has been unable to locate the owner or other persons having charge or control of the building or
premises to reouest entry, the Building Official shall have recourse to the remedies provided by
law to secure entry. None of the above requirements are intended to restrict or limit the power
of the Building Official from inspecting or acting upon conditions observed within plain view. The
Building Official may enter a building or premises to abate public nuisances pursuant to the
provisions of this Chapter.

SECTION 4. Subsection amended. Subsection 19 of Section 16-8A-6.B of the Ogden
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
19.
Whenever any building or structure, or portion thereof, is vacant [and] or
open [to unauthorized or unlawful ontry, GO as to constitute ouch building or portion thoroof] and:
a.
One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are missing
or broken;
b.
One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are
boarded up or secured bv anv means other than conventional methods used in the design of the
building or permitted for new construction of similar type, unless boarded in accordance with an
approved vacant building plan pursuant to Article B of this Chapter: or
c.
In such condition that it constitutes an attractive nuisance or
hazard to the public.
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SECTION 5. Section amended. Section 16-8A-10 of the Ogden Municipal Code is
hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
16-8A-10. [Standards for Repair, Vacation and Demolition.] The following standards shall
be followed by the Building Official, or by the Board of Building and Fire Code Appeals in
hearing an appeal, or in ordering the repair, vacation^ [OF] demolition, or securing of any
dangerous building or structure:
A.
Any building or structure declared a dangerous building under this Chapter shall
be made to comply with one of the following:
1.
The building shall be repaired within a reasonable time in accordance
with the current Building Code or other current code applicable to the type of substandard
conditions requiring repair.
2.
The building shall be demolished:
a.
At the option of the building owner;
b.
If the owner has failed to repair within a reasonable period of time;
c.
If the owner has failed to adequately secure the building against
entry or has failed to [board tho building in aocordanco] comply with the requirements of Article
B of this Chapter^, or
d.
If the building constitutes an immediate danger to the life, limb,
health, property or safety of the public and it is either unfeasible, or the owner has failed to
present plans, to repair the building within a reasonable period of time.{r9f]
3. If the building does not constitute an immediate danger to the life, limb,
health, property or safety of the public, it may be vacated, temporarily secured and maintained
against entry; provided, however, that the building shall be secured and maintained in
accordance with the [boarding] requirements of Article B this Chapter.
B.
[Boarding shall not bo concidorod to bo a moans of abatement oxcopt for
buildings determined to bo dangorouo only by roooon of subooction 16 8A 6.B.1Q of this Article.
Otherwise, boarding] Boarding shall be considered to be only a temporary or interim means of
abatement, until such time as the building is repaired or demolished^ [as required horoin] or
otherwise brought into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter.
C.
If the building or structure is in such condition as to make it immediately
dangerous to the life, limb, health, property or safety of the public or its occupants, the building
shall be ordered to be vacated in addition to any other order to repair or demolish.

SECTION 6. Section amended. Section 16-8A-14 of the Ogden Municipal Code is
hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
16-8A-14. [Enforcement of Orders to Repair, Demolish, and/or Secure.]
A.
If, after any unappealed order of the Building Official becomes final or thirty (30)
days after a final decision of the Board made pursuant to this Chapter becomes final, the person
to whom such order is directed shall fail, neglect or refuse to obey such order within the required
time, the Building Official, in addition to any other remedy herein provided or otherwise available
at law, may:
1.
Cause the building to be repaired to the extent necessary to correct the
conditions which render the building dangerous as set forth in the notice and order, in
accordance with Section 16-8A-15 of this Article^ [r^f]
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2.
Cause the building to be demolished and the materials, rubble and debris
therefrom removed and the lot cleaned, in accordance with Section 16-8A-15 of this Article, if: 68A-15 of this Article, if:
a. The notice and order required demolition; or
b. The notice and order required repair or demolition and repair by the
City is determined to be unfeasible., [ret]
3.
Cause the building to be secured against entry [in acoordanco with tho
provisions of Article B of thio Chapter], if the notice and order required that the building be
secured,, [ t]
4. Cause such person to be prosecuted under Section 16-8D-1 of this Chapter, [t
w]
5. Refer the matter to the City Attorney to institute any appropriate action to
abate the nuisance.
B.
Whenever the required repair or demolition work is not commenced within thirty
(30) days after any final notice and order issued under this Chapter becomes final, the Building
Official may cause the building described in such notice and order to be vacated, unless
previously ordered under the provisions of this Chapter, by posting at each entrance thereto a
notice to vacate which shall be in the same form as required under Section 16-8A-11 of this
Article.
C.
[Standards for Boarding.] If the Building Official determines that a building is to
be boarded in order to secure the building against entry, the boarding shall be performed in
accordance with the standards imposed in Section 16-8B-9 of this Chapter.
CL
[Costs.] If the City causes the building to be repaired, demolished, or secured
against entry, the City shall charge the following costs against the property or the property
owner, which costs shall be recovered as provided in Article C of this Chapter:
! A one hundred dollar ($100.00) fee to partially recover the City's costs in
administering the abatement action: and
2. The actual costs of repair, demolition, or securing the building against entry.

SECTION 7.

Subsection amended. Subsection A. 1 of Section 16-8A-15 of the Ogden

Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
1.
When any abatement work by repair or demolition is to be performed by
the City pursuant to Section 16-8A-14 of this Article, except in emergency situations under
Section 16-8D-2 of this Chapter, [and temporary boarding under Section 16 8B 1 of this
Chapter,] the Building Official shall petition the Mayor to hold a hearing and order the property
owner to show cause why the City should not abate by repair or demolition a substandard of
dangerous building or structure constituting a public nuisance. The provisions of this Section
shall specifically not apply to actions taken bv the Building Official in securing a building against
entry.
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SECTION 8. Article adopted. Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code is hereby
amended by repealing Article B in its entirety and adopting a new Article B (entitled "Vacant
Buildings") to read and provide as follows:
16-8B-1.
[Applicability.] This Article shall apply to all vacant buildings or structures within
the City now existing or hereafter becoming vacant.
16-8B-2.
[Purpose and Intent] It is the purpose and intent of this Article to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare bv establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and
requiring responsible parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to remedy
any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent adverse impact on
the value of nearby property, and to establish minimum maintenance standards for vacant
buildings. To such ends, it is the specific purpose and intent of this Article;
A.

To minimize the period of time a building is boarded;

B.
To provide alternative procedures for the abatement of dangerous buildings,
which, if adeouatelv secured and maintained against entrv in accordance with the requirements
of this Article, will not constitute an immediate danger to the life, limb, health, property or safety
of the public;
C.

To prevent vacant buildings from becoming a public nuisance; and

D.
To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings, in order to protect
surrounding properties.
16-8B-3.
[Obligation to Register Vacant Buildings.]
A.
Except as provided in Subsection B. whenever a building is vacant for more than
ninety (90) davs. or whenever any building is vacant and such building or premises thereof
contains one or more public nuisance violations, as defined herein, then the owner of such
building shall, within ten (10) davs of notification, register such building as a vacant building and
submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is granted under paragraph E below.
B.
Whenever any building designed as a single-family dwelling is vacant and such
building or premises thereof contains one or more public nuisance violations, as defined herein,
then the owner of such building shall, within ten (10) davs of notification, register such building
as a vacant building and submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is granted under
paragraph E below.
C.
Notification of the registration reouirement shall be made in writing to the owner
of such property either personally or bv mailing notice first class, postage prepaid, addressed to
the owner at their last know post office address, as disclosed bv the records of the County
Assessor, or at such other address as is known bv the Building Official.
D.

For purposes of this Article, "public nuisance violations" includes:
1.
A building or structure in violation of one or more provisions of Subsection
16-8A-6.B of this Chapter; and
2.
Property maintenance violations pursuant to Chapters 4. 5 and 8. Title 12
of this Code.
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E.
If repair or demolition of the building is reguired under a notice and order issued
pursuant to Section 16-8A-7 of this Chapter, the Building Official mav grant a stay of the
registration requirement for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed ninety (90) days, while
the owner diligently investigates abatement options and prepares plans for abatement The
maintenance standards imposed in Section 16-8B-9 shall be applicable during the stay period.
F.
It is not the intention of this Article to require the initial registration of a building
being actively and dilligentlv constructed or renovated, pursuant to valid building permit issued
by the City, where persons responsible for such construction or renovation are present in the
building on a regular basis; provided that the commencement of repair or rehabilitation pursuant
to a vacant building plan shall not eliminate the continuing reguirement for registration.
16-8B-4.
[Registration of Vacant Buildings.]
A.
The owner registering a vacant building shall supply the following information on
a form provided by the Building Official:
1.
The address of the vacant building;
2.
The name, address, and telephone number of the owner;
3.
The name, address and telephone number of a person authorized to act
as an agent for the owner for performing the owner's obligations under this Chapter, who lives
within forty (40) miles of the City;
4.
Legal description and tax parcel identification number of the premises on
which the building is situated.
5.
Date on which the building became vacant;
6.
The vacant building plan;
7.
A description of the condition of the building and the landscaping of the
surrounding property.
B.
The initial vacant building registration shall be accompanied bv a filing fee of one
hundred dollars ($100.00). together with anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8.
C.

Registration of a vacant building shall be valid for a period of six (6) months.

D.
If the building is vacant at the expiration of anv registration period and
reouirements of the vacant building plan are not completed, or have not otherwise been met,
then the owner shall re-register such building and oav a re-reaistration fee of five hundred and
seventv-one dollars ($571.00). together with anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8. If
the building is vacant at the expiration of anv registration period and the reouirements of the
vacant building plan are completed and otherwise met, the owner shall re-reoister such building,
paving anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8. without filing a new vacant building plan
or paving a filing fee.
16-8B-5 [Vacant Building Plan J
When a building is registered as required herein, the owner or agent shall submit a vacant
building plan. The plan shall contain the following;
A.
A plan of action to repair anv doors, windows, or other openings which are
boarded or otherwise secured bv anv means other than conventional methods used in the
design of the building or permitted for new construction of similar type. The proposed repair
shall result in openings secured bv conventional methods used in the design of the building or
bv methods permitted for new construction of similar type.
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B.
For building and premises which are identified as being or containing public
nuisance violations unrelated to improperly secured openings, a plan of action to remedy such
public nuisance violations.
C.
For each required plan, a time schedule shall be submitted identifying a date of
commencement of repair and date of completion of repair for each improperly secured opening
and identified public nuisance violations.
D.
If the owner proposes to demolish the vacant building, then the owner shall
submit a plan and time schedule for such demolition.
E.
If the owner proposes to repair the vacant building, then the owner shall submit a
plan and time schedule for such repair.
F.
A plan of action to maintain the building and premises thereof in conformance
with the provisions of this Article.
G.

A plan of action to maintain the building against unlawful entry.

16-8B-6. [Review, Approval or Modification of Vacant Building Plan; Appeal.]
A.
The Building Official shall have sole discretion to approve the vacant building
plan in accordance with the standards and reouirements of this Article, and Article 8A of this
Title.
B.
The Building Official shall, upon notice to the vacant building owner or agent,
have the authority to modify the vacant building plan bv altering the dates of performance or the
proposed methods of action.
C.
If the owner or agent of the vacant building objects to the modifications made bv
the Building Official, such owner shall have the right to appeal to the Board for final
determination. Such appeal shall be filed with the Building Official within ten (10) days of receipt
of the Building Official's notice of modification.
D.
The Board, after considering the testimony of the Building Official, the building
owner, and any other interested person, shall render its decision on the owner's appeal of the
Building Officiars modifications to the proposed vacant building plan. The Board shall have the
authority to fashion its own vacant building plan or approve the plan submitted bv the owner or
the plan as modified bv the Building Official. The decision of the Board shall be final and
constitute the approved vacant building plan.
16-8B-7.
[Standards Governing Review.]
In considering the appropriateness of a vacant building plan, the Building Official and the Board
shall consider the following:
A.
The purpose and intent of this Article to minimize the period of time a building is
boarded or otherwise vacant.
B.

The affect of the proposed plan on adjoining property.

C.

The general economic conditions of the community.
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D.

The financial resources of the owner.

E.

The cost to implement the proposed plan.

F.

The length of time the building has been vacant.

G.

The presence of anv public nuisances on the property.

H.
The relative hardship on or gain to the public as contrasted and compared to the
hardship or gain of the owner resulting from approval or modification of the proposed plan.
16-8B-8.

[Mitigation Fees.]

A.
The owner shall pay, along with the registration fee, a boarded building fee of
fifty-five dollars ($55.00) for a single-family dwelling or one hundred dollars ($100.00) for anv
other type of vacant building, for each month that a building is boarded, which fee shall be due:
1. At initial registration:
a. for each month during the registration period that the building is proposed
to be boarded under the vacant building plan.
b. for each month, after notification of the registration reguirement that the
owner failed to register as reguired herein:
2. At re-registration:
a.
for each month that the building was boarded during the prior
registration period, for which fees were not previously paid.
b.
for each month during the registration period that the building will be
boarded under the approved vacant building plan
c.
for the entirety of the upcoming registration period, if the vacant
building plan is not completed in accordance with the plan.
3. If the owner fails to register, at the end of each month, after notification of the
registration reguirement that the owner fails to register as reguired herein.
(X
[Refunds.]
The Building Official shall refund anv of the above amounts
applicable to future months, if the building is not boarded in anv respect for the entirety of such
month. In no event shall the owner be charged more than once for the same month.
(X
[Failure to Pay Fees.]
If the property owner fails to register or pay the
boarded building fee, the City may take legal action to collect anv amounts owed.
16-8B-8.
[Change of Ownership.]
The approved vacant building plan shall remain in
effect notwithstanding a change in ownership. The new owner is reguired to file a revised
registration form with the Building Official for the applicable registration period, and supply the
name and address and telephone number of the new owner(s), agent or local representative.
The revised registration shall be in the same form as the original registration and shall remain in
effect for the remainder of the registration period applicable to the original registration. No filing
fee is required for the filing of the revised registration form.
16-8B-9.
[Maintenance Standards.] Anv vacant building, whether or not subject to a
vacant building plan, shall be maintained in accordance with all of the following maintenance
standards:
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A,
[Boarding.] If a building is boarded, the building shall be boarded in the
following manner:
1.
[Plywood Sheathing; Exterior-Grade Chipboard.]
All openings in
the structure on the first two (2) floors, other openings easily accessible from the ground, and
openings with broken glass, shall be secured either bv erecting a single one-half inch (1/2")
thick layer of plywood sheathing, or exterior-grade chipboard, covering over all exterior
openings, overlapping the opening on every edge bv three inches (3"). nailed along the edges
bv eight-penny common nails or egual spaced even/ six inches (6");
Z
[Wood-Frame Construction.]
Alternately, the openings may be
secured bv conventional wood-frame construction. The frames shall use wood studs of a size
not less than two inches bv four inches (2" x 4") (nominal dimension) placed not more than
twenty four inches (24") apart on center. The frame stud shall have the four inch (4") sides or
the wide dimension perpendicular to the face of the wall. Each side of the frame shall be
covered with plvwood sheathing of at least one-half inch (1/2") thickness or eouivalent lumber
nailed over the opening bv using eight-penny common nails or egual spaced every six inches
(6") on the outside edges and every twelve inches (12") along intermediate stud supports:
3.
[Painting.]
All coverings shall be painted with the same color as the
building or its trim and maintained in accordance with paragraph D below.
EL
[Exterior Doors; Secured.] Exterior doors or windows of a vacant building shall
be adeguatelv locked to preclude entry of unauthorized persons, or shall be covered as an
opening described in subsection A.1 or A.2 of this Section.
CX
[Landscaping; Lawn.]
Existing landscaping and lawn on the premises of a
vacant building shall be maintained in the manner otherwise reouired bv law.
[X
[Exterior Walls; Surfaces.] Exterior walls and surfaces of a vacant building
must be properly maintained. Any exterior surface which has previously been treated with a
weather coating material such as paint or stain shall be maintained in good condition free from
faded or peeling paint or other coating material. Severely weathered, peeling or unpainted
wood or damaged siding or roofing must be replaced or repaired with similar materials and
colors.
E.
[Snow Removal.]
Snow must be removed from public sidewalks surrounding
the premises of a vacant building in the manner otherwise reouired bv law.
F.
[Utility Connections.] Although service may be discontinued and meters locked
off during vacancy, all pre-existing meters and service lines for water, sewer, electric and oas
shall be maintained on the premises of a vacant building, unless eliminated or replaced as part
of the approved vacant building plan.
a

[Signage.]
1.
The owner of a vacant building shall remove all signage relating to
persons or businesses no longer occupying the premises, in accordance with the reouirements
of Subsection 18-1-9.B of this Code, except that signs having historic significance, as provided
in subsection 3 below, may be retained.
2.
A vacant building and the premises shall be kept free of all interior or
exterior signs, displays or graffiti visible from adjacent public streets, sidewalk or adjacent
properties, except for:
a.
Property sions. as defined in Section 18-1-3 of this Code and
complying with the reguirements of Title 18 of this Code;
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b.
b.

Signs depicting the building address;
Signs having historic significance, as provided in subsection 3

below; and
c.
Off-premise signs, installed and maintained on the building or
premises in accordance with the provisions of Title 18 of this Code.
w
3.
Sions having historic significance" shall mean a sign:
a.
Related to a building either designated as a historic resource or
located within a historic district, pursuant to Title 17 of this Code; and
b.
Determined bv the Ooden City Landmarks Commission as
significantly contributing to the historic character of such building or district.
4.
For purpose of this subsection, "signs, displays or graffiti" shall include
anv presentation of words, letters, figures, designs, pictures or colors, which are not a part of
the architectural design of the building.
K
[Interior Maintenance.] The interior of a vacant building shall be kept free from
any accumulation of rubbish or garbage, and shall be maintained in a clean and sanitary
condition.
I
[Property Maintenance Violations.] The exterior premises of a vacant building
shall be maintained in accordance with all ordinances of the City regarding the maintenance of
property, including, but not limited to. the recuirements of Chapters 4. 5 and 8. Title 12 of this
Code.
J.
[Obscuring of Windows.] The windows and glass exterior doors of a vacant
building shall not be painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the
interior of the building; provided that the Building Official mav order that windows or glass doors
are to be obscured with a solid coat of paint as part of maintenance work to be performed bv the
City under Section 16-8B-10:
1.
If the Building Official determines such action is necessary in order to
temporarily obstruct the view of interior conditions otherwise in violation of this Section, until
such time as such conditions can be remedied under an approved vacant building plan; and
2.
The Citv cannot readily access the interior of the vacant building in order
to correct such conditions.
16-8B-10.
[Failure to Maintain.]
A^
[Notice; Action By City.]
If the Building Official determines that a vacant
building is not being maintained in accordance with Section 16-8C-9 of this Article, either in
whole or in part, the Building Official shall send a notice to the owner or the owner's agent bv
first class mail, prepaid, reguirino compliance with the building maintenance standards within
ten (10) davs. If the maintenance work is not performed within the required time, the Building
Official mav cause the maintenance work to be done bv Citv personnel or bv a contractor hired
bv the Citv. Such notice mav occur whether or not the vacant building is subject to an approved
vacant building plan, and mav be sent in conjunction with a notice to register the building as a
vacant building under Section 16-8B-3.
EL
[Charges To Property Owner.]
If the Building Official causes maintenance
work to be done pursuant to Subsection A above;
1.
The Citv shall charge the property owner:
a.
An administrative fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) to partially
re cover the City's costs in administering or contracting for the maintenance of the building
and/or premises; and
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b.
2.

The actual costs of maintaining the building and/or the premises.

The costs shall be collected as provided under Article C of this Chapter.

16-8B-1!
[Existing Boarded Buildings.]
Au
[[Compliance Required.] Owners of vacant buildings who obtained a
boarded building permit from the Citv. prior to
. 2001. [insert date of passage]
pursuant to the former provisions of this Article, shall register the building and comply with the
new reouirements of this Article bv the expiration date of such permit; provided, that the owner
of anv such vacant building shall still be subject to the maintenance standards imposed in
Section 16-8B-9.
E3L
[Notification To Owners.] The Building Official shall take reasonable actions
to notify the owners of buildings subject to a boarded building permit as of
. 2001.
[insert date of passage] informing the owner of the enactment of this new Article, the revised
maintenance standards, and the reguirement to register as a vacant building upon expiration of
the permit.
16-8B-12.
[Appeals.]
Anv person aggrieved bv a decision of the Building Official
pursuant to the provisions of this Article, may appeal the decision in accordance with the appeal
procedures provided in Section 16-8A-12 of this Chapter.
16-8B-13.
[Building Permits and Inspections Required.] Whenever a property owner,
agent of the owner, manager or tenant intends to clean, repair, renovate, reopen or reoccupv a
building that is registered as a vacant building, the building is to be inspected and a permit must
be issued bv Building Official prior to the building owner, agent, manager, or tenant initiating anv
of the above actions. Anv person conducting anv work on a building that is registered as a
vacant building must have a copy of the permit on the site at all times. Anv person conducting
work without a permit on the site, will be evicted from the premises.
16-8B-14.
[Enforcement of Other Laws or Notice and Orders.]
A.
This Article shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of other laws,
codes, ordinances, and regulations which prescribe standards other than are provided herein.
and in the event of conflict, the most restrictive provision shall apply.
B.
Registration of a vacant building shall not stay enforcement of anv existing notice
and order reouirino repair or demolition of the building: or prevent issuance of subsequent or
supplemental notice and orders, requiring the securing, repair or demolition of the building in
accordance with the provisions and standards of this Chapter.
16-8B-15.
[Distribution of Vacant Building Registry.] The Building Official shall provide
a registry of vacant buildings to the police department, the fire department, and to other officials
in the Citv who may provide services to owners of vacant buildings.

SECTION 9. Subsection amended. Subsection A of Section 16-8C-1 of the Ogden
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows;
A.
[Account Of Expense And Filing Of Reports; Contents.] The Building Official
shall keep an itemized account of expenses incurred by the City in the performance of
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abatement [by] work authorized [by an ordor of the Mayor undor this Chapter or boarding undor
Soction 16 8B 1] under the provisions of this Chapter. Within ten (10) days of the completion of
[the] such abatement work [of demolition or repair as ordered by tho Mayor, or tho boarding
undor Section 16 8B 1 of this Chapter], the Building Official shall prepare and file with the City
Treasurer a report specifying the work done, the itemized and total cost of the work to be
reimbursed, a description of the real property upon which the building or structure is or was
located, and the name and addresses of the property owner joined as a party in the abatement
proceeding or otherwise entitled to notice pursuant to this Chapter.

SECTION 10. Section amended. Section 16-8D-1 of the Ogden Municipal Code is
hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
A.
[Nuisances.] It shall be unlawful for any owner or occupant of any lot, tract or
parcel of land to cause or permit any nuisance as defined in Section 16-8A-6 of this Chapter to
be created or remain, upon such premises; and it shall be the duty of such owner or occupant to
abate and remove any such nuisance from such premises.
B.
[Buildings In Violation.] It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, construct,
enlarge, alter, repair, move, improve, remove, convert or demolish, equip, use, occupy or
maintain any building or structure or cause or permit the same to be done in violation of this
ChapterfGedel.
C.
[Unlawful Entry.] No person shall remain in or enter any building which has
been posted pursuant to Section 16-8A-11 of this Chapter or subsection 16-8A-14B of this
Chapter, except that entry may be made to repair, demolish or remove such building under
permit. No person shall remove or deface any such notice after it is posted until the required
repairs, demolition or removal have been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued
pursuant to the provisions of the Building Code, if applicable.
D.
[Refusal To Comply.] It shall be unlawful for any person to fail, neglect or refuse
to obey any order made pursuant to this Chapter.
E.
[Interference With Authorized Representative.] No person shall obstruct,
impede or interfere with any officer, employee, contractor or authorized representative of the
City or with any person who owns or holds any estate or interest in any building which has been
ordered repaired, vacated or demolished under the provisions of this Chapter, whenever such
officer, employee, contractor or authorized representative of the City or person having an
interest or estate in such building or structure is engaged in the work of securing, repairing,
vacating [and repairing,] or demolishing any such building, pursuant to the provisions of this
Chapter, or in performing any necessary act preliminary to or incidental to such work or
authorized or directed pursuant to this Chapter.
jR
[Non-compliance With Vacant Building Requirements.] It shall be unlawful for
an owner of a vacant building to fail to:
1.
Register or reregister such building in accordance with the requirements
of Article B of this Chapter.
2.
Comply with the approved vacant building plan for such building, in
accordance with the requirements of Article B of this Chapter, or
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3.
Section 16-8B-9.

Maintain such building in accordance with the standards imposed under

SECTION 13. Subsection amended. Subsection 16-12-3.C.2 of the Ogden
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows:
2. Ogden City Code For Abatement Of
Dangerous Buildings (Chapter 8 of this
Title):
Causing or permitting any
dangerous building nuisance to be
created or remain, or failure to
abate such nuisance as provided
under subsection 16-8D-1A of
this Title

25.00

100.00

Failure to register or reregister a vacant building
in accordance with the requirements of Article B.
Chapter 8 of this Title fFailuro to obtain a oormit
for o boordod building, undor Section 16 8B 2
of thioTitlo]

25.00

[§0£Q] 100.00

Failure to comply with an approved vacant building
plan in accordance with the reouirements of Article
B. Chapter 8 of this Title [proporlv socuro a boordod
building under Soction 16 8B 5 of this
Title].

25.00

[50.00] 100.00

Failure to maintain a [boarded] vacant
building [undor] in accordance with the
reouirements of Section 16-8B-[§]9 of this Title

25.00

[50.00] 100.00

SECTION 14. Effective date. This ordinance shall become effective immediately
upon publication after final passage.
PASSED, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED by the Council of Ogden
City, Utah, this

4 t h day of December

, 200.1..

-Acl
John W.

£%
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Agenda and Minutes: Detail
Ogden City Council
Tuesday, December 4, 2001

Council Chambers - Third Floor
Municipal Building, 2549 Washington Boulevard
December 4, 2001 - 5:00 p.m.
City Council Chambers - Third Floor Municipal Building,
2549 Washington Blvd.

1. Roll call.
2. Pledge of Allegiance.
3. Moment of silence.
4. Introduction of guests.
5. Request to be on the Agenda
a. Shelleice Stokes, Top of Utah Committee - presentation of Olympic flag and banners
6. Reports from the Planning Commission
a. Consideration of Proposed Ordinance #2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden
Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden City Code for the abatement of
dangerous buildings, and, in particularly, repealing Article B, concerning temporary boarding of
buildings and temporary boarding permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration
of vacant buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan, adopting
standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing additional fees for re-registration
when there the owner does not comply with the plan and for each month that a vacant building is
boarded; by revising Subsection 16-12-3 regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to
reflect the changes in the regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and increasing
the civil penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations. (Adopt/not adopt ordinance - roll
call vote)
7. New Business
a. Fleet Division Management Audit Contract (Approve/not approve contract- voice vote)
8. Administration Reports
a. Proposed Resolution #2001-34 considering an amendment to the Annual Action Plan:
(Adopt/not adopt resolution - roll call vote)
9. Comments
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a. Administration
b. Councilmembers
c. Council Staff
10. Public Comments: This is an opportunity to address the Council regarding your concerns or
ideas. Please limit your comments to three minutes. In this form of government, all City personnel
are the responsibility of the Administration, not of the Council. Please discuss any concerns you
may have regarding staff with the Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer, or Department Directors.
11. Adjournment

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, persons needing auxiliary communicative
aids and services for these meetings should call Wayne Parker at 629-8701, giving him at least
48 hours advance notice. Hearing impaired individuals may call the TDD# 629-8949.
CERTIFICATE OF POSTING
The undersigned, duly appointed City Recorder, does hereby certify that the above notice and
agenda was posted in three public places within the Ogden City Limits on this 30th day of
November, 2001. These public places being: 1) City Recorder's Office on the 2nd floor of the
Municipal Building; 2) 2nd floor foyer of the Municipal Building; and 3) the Weber County Library.
GLORIA J. BERRETT,
MMC OGDEN CITY RECORDER
Visit the Ogden City Web Site ©www.ogdencity.com
Ogden City Council Information Hot Line - 629-8159
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Community and Economic Development
Building Services Division

Offden

January 9,2002
Westland Development L.L.C.
2962 N. 725 W.
Layton,Ut 84041
•p

RE: 205 25th St.
Dear Sir or Madam:
Recently the Ogden City Council adopted a new ordinance regulating vacant buildings. The main purpose of
the new ordinance is to prevent vacant buildingsfrombecoming a public nuisance or a dangerous building
due to neglect The ordinance requires the owner of a vacant building to register as a vacant building and to
submit a vacant building plan for die approval of the City. The ordinance also imposes minimum
maintenance standards applicable to all vacant buildings whether registered or unregistered.
As the building official of Ogden City, I have determined that the building, located at 205 25th St is a vacant
building subject to the requirements of the ordinance. As the owner of that building you are required to
register the building within ten days of this notification, and otherwise begin to comply with the
requirements of the ordinance. A copy of the ordinance is attached for your information.
Initial registration will require the submission of a vacant building plan, meeting the requirements of Section
16-8B-5, and a registration fee in the amount of $100.00, along all other information required in the
ordinance (See Section 16-8B-4). You should be aware that additional fees will be applicable to vacant
buildings that remain "boarded." Re-registration of the building is required every six months and fees will
be determined based upon compliance with the vacant building plan and whether the building continues to be
boarded.
You should also be aware that we have identified thefollowing violations) ofthe maintenance standards,
which should be corrected immediately:
1.

The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a
manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building, in violation ofSection 16-8B9J ofthe Ogden Municipal Code.

2.

Unlawful signs visiblefrom adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed
in the windows of the building, in violation of section 16-8B-9J.

Failure to correct the above violations within the required time period may result in the City correcting
the violations and imposing a tax lien against the property to recover its costs. Failure to comply is also
a Class B misdemeanor and may result in the imposition of civil and/or criminal penalties.
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My staff and I are eager to assist you with the registration process and in preparing the vacant building plan.
We are also available to discuss any questions you may have about the maintenance standards and the other
requirements of the ordinance.
Sincerely,

Wayne Glover, CBO
Manager, Building Services
2549 Washington Boulevard Suite 240
Ogden, Utah 84401-3102
Phone: 801 629-8950
Fax: 801 629-8902
Email: wayneglover@ei. ogden. ut. us
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January 15,2002
Ogden City
2549 Washington Blvd., Suite 240
Ogden, Utah 84401

Dear Mr. Glover
I received your letter of January 9,2002 on January 13,2002. Please be informed
that the ordinance regulating vacant buildings is defective.
The "unlawful signs" under said ordinance are protected under the First
Amendment: of the United States Constitution. "Congress shall make no law...abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances". Said signs under the First
Amendment do not constitute a public nuisance. Ogden City is not above the
Constitution even though there are many within the Ogden City Administration that
believes they are.
If for any reason, any party enters any property, I will seek criminal recourse with
the appropriate Federal Agency and will file civil action for violating my Civil and
Constitutional Rights against each and every party for each occurance.

Bruce Edwards

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r

(i « I Iffl —
I
I ^ I

OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

's.

CRIMINAL NO.

EDWARDS

BRUCE

Defendant.

C&\%01?&

U.B.I NO.

DOB:
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON T O BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT T H E ABOVE NAMED
DEFENDANT, O N OR ABOUT January 1st , t h r u . . l 2 t h , 2002 , A T
»05 25TH S T
WTHIN T H E C O R P O R A T E LIMITS O F O G D E N CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH, COMMITTED THE
DFFENSE OF:
COUNTS OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS:

. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility
ito the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B

Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in
olation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B

:nesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based;
icer(s)

PRESENTED AND FIUED THIS:
Wednesday, January 23,2002

GLOVER
MAGISTRATE

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
CLERK
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u I A M , VVLbbK COUNTY, Ov JEN DEPARTMENT

OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation
AMENDED

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

Vs.

CRIMINAL NO.

EDWARDS

.BRUCE

Defendant

flj/tf£03/^5

U.B.I N O .

DOB:

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT
205 25th St.
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE
OFFENSE OF:
4 COUNTS OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS:

1. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility
into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B

2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in
violation of Section 16.8B-9. J OMC Class B

3. Failure to register and provide a vacant building plan in violaiton of OMC Chapter 8 Section 16-8B-3 Class B

4. Failure to maintin vacant building in accordance with the Vacant Building Maintenance Standards OMC Chapter 8, Section 168B-9.J Class B

Witnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based;
Officer(s)

PRESENTET^ND FILED THIS:
Tuesda}, March 05, 2002

GLOVER
MAGISTRATE
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OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation
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Page 1 of 2
AMENDED

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

Vs.

i, CRIMINAL NO.

EDWARDS

021900315

l

<J

.BRUCE

U.B.I NO.

Defendant.

• ^j'-wo-BCGu'fir

DOB:

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT

205

ABOVE NAMED

25th S t .

WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE
OFFENSE OF:
OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS

I. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into
tie interior of the building in violations of Section 16-8B-10.J OMC Infraction

I Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in
n'olation of Section 16.8B.10.G OMC Infraction

by Ogden City Prosecutor

PRESENTED AND
tnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based;

FILED THIS:

Wednesday, October 02, 2002

Rcer(s) GLOVER
%

MAGISTRATE

CLERK
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OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation

Page 2 of 2
AMENDED

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

Vs.

CRIMINAL NO.

EDWARDS

.BRUCE

021900315

U.B.I NO.

Defendant.

DOB:
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT
205 25th S t .
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE
OFFENSE OF:
OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS

1. Failure to register a vacant building in violation of OMC Chapter 8 Section 16.8B-3 Infraction

"..(*•

2. Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5 Infraction

/(

, fir a >

4,'

Authorized for filing by Ogden City Prosecutor

PRESENTED AND FILED THIS:
Witnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based;
Officer(s)

Wednesday, October 02, 2002

Glover
MAGISTRATE

CLERK
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ogden City
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

OGDEN CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,

]

Plaintiff,

BRUCE EDWARDS, an individual,
and WESLAND DEVELOPMENT
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
v.

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

Civil No. 020900777 PR

]
1
]
]

Honorable Parley R. Baldwin

J

OGDEN CITY and MATTHEW
GODFREY, Mayor of Ogden City,
Counterclaim Defendants.

)
)
)

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, Ogden City ("Ogden"), initiated this action against
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Bruce Edwards and Wesland Development LLC
("Edwards"), the owners of vacant buildings located on 25th Street in Ogden. Ogden Municipal
Code § 16-8B-10(G) (2003) bans the owner of a vacant building in Ogden from displaying any
sign at that vacant property. Ogden seeks a preliminary injunction against Edwards, who at
various times since the adoption of the ordinance, has used his property to display signs that
criticized Ogden City government. Edwards claims that the ordinance violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he seeks summary judgment declaring the
ordinance unconstitutional on its face and enjoining its enforcement. Because the ordinance is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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over-broad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction, the Court grants
Edwards summary judgment.
I. THE ORDINANCE.
In December 2001, the Ogden City Council passed Ordinance 2001-69, 12-4-2001, to
address the increasing menace of vacant buildings, which the ordinance says can become
attractive nuisances, fire hazards, health hazards, places of retreat for criminal or immoral
purposes and a visual blight, detracting from the aesthetics of the city and the surrounding
properties.1 The ordinance defines a vacant building as a building that is "(A) Empty; (B) Not
occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or (C) Not used by a person on a regular basis for the
usual and customary purposes for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted." § 16-8A3. It requires the owner of a vacant building to register the building, § 16-8B-4, file a plan to
maintain or repair the building, § 16-8B-5, and keep the building secured, § 16-8B-10(B), and its
windows not obscured, § 16-8B-10(J).
The ordinance also requires the owner to remove all signs relating to former occupants of
the building and to keep the premises free of "all interior or exterior signs, displays, or graffiti
visible from adjacent public streets, sidewalk or adjacent properties," except property signs,
street address signs, historical signs, and off-premises signs. §16-8B-10(G).
The Municipal Code defines "property signs" as:
A sign related to the property upon which it is located and offering such property
for sale or lease, or announcing the destruction, construction or remodeling of a
building, or announcing the enterprise to be allocated in a building under
construction, or announcing the name and address of the architect, contractor, or

Although Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff elsewhere alleges that Ogden had additional,
improper motives in adopting the ordinance, the parties have stipulated to limit this challenge to
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other professional involved in the design or construction of the building, or the
owner thereof.
OGDEN MUN. CODE

§ 18-1-3.

For a historical sign to qualify for the exemption, the building on which it is located must
be designated as a historic resource or located in the city's historic district, and it must
significantly contribute to the historic character of the historic building or district, as the Ogden
City landmarks commission determines. § 16-8B-10(G)(3).
The Municipal Code defines "off-premises sign" as a sign "which directs attention to a
use, products, commodity or service not related to the premises on which [the sign] is located."
§ 18-1-3. Effective August 20, 2001, Ogden banned new off-premises signs, although it allowed
the continued use, maintenance, and restoration of then-existing off-premises signs. § 18-3-27.
In 2002, Ogden amended the ordinance to allow the building official to either grant
further exceptions for window dressings in vacant buildings that are part of temporary film sets
for filming purposes, or to deny applications for such exceptions if the window dressings are, in
the building official's discretion, inconsistent with the purposes and intent of the ordinance's
vacant buildings article.

II. FACIAL CHALLENGE BASED ON OVERBREADTH
The parties have stipulated for the purposes of summary judgment that Edwards
challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face. Ogden contends that much of
Edwards' argument is inapplicable and that, in order "[t]o prevail on a facial challenge brought
on overbreadth grounds, 'the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [challenged legislation] would be valid.'" Countercl. Def.'s Resp. Countercl. PL's
Supplemental Mem.Digitized
Supp.byMot.
Partial Summ. J. at 7-8 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Salerno speaks not of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge but rather
of a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(e), a portion of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984.2
However, Faustin v. Citv and County of Denver. 268 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2002), which
Ogden cited in accord with Salerno, sets forth a different standard for a facial challenge based on
overbreadth grounds:
To prevail on a facial attack, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged
law either could never be applied in a valid manner or, even though it may be
validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it may
inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. There must be a
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially
challenged on overbreadth grounds.
Id. at 948 (emphasis added)(internal quotes and citations omitted).
Thus, in this facial overbreadth challenge, the Court examines Ogden's ordinance to
determine whether there is a realistic danger that the ordinance itself will significantly
compromise First Amendment protections either of Edwards or of parties not before the Court,
without examining the actual application of the ordinance to Edwards.
III. TIME-PLACE-MANNER RESTRICTION

2

The quoted material along with the two sentences following it clarify that Salerno has no
applicability:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail
Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not
recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added).
Thus, Ogden's invocation of Salerno in the First Amendment context misstates the law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ogden contends that the ordinance is justifiable as a time-place-manner restriction. For
such a restriction to meet constitutional muster, it must be content-neutral and narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest while leaving open adequate alternative means of
communication. Edwards argues that the Ogden ordinance is content-based and overbroad, does
not advance the City's stated interest, and almost entirely forecloses a medium of speech. The
Court analyzes each of those arguments in turn.
A. Content-Neutrality
Clearly, a content-neutral ordinance may not discriminate against speech because of the
viewpoint of the speaker. However, the parties dispute the extent to which an ordinance may
examine content in order to classify speech.
Edwards argues that where it is necessary to examine the specific content of speech in
order to determine whether that speech violates a regulation, that regulation is content-based.
Ogden argues that, where an ordinance makes only a viewpoint-neutral precursory examination
of sign content in order to classify speech into one of several regulatory categories, that
ordinance is content-neutral.
A governmental restriction of speech may violate the Constitution either by prohibiting
too much protected speech, see City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994), or by prohibiting
too little speech, see id., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. 453 U.S. 490, 512-17 (1981).3
3

The notion that an ordinance may impermissibly ban too little speech is somewhat
misleading. "[W]e do not imply that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not abridge
enough speech." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. More accurately, such an ordinance carries
too great a risk of governmental discrimination. Justice Stevens explained:
While surprising at first glance, the notion that a regulation of speech may be
underinclusive is firmly grounded in basic First Amendment principles. Thus, an
exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a
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Edwards argues that the distinctions between the categories of signs that are permitted or banned
are specious and that, therefore, the ordinance's exceptions make it unconstitutional. Ogden
argues that, under the holdings of Metromedia, Wheeler v. Comm'r of Hwvs. 822 F.2d 586 (6th
i

Cir. 1987). cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988), and Rappa v. New Castle County. 18 F.3d 1043
(3d Cir. 1994), the exceptions are all based on a permissible distinction between messages with
on-premises significance and messages with off-premises significance.
Rappa and a line of cases following it, including Wheeler and Messer v. City of
Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), stand for the proposition that ordinances allowing
on-site signs but not similar off-site signs regulate signs "not based on the viewpoint of the
speaker, but based on the location of the signs." Messer, 975 F.2d at 1509. Such ordinances may
in fact be viewpoint-neutral. However, where an ordinance treats two signs at the same location
differently solely because their messages are different, the ordinance is neither based on the
location of the signs nor content-neutral.
"An ordinance is content-based if it 'prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech addresses,' that is, where the municipal officer must examine the
content of the speech to determine the applicability of the ordinance." Savago v. Village of New
Paltz. 214 F. Supp. 2d 252, 257 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S.
377, 381 (1992) (holding St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance unconstitutional on its face)
and citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 (invalidating as content-based an ordinance prohibiting

in expressing its views to the people. Alternatively, through the combined
operation of a general speech restriction and its exemptions, the government
might seek to select the permissible subjects for public debate and thereby to
control the search for public truth.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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noncommercial signs except for certain classes of signs)). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First Amendment's hostility to contentbased regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition
of public discussion of an entire topic."); Whitton v. City of Gladstone. 54 F.3d 1400, 1403-04
(8th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has held that a restriction on speech is content-based when
the message conveyed determines whether the speech is subject to the restriction."); Nat'l Advert.
Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F. 2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1990) (exceptions for political signs, inter
alia, were content-based; Sugarman v. Village of Chester, 192 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302 (S.D.N. Y.
2002) ("The First Amendment proscribes municipal favoritism of one form of speech over
another...."); Outdoor Svs.. Inc. v. City of Merriam, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1258,1264 (D.Kan. 1999)
(Where determining whether a sign was banned by an ordinance required consideration of the
message that the sign carried, the ordinance was content-based.).
Although the Supreme Court has never followed the Third Circuit's decision in Rappa,
and neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Utah Supreme Court has adopted Rappa, the present Court
still would be free to apply Rappa's reasoning were it persuasive. However, the Court believes
that Savago more accurately interprets Metromedia and is both better reasoned than the Rappa
cases and more closely analogous to the present case. Therefore, because Savago correctly
follows Metromedia, it provides a proper analysis of whether Ogden's ordinance is contentbased.
The determination of whether Ogden's ordinance is content-neutral focuses on the
exceptions to the ordinance's otherwise complete ban on all signs on vacant buildings. If the
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ordinance banned all signs, without exception, it would be content-neutral. However, Ogden
chose instead to allow some signs and ban others based solely upon their content.
The Court holds that, because the ordinance requires an official to examine the content of
signs to determine whether they fit under an exception to the ordinance, it is content-based.
B. Serving a Significant Government Interest
In order for a time-place-manner restriction to be upheld, the government must show that
the regulation serves a significant governmental interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491
U.S. 781,791(1989).
Here, Ogden claims that its ordinance is intended "to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare . . . to remedy any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and
consequent adverse impact on the value of nearby property, and to establish minimum
maintenance standards for vacant buildings." § 16-8B-2. The ordinance further states, "[I]t is the
specific purpose and intent of this article:... D. To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant
buildings, in order to protect surrounding properties." Id
Aesthetics alone has never been determined to be a compelling government interest
sufficient to justify a content-based ordinance. However, aesthetics would be a sufficiently
substantial interest to support a content-neutral time-place-manner regulation. See Members of
the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806-807 (1984) (holding that
aesthetics justified time-place-manner restriction). Moreover, Ogden does not offer aesthetics
alone to justify the ordinance, but also the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, which
are certainly significant government interests, and even rise to the level of compelling interests.
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However, it is not enough that the interest be sufficiently significant, but the ordinance
must also serve that interest. Otherwise, any onerous regulation might be justified by citing the
most vital government interest, whether or not the regulation actually related to achieving that
interest. Here, a regulation banning signs is reasonably related to achieving the City's aesthetic
interest but may be only marginally related to public health, safety, and welfare. For example,
Ogden argues that vacant buildings pose health and fire hazards and are attractive nuisances,
either by deterioration or by serving as a place of retreat for criminal or immoral purposes. It is
unclear how the absence of a sign could lessen any of these hazards. On the contrary, to the
extent that a vacant building poses an easy target for illegal entry, a "space available" or "for
sale" sign (allowable under the ordinance) likely would attract more potential lawbreakers than
would a "protected by ABC Security" sign or one bearing a political message (both forbidden
under the ordinance).
To serve a significant government interest, an ordinance need not take every possible step
toward accomplishing that interest, so long as there is a direct relationship between the steps that
the ordinance does take and the end it intends to accomplish. The fact that the ordinance does not
take other steps does not make the ordinance illegitimately underinclusive. However, the steps
that the ordinance does take must be directly related to that interest. Thus, the signs that Ogden
does ban must tend to bring Ogden closer to achieving the stated goals of the ordinance.
The Court finds that the sign ordinance does serve significant government aesthetic
interests, but it is not reasonably related to the interests of public health, safety, and welfare, not
withstanding §16-8B-2's vague assertions to the contrary.
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Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Metromedia, aesthetic judgments are
necessarily subjective and defy objective evaluation, 453 U.S. at 510, and, where made in the
discretion of the government, may conceal discrimination. With this principle in mind, this Court
carefully considers the exceptions to the ordinance.
Under Metromedia and the cases following it, in order for an exception to be legitimate,
the exception must further an interest that is at least as great as the governmental interest that the
regulation furthers. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047 ("Such exceptions must also be substantially
related to advancing an important state interest that is at least as important as the overall goal
advanced by the underlying regulation, be no broader than necessary to advance the special
interest, and be narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible on the overall goal.");
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (allowing San Diego to conclude that a commercial enterprise had a
stronger interest in identifying its place of business and the products or services available there
than the city had in traffic safety and aesthetics). See also Outdoor Svs., 67 F. Supp.2d at 12671268 (M[I]f a commercial message overrides the city's aesthetics and safety interests, any message
that is at least as important in the First Amendment hierarchy also must override those interests.")
(quoting Ackerley Communications of Mass.. Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 517 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding the city, because it made exceptions for commercial signs "could not decide
that its aesthetic and safety interests were outweighed by the need to express commercial
messages but not by the need to express noncommercial messages" because "noncommercial
speech is entitled to a higher degree of protection than commercial speech.")).
Before weighing the interests of the exceptions against the interest of the regulation and
the speech it affects, the Court notes that some First Amendment interests weigh more strongly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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than others. Generally, noncommercial speech outweighs commercial speech, see Metromedia
453 U.S. at 513, a speaker has a weightier right to speak on the speaker's own property than he
does on public property or the property of another, see Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58, and a commercial
business has a greater interest in on-premises speech promoting itself than in a sign promoting an
off-premises entity, see Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Further, a person has a greater interest in
speech at his residence than at his vacant commercial building, and more there than on his freestanding billboard in a field adjacent to a highway.
The Supreme Court consistently has held that noncommercial speech deserves a greater
degree of First Amendment protection than does commercial speech. See id., 453 U.S. at 513. In
fact, prior to 1975, purely commercial advertisements were outside the protection of the First
Amendment. See id. at 505. Although the Supreme Court now recognizes the need for greater
protection of commercial speech, see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)
(holding that a court must still weigh the First Amendment implications of a regulation, even
though the regulated speech was categorized as "commercial"); Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Citizens Consumer Council 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not
"wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment"); Linmark Associates v. Township of
Willingoboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) ("[T]he societal interest in the free flow of commercial
information is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the commercial information here
is realty" instead of abortions or drugs); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 419 (1993) ("In our view, the city's argument attaches more importance to the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously
underestimates the value of commercial speech."), there is still a difference in the greater
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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protection given to noncommercial speech and the lesser protection given to commercial speech,
see Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 426 (holding that the interest in preventing commercial harms is a
typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than
noncommercial speech).
While the distinction between the protection of commercial speech and that of
noncommercial speech is not as great as it once was, the trend has been to afford more protection
to commercial speech rather than lessening the protection afforded noncommercial speech. In the
face of this trend, the Metromedia court warned against allowing the narrowing distinction to
diminish the protection of noncommercial speech:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of
the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have
afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression.
453 U.S. at 506 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
Now that courts are recognizing the societal interest in the free flow of commercial
information, courts must also zealously preserve the time-proven societal interest in the free flow
of ideas. Particularly in today's world, where purveyors of commercial speech likely will have
greater resources and abilities to protect their rights than will the advocate of an unpopular
noncommercial message, Courts have good reason to ensure that noncommercial speech receives
at least as much First Amendment protection as does commercial speech.
1. Property Signs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The exception for property signs under the ordinance is vulnerable to challenge because it
has the effect of allowing on-site commercial speech where noncommercial speech of the same
type is prohibited. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 ("[TJhe city may not conclude that the
communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a
particular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages.").
Ogden argues that, in fact, the ordinance does not prohibit on-site noncommercial speech
because the ordinance covers only vacant buildings, and, by definition, there is no on-site activity
at the premises of a vacant building. However, the ordinance's broad definition of "vacant" would
cover a building where noncommercial activities, for example, perhaps religious or political
gatherings, may be held sporadically but not regularly. Under those circumstances, the ordinance
would ban signs pertaining to those activities. Thus, even under Rappa, the Ogden ordinance
impermissibly would prefer on-site commercial speech over on-site noncommercial speech.
Further, the Eleventh Circuit, developing Rappa's line of reasoning, has held that "all
noncommercial speech is on-site. A sign bearing a noncommercial message is on-site wherever
the speaker places it." Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow. 112 F.3d 1114
(1 lth Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 820 (1998).
Moreover, the Metromedia plurality struck down the billboard regulation in that case not
merely because it preferred on-site commercial speech over similarly on-site noncommercial
speech, but rather because it preferred on-site commercial speech over noncommercial speech of
any type. 453 U.S. at 513.
By exempting property signs, Ogden City must have concluded that its interests in
aesthetics and public health, safety, and welfare were not important enough to justify banning all
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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commercial speech in the form of property signs. In light of such a conclusion, Ogden cannot
conclude that those same interests justify banning all noncommercial speech where they are not
strong enough to ban all commercial speech; if some commercial speech is too important to ban,
then noncommercial speech is too important to ban.
2. Address Signs
In exempting address signs from the ban, Ogden implicitly concluded that address signs
are more important than the both the government interest furthered by the ordinance and the
speech foreclosed by the ban. Considering the obvious importance of address signs, the Court
concludes that this exception is reasonable.
3. Historical Signs
In accordance with the principle, advanced by Rappa, that signs bearing messages
relating to the property where the sign is located enjoy greater First Amendment protection than
both (1) signs bearing the same messages located elsewhere, and (2) signs located on the same
property bearing messages that are not related to that property. The city has allowed exceptions
for signs on the premises of a building that is located within the historic district or that is
designated a historic resource, so long as the sign relates to that location and is determined by the
Ogden City landmarks commission to significantly contribute to the historic character of the
building or the historic district. §16-8B-10(G)(3).
In exempting approved historical signs from the ban, Ogden again implicitly concluded
that the content of those signs was more important than both the aesthetic interests that the
ordinance serves and the noncommercial speech that the ordinance banned.
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The fact that historical signs are meaningless and have no value away from the premises
to which they refer tends to support Ogden's decision. The ordinance values city-approved
historical signs, at those locations at least, more highly than all other forms of speech. In light of
the absence of objective guidance to cabin the discretion of the Ogden City landmarks
commission in approving the signs and the subjective aesthetic interests that the ordinance
serves, Ogden's preference for approved signs is highly suspect. As the Supreme Court noted in
Ladue, "An exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a
governmental 'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing
its views to the people.'" 512 U.S. at 51 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S.
765,785-86(1978)).
The only criteria in the ordinance for the landmarks commission to consider is, whether
in the committee's own judgment, the sign is "significantly contributing to the historic character"
of the building or district. §16-8B-10(G)(3)(b). Ogden has not shown that the landmark
committee's discretion is restricted by any applicable standard. See Acorn v. City of Tulsa, 835
F.2d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 1987) (Holding that municipal Park Board's own intuitive judgment,
"however well exercised, is an insufficient standard to be applied in determining the
permissibility of first amendment activities."); Outdoor Svs., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (striking
down ordinance similar to Ogden's where it gave municipal committee discretion to approve or
deny a sign permit application).
Further, such exemptions may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for
restricting speech in the first place. See Ladue, 512 U.S. at 52. In other words, the government's
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justification for the ban certainly can be no stronger than the weakest interest to which the
government grants an exemption.
Because the ordinance gives the city officials too much discretion in excepting historical
signs, and because the ordinance impermissibly favors city-approved messages over all other
forms of speech on private property, the historical sign exception is unconstitutional.
4. Grandfathered Off-Premises Signs
The Ogden ordinance allows exempts off-premises signs that legally existed on August
20, 2001. §§16-8B-10(G)(2)(d) and 18-3-27(A). Ogden claims that the ordinance required this
exemption in order to comply with state law, UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 10-9-408, to avoid a taking

under eminent domain, which could subject the city to costly and time-consuming litigation. The
text of the key subsection of that law reads: "(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company
from maintaining, repairing, or restoring a billboard structure . . . the municipality's actions
constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent domain

M

§10-9-408(3) (emphasis added).

Tailoring municipal action to avoid an eminent domain taking and thus avoiding
inadvertent, involuntary, and prohibitively costly eminent domain proceedings outweighs
Ogden's stated aesthetic interest in the ordinance and would justify a narrow exemption to
comply with state law. However, the exemption goes too far.
That chapter of state law defines "billboard" as "a freestanding ground sign located on
industrial, commercial, or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to direct
attention to a business, product, or service that is not sold, offered, or existing on the property
where the sign is located.4
4

By defining billboards as "free-standing ground signs" and excluding signs on buildings
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The Municipal Code defines "off-premises signs" as "A sign which directs attention to a
use, product, commodity or service not related to the premises on which it is located." OGDEN
MUN.CODE§

18-1-3.

Thus, by exempting off-premises signs in legal existence on August 20, 2001, Ogden
grandfathers not only free-standing ground signs,5 but all commercial signs with off-site
messages. The Court finds that this exemption of commercial messages where there is no similar
exemption for noncommercial messages is unconstitutional. Further, it would be unconstitutional
even under Rappa because it exempts off-site commercial messages while prohibiting off-site
noncommercial messages.
5. Temporary Filming Activities
Since the filing of this action, Ogden has amended its ordinance to allow temporary signs
on vacant buildings in the context of window dressings for film sets. While it is reasonable for
Ogden to conclude that allowing signs to be displayed for filming purposes does not detract from
the purposes of the ordinance, it is not clear how the signs displayed for filming purposes pose
less of a threat to the city's aesthetics than the signs that the ordinance prohibits, or what purpose
this exemption serves that is greater than Ogden's stated aesthetic interest.

billboards. Such a distinction may favor a holding that a property owner has a greater interest in
speech on his building than on a billboard. If that is the case, then perhaps some of the principles
of billboard law cited in this case may not strictly apply. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 ("Each
method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself and that law must reflect the 'differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.") (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77,
97(1949)).
5

The state law might also arguably restrict the statutory eminent domain taking to
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Ogden's arguments in support of the exemption illustrate the problem with regulations
that require an examination of a sign's message to determine whether or not the sign violates the
regulation. Ogden not only would have the Court examine sign content to determine whether a
sign's message is on-site or off-site, commercial or noncommercial, but also to determine
whether the sign is fictitious. Ogden argues that, because the film set signs are fictitious, they are
not communicative under the First Amendment. Further, the fictitious signs convey no message
until they are published in the resulting production. This specious argument defies reason.
The Court finds that the exception for film set signs is an impermissible content-based
discrimination between forms of noncommercial speech.
C. Narrow Tailoring
To be narrowly tailored toward serving a significant government interest, an ordinance
regulating speech need not be the least restrictive means available toward achieving that interest.
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 ("[Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are
not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech.") (internal quotations omitted). The regulation need only promote a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. See id. at 799.
However, if a substantial portion of the regulation's burden on speech does not serve to advance
its goals, that regulation is not narrowly tailored. See id.
Arguably, Ogden has shown that its stated purpose - improving the aesthetics of vacant
buildings - would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Now, driving through
Ogden, one notes that vacant buildings look bare instead of cluttered, although the prevalence of
"for sale" or "available" signs is striking.
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The fact that Ogden's ordinance prohibits only signs on vacant buildings, not occupied
buildings, does not impugn the ordinance in light of the stated purpose of the ordinance - "to
improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings," OGDEN MUN. CODE §16-8B-2(D)
(emphasis added), and in light of Title 18 of the Municipal Code, §§ 18-1-1 to 18-5-1, which
regulates signs on occupied buildings and includes a ban on the construction of new off-premises
signs after August 20, 2001. Thus, the Municipal Code does not appear to target signs on vacant
buildings while ignoring signs on occupied buildings.
However, while the means chosen to regulate speech need not be the least restrictive, if
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to a restriction on speech, that is
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between the ends and means is
reasonable. See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 418 n. 13.
Significantly, Ogden chose to ban signs outright rather than regulating the size, height, or
typeface of the sign, or describing a maximum percentage of window space allowable for signs,
or mandating maintenance or removal of signs that have become deteriorated or faded, as other
cities have done. Absent a satisfactory reason for an outright ban, such size or format restrictions
are more appropriate for a time-place-manner restriction.
Further, Ogden has not justified its complete ban by showing that each activity with in
the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. The
sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average American, who, given
this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect for individual liberty and private
property, would be surprised to learn that he could not display flags, religious symbols, political
placards, or even bumper stickers from the windows of his vacant building.
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Because a substantial portion of the ordinance's burden on speech does not advance its
goals, the Court holds that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve its legitimate
purpose.
D. Ample Alternatives
Even a content-neutral regulation may be invalid if it does not leave open ample
alternatives of communication. See Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55 ("Although prohibitions foreclosing
entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose
to the freedom of speech is readily apparent - by eliminating a common means of speaking, such
measures can suppress too much speech.")
Here, the Ogden ordinance completely forecloses the owner of a vacant building from
posting signs on his own property. Edwards argues that this will effectively remove such an
owner from the public debate. A sign on a building is a particularly cheap and expressive form of
communication. In particular, a sign on a vacant building explaining the owner's opinion of the
political reasons that the building is vacant could not have the same impact on a reader anywhere
else. Further, no other medium is as effective as communicating the building owner's message to
those who live, work, or frequent the immediate vicinity of the vacant building. Handing out
handbills is not as effective, nor is contacting neighboring merchants or passers by one at a time.
A building owner cannot control his access to or coverage in a newspaper. Building signs are
unique in the context of their location, audience, and impact, and a regulation that bans them
completely denies a building owner an unequaled opportunity to participate in the public debate
in the neighborhood and city where his building is located.
IV. SEVERABILITY
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The remaining issue is whether to strike the content-based exceptions of paragraphs
(G)(2) and (3), all sign regulations of subsection 10(G), or the entire vacant building ordinance of
Article 16-8B.
In determining whether an unconstitutional portion of an ordinance is severable from the
remainder of the ordinance, Utah's Supreme Court has said that "we look to legislative intent."
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 19. "Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is
primarily a matter of legislative intentf,] which generally is determined by whether the remaining
portions of the act can stand alone and serve a legitimate legislative purpose." Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted, alteration in original). The
Supreme Court has also said, "[T]he test fundamentally is whether the Legislature would have
passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts are so dependent
upon each other that the court should conclude the intention was that the statute be effective only
in its entirety. Frequently the courts are aided in the determination of legislative intent by the
inclusion within a statute of a 'saving clause.'" Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P.2d 190, 193
(1949).
The Municipal Code contains such a "saving," or severability, clause,6 which indicates
the City Council's intent that any unoffending portions of an unconstitutional ordinance should

6

If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase of this Code
is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, invalid or ineffective by any court of
competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the
remaining portions of this Code. The City Council hereby declares that it would have
passed each section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence, subdivisions,
paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases thereof irrespective of the fact that any one or
more sections, subsections, subdivisions, paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases be
declared unconstitutional, invalid or ineffective.
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survive. However, to do so, the remaining portions of the enactment must be able to stand alone
and serve a legitimate legislative purpose. Removal of the exemptions of 16-8B- 10(G)(2) and (3)
would drastically alter the effect of subsection (G). Without the exceptions, subsection (G) would
completely ban all signs on vacant buildings and, as shown above, would constitute too great an
infringement of free speech rights on private property and would not leave open ample
alternatives of communication. The remaining application of subsection (G) would be overbroad
and burden more speech than necessary to accomplish the legitimate governmental purpose of
improving the aesthetics of vacant buildings.
However, after the removal of subsection (G) in its entirety, the remaining portions of
Ogden's vacant building ordinance would stand alone and would be consistent with the legitimate
legislative purposes for which they were enacted. Further, the remaining portions of the vacant
building ordinance are not challenged here. Therefore, the Court strikes down the entire sign
regulation of subsection (G) as unconstitutional, but in doing so, severs subsection (G) from §
16-8B-10, leaving the remainder of Article 16-8B intact.
It is so ordered.
DATED this

/

day of October, 2 0 0 3 . ^ - - ^

Parley R. Baldwin
District Court Judge

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bruce Edwards
Pro Se
P. O. Box 1886
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: (801>603-9094
SECOND DISTRICT COURT-OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

OGDEN CITY, a governmental entity,
I
1

PLAINTIFF,

vs.

;

>
>
)

BRUCE C. EDWARDS

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and Vacate
Case No: 021900315 and
021899315
Judge: CITY JUDGE

DEFENDANT

Plaintiff, Bruce Edwards, pro se, respectfully requests this Court for entry of an
Order dismissing Plaintiffs informations and vacating the previous order of the Court
and granting such other andfiirtherrelief to which this Courtfindsthe Defendant
otherwise entitled. Grounds for this Motion are stated in Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate.

1. DATED this 21 day of October, 2003

Plaintiff
ProSe
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Bruce Edwards
ProSe
P.O. Box 1886
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: (801)-603-9094
SECOND DISTRICT COURT-OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,

OGDEN CITY, a governmental entity,

]
)
)
I

PLAINTIFF,

vs.

;

1
)
l

BRUCE C. EDWARDS

Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and Vacate
Case No: 021900420
Judge: CITY JUDGE

DEFENDANT

Defendant, Bruce Edwards, pro se, respectfully submit the following
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate.
In short, the Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Vacate should be granted because
Ogden City failed to follow Utah State Code to enact ordinance #2001-69 amending
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code and that the Second District Court ruled
that 16-B-10-J is unconstitutional on its face.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. That;
Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001 adopted #2001-69 amending Chapter
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden
City Code for the abatement of dangerous buildings, and, in particularly,
repealing Article B, concerning temporary boarding of buildings and temporary
boarding permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration of
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vacant buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan,
adopting standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing
additional fees for re-registration when there the owner does not comply with the
plan and for each month that a vacant building is boarded; by revising Subsection
16-12-3 regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to reflect the
changes in the regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and
increasing the civil penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations.
2. That the notice amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal code was posted
on 30th day of November, 2001 by the Ogden City Recorder, Gloria J. Berrett
3. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16 was approved as to form by Andrea
W. Lockwood, Chief Deputy City Attorney Civil Division, on December 5,2001.
4. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16, was transmitted to the Matthew
Godfrey, Mayor of Ogden, and approved on December 6,2001.
5. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16; was published on December 9,2001
and became effective on December 9,2001.
6. That no other notice other than the posting on the 30th day of November, 2001, by the
City Recorder, of said amended ordinance was provided to the public.
7. That Ogden City filed multiple violations for having "unlawful signs" and "obscuring
windows" which were amended on numerous occasions against Defendant in that
Defendant committed the offense of zoning ordinance violations.
8. That Ogden City ordinance 16-8B is a zoning ordinance.
9. That Utah Code Annotated, Zoning Districts 10-9-405;
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction
into zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict the
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and
structures, and the use ofland.
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each
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class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one
district may differ from those in other districts.
10. That under Utah Code Annotated Ordinance 16-8-B is provided for under Cities and
Towns, Municipal Land Use Development and Management, Zoning or section 10-9-4.
11. That Ogden City new zoning ordinance has attempted to have vacant buildings
determined as a separate class.
12. That Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, "regulate(s) and restrict the erection,
construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings,55 those of vacant
buildings.
13. That Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402, Preparation and adoption;
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the legislative
body a proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the zoning
ordinance and maps, that represents the commission's recommendations for
zoning all or any part ofthe area within the municipality.
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning
ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission.
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice ofthe public hearing
at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails
notice of a proposed zoning change to property owners within that
municipality within a specified distance of the property on which the zoning
change is being proposed, it shall also mail equivalent notice to property
owners of an adjacent municipality within the same distance of the property
on which the zoning change is being proposed.
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may:
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed;
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as
amended; or
(c) reject the ordinance.
14. That Ogden City Council failed to hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning
ordinance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402.
15. That Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402.
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16. That Ogden City Council failed to have the planning commission prepare and
recommend to the legislative body the proposed zoning ordinance.
17. Utah Code Annotated 10-9-403, Amendments and rezonings.
(1) (a) Hie legislative body may amend;
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district;
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance.
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this
subsection unless the amendment was proposed by the planning
commission or isfirstsubmitted to the planning commission for its
approval, disapproval, or recommendations.
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section 109-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance or the
zoning map.
18. That Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated 10-9-403-1 -B in that Ogden City Council failed to submit said amendment to
the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or recommendations.
19. That Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah
Code Annotated 10-9-403-2 in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the
procedure specified in Section 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the
zoning ordinance.
20. That Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402 pursuant to 10-9-403-2 in amending Chapter
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code.
21. That Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming uses and structures;
(1)

(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure
may be continued
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building,
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for
the purpose of die extension.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to
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a building is not a structural alteration.
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for:
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration,
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and
conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance;
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use, if any; and
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring
the billboard and associated property rights through:
(i)gift;
(ii) purchase;
(iii) agreement;
(iv) exchange; or
(v) eminent domain*
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard companyfrommaintaining,
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or
vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by
eminent domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v)»
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove a
billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with
reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the
legislative body finds that
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading
statement in his application;
(b) the billboard is unsafe;
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or
22. That Ogden City's ordinance provided for the termination of all nonconforming uses,
removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and anything that would obscure a window
which would include curtains, blinds, shades, tenting, partitions etc., in or on vacant
building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable time period during
which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408.
23. Ogden City's ordinance failed to provide that a nonconforming use may be extended
through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or
made for the purpose of the extension.
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24. That the termination of Plaintiffs signs and window covering that became a
nonconforming use on or about December 9,2001, have not been acquired by Ogden
City by either gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent domain.
25. That Ogden City's ordinance required Plaintiff to remove all signs and or billboards,
on the interior of Plaintiff s property including anything that would obscure any window
without providing compensation as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408.
26. That Ogden City failed to provide Plaintiff with reasonable notice of proceedings and
or an opportunity for a hearing as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408.
27. That Ogden City would not have been able to find the facts necessary to remove
Plaintiffs sign(s) and or "obscuring of windows" in that no permit was required in that
the sign(s) were located in the interior of Plaintiff s property, the sign(s) and or window
covering were not unsafe nor were the sign(s) and or "obscuring of windows" in an
unreasonable state of repair.
28. That on February 6,2002, Ogden City, filed in the Weber County District Court
Civil No. 020900777 an action against the Defendant
29. That on October 1, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court Civil No. 020900777 in
the Weber County District Court ruled that 16-8B-10-G was unconstitutional on its face.
A true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
30. That" The sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average
American, who, given this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect for
individual liberty and private property, would be surprised to learn.... (Ogden vs
Edwards Page 19).
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On December 9,2001, Ogden City enacted a municipal ordinance directing that vacant
building within the city be registered by their owners, that a vacant building plan be filed with
Ogden City and that the property meet maintaince standards that Ogden City setforth. The
Appellant is the owner of two adjoining buildings located in the centeral business district of
Ogden City. These buildings have been largely used by the defendant for storage of construction
materials and personal property, for a wood shop,for office use for himself and as a political
forum. On January 9,2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager mailed
defendant a written notice to register his building within 10 days of defendants notification.
Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002. As a condition of registering Ogden city had
determined that the signs on the interior of Appellant's property, that stated "Ogden City
Administraton has no integrity" etc., were "unlawful" and had to be removed and any window
that was obscured had to be unobscured. Appellant personally delivered to Ogden City on
January 15,2002 a letter that stated that Appellant's signs were "protected by the Constitution of
the United States". On January 23,2002 Ogden City filed an information charging Appellant
with "2 counts Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations: 1. The windows and glass doors on
the building are painted or otherwise obsecured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the
interior of the building, in violation of Secton 16-8B-9.J OMC, Class B, and 2. Unlawful signs
visiblefromadjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows
of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B". The Appellant reviewed the
conditions that required regristration and concluded that the properties in question did not meet
the criteria and if they were registered that Appellant would be deprived of numerous rights
guaranteed under the Constitutions of the United States and of Utah and therefore declined to
register the building as a vacant building. On March 5,2002, and again on October 2,2002,
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In addition Defendant knew said ordinance was unconstitutional and Plaintiff
knew or should have known that the ordinance and actions of Plaintiff were
unconstitutional. That on October 1,2003, the Second Judicial District Court Civil No.
020900777 in the Weber County District Court ruled that 16-8B-10-G was
unconstitutional on its face. That Defendant can not be required as a prerequisite of
compliance with 16-8B waive Defendant's constitutional rights. Therefore Defendant
was not required to register a vacant building under 16-8B and remove the "unlawful
signs" pursuant to Ogden City Code to assist Ogden City in the depravation of the
Defendant's rights under the Unites States Constitution and the Constitution of the State
ofUtah.
In addition the ordinance is in violation of Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408,
Nonconforming uses and structures and raises other constitutional issues but because said
ordinance is void Defendant refrains from further wasting this Court's time with other
arguments on the unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs informations must be dismissed and the
order of the court vacated.
Respectfully submitted*
DATED this 2 day of October, 2003.

Plaintif
ProSe
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH

OGDEN CITY,
Plaintiff (s),

ORDER

vs.
Case No.: 021900315
021900420

BRUCE EDWARDS,
Defendant (s).

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and vacate the convictions.
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Memorandum of Law and
having heard oral arguments from both parties, enters the following
ruling:

In the case of #0219000315:
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3
and 4 is denied.
In the case of #021900420:
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted.
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3
and 4 is denied.
Dated thisyj2_JL_day of

EH&TE W. JONES
cc:

file
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INDEX
United States Constitution
United States Constitution, Amendment I

1

United States Constitution, Amendments V

1

United States Constitution, Amendments XIV

1

Utah Constitution
Utah Constitution Article I, § 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]

1

Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]

1

Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]

1

Utah Constitution Article I, § 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.]

2

Utah Code
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-102. Purpose

2

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401. General powers

2

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402. Preparation and adoption

3

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings

3

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-404. Temporary regulations
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II

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
United States Constitution, Amendments 1
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging thefreedomof speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
United States Constitution, Amendments V
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendments XIV
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Utah Constitution
Utah Constitution Article I, § 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicatefreelytheir thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
Utah Constitution Article I, § 7. [Due process of law,]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
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Utah Constitution Article I, § 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Utah Constitution Article I, § 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press.
Utah Code
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-102. Purpose.
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in order to provide for the health, safety,
and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order,
comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of the municipality and its present and future
inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, secure economy in governmental
expenditures, foster the state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and
nonurban development, and to protect property values, municipalities may enact all
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and
development of land within the municipality, including ordinances, resolutions, and rules
governing uses, density, open spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and
air, air quality, transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure,
public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those ordinances,
resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401. General powers.
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use
and development that furthers the intent of this chapter.
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402. Preparation and adoption
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the legislative body a
proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and
maps, that represents the commission's recommendations for zoning all or any part of the
area within the municipality.
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning ordinance
recommended to it by the planning commission.
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14
days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails notice of a proposed zoning
change to property owners within that municipality within a specified distance of the
property on which the zoning change is being proposed, it shall also mail equivalent
notice to property owners of an adjacent municipality within the same distance of the
property on which the zoning change is being proposed.
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may:
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed;
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as
amended; or
(c) reject the ordinance.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings.
(1) (a) The legislative body may amend:
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district;
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance,
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this subsection
unless the amendment was proposed by the planning commission or is first submitted to
the planning commission for its approval, disapproval, or recommendations.
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section 10-9-402 in
preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance or the zoning map.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-404. Temporary regulations.
(1) (a) A municipal legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an ordinance
establishing a temporary zoning regulation for any part or all of the area within the
municipality if:
(i) the legislative body makes a finding of compelling, countervailing public
interest; or
(ii) the area is unzoned.
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(b) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (l)(a) may prohibit or regulate the
erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of any building or structure or
subdivision approval.
(c) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (l)(a) may not impose an impact fee
or other financial requirement on building or development.
(2) The municipal legislative body shall establish a period of limited effect for the
ordinance not to exceed six months.
(3) (a) A municipal legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an ordinance
establishing a temporary zoning regulation prohibiting construction, subdivision
approval, and other development activities within an area that is the subject of an
Environmental Impact Statement or a Major Investment Study examining the area as a
proposed highway or transportation corridor.
(b) A zoning regulation under Subsection (3)(a):
(i) may not exceed six months in duration;
(ii) may be renewed, if requested by the Utah Transportation Commission created
under Section 72-1-301, for up to two additional six-month periods by ordinance
enacted before the expiration of the previous zoning regulation; and
(iii) notwithstanding Subsections (3)(b)(i) and (ii), is effective only as long as the
Environmental Impact Statement or Major Investment Study is in progress.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405. Zoning districts.
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction into
zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to carry out the
purposes of this chapter.
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict the
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and
structures, and the use of land.
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class or
kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ
from those in other districts.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures.
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure may be
continued.
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, provided no
structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for the purpose of the extension.
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to a building is
not a structural alteration.
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for:
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(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or
substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions set forth in the zoning
ordinance;
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by providing a formula
establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the
amount of his investment in the nonconforming use, if any; and
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring the billboard
and associated property rights through:
(Ogift;
(ii) purchase;
(iii) agreement;
(iv) exchange; or
(v) eminent domain.
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard companyfrommaintaining, repairing, or
restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or vandalism, the
municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent domain under
Subsection (2)(c)(v).
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove a billboard
without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with reasonable notice of
proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the legislative body finds that:
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading statement in his
application;
(b) the billboard is unsafe;
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months.
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school district property
when the property ceases to be used for school district purposes.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode
— Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is
so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.

Ogden City Code
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2: Title 15 Purpose, Zoning Regulations.
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals
and the general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of Ogden City, state of Utah,
including, amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in the streets, securing safety
from fire, panic and other dangers, encouraging energy efficient patterns of development,
the use of energy conservation, solar and renewable energy sources, and assuring access
to sunlight for solar energy devices, providing adequate light and air, preventing the
overcrowding of land, avoiding undue concentration of population, facilitating adequate
provision for transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements,
providing for the classification of land uses. These regulations shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its
Ogden City Code § 16-8A-3. Definitions.
VACANT:
A. Empty;
B. Not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or
C. Not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for
which a building is designed and lawfully permitted.
Ogden City Code § 16-8B-2: Vacant Buildings Purpose and Intent.
It is the purpose and intent of this article to protect the public health, safety, and welfare
by establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and requiring responsible
parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to remedy any public
nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent adverse impact on the
value of nearby property, and to establish minimum maintenance standards for vacant
buildings. To such ends, it is the specific purpose and intent of this article:
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c. Signs having historic significance, as provided in subsection G3 of this section;
and
d. Off premises signs, installed and maintained on the building or premises in
accordance with the provisions of title 18 of this code.
3. "Signs having historic significance" shall mean a sign:
a. Related to a building either designated as an historic resource or located within
an historic district, pursuant to title 17 of this code; and
b. Determined by the Ogden City landmarks commission as significantly
contributing to the historic character of such building or district.
4. For purpose of this subsection, "signs, displays or graffiti" shall include any
presentation of words, letters,figures,designs, pictures or colors, which are not a part of
the architectural design of the building.
Ogden City Code § 16-8B-9-J: Maintenance Standards.
J. Obscuring Of Windows:
The windows and glass exterior doors of a vacant building shall not be painted or
otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building;
provided that the building official may order that windows or glass doors are to be
obscured with a solid coat of paint as part of maintenance work to be performed by the
city under section 16-8B-11 of this article:
1. If the building official determines such action is necessary in order to temporarily
obstruct the view of interior conditions otherwise in violation of this section, until such
time as such conditions can be remedied under an approved vacant building plan; and
2. The city cannot readily access the interior of the vacant building in order to correct
such conditions.
Utah Rules of Procedure
Rule 6. Time. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules,
by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it
is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection
(e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be
excluded in the computation.
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Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. Criminal procedure
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters ofjudicial notice
need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or
information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the
court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to
such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the
statute creating or defining the offense.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
0 contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR, 1
may

(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless
they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or
information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based
shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity
but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the
names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before
the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.
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OGDEN, UTAH; THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002/ 11:30 A.M.
HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G
THE CLERK:

This is the time set for disposition on

Ogden City vs. Bruce Edwards, case number 011904365, case
number 021900506, and the time set for trial on case number
021900315 and case number 021900420.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Knowlton, you're here on

behalf of Mr. Edwards?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I am, Judge.

All right.

Are you ready to proceed,

then?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, I want address a small item

before we do, if I can.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, we're here on an information.

I've just apparently been given two pages of an amended
information.

On the first page there's an allegation of

violating zoning ordinances regarding windows and glass
exterior doors and railings being painted, et cetera.
THE COURT:

Which case number are you looking at?

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I'm looking at 021900315.

All right.

MR. KNOWLTON:

And there's a count 1 and a count 2 on

the first page —
1
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:

- one dealing with windows and glass,

two dealing with unlawful signs visible from the adjacent
street.

On the second page, there are two more counts,

numbered 1 and 2, and counsel tells me there's yet two other
counts that bring us here today, although I haven't seen that.
MR. JUNK:

Well, it's on there, a different case.

There's two different cases.
MR. KNOWLTON:

They're both -

We were here before, Judge Taylor, and

we agreed to continue the trial as to counts 1 and 2 on the
first page of the criminal number I just gave you. And one of
the reasons we agreed to continue that, Judge, was because
there are some issues in litigation, I suppose, between
Mr. Edwards and the city dealing with the constitutionality of
the ordinances in question, and that specifically deals with
some sign ordinances that the city has, and I think that
relates in a similar way to count 1 as well.
And as I rethought this, this — obviously that's been
continued until after the signage litigation and the
constitutional issues are resolved.

I don't know if it makes

any sense for us to be proceeding to trial on the other counts
at the same criminal information.

They're not necessarily the

same, but it seems to me, instead of piecemealing this out, if
Mr. Edwards were convicted today of a couple of counts of
failure to register a vacant building and failure to make
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plans, then you would impose sentence, and then we come back
here in a couple of months, depending on what happens with the
other litigation, and then we'll be trying a couple of more
infractions that Mr. Edwards is charged with regarding
[unintelligible] property.

And if he were to lose that, then

we'd ask this Court to sentence him yet again. And so it
doesn't make any sense for us to ask the Court to
[unintelligible].
THE COURT:

Does that just apply to case -315,

though, or —
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

No.

Actually it's both of them.

Does it apply to the case, for example,

that ends in 420?
MR. JUNK: Yes.
THE COURT: - or 0506?
MR. JUNK:

The other cases, we're just — let's see.

Let me make sure.
THE COURT:
disposition.

See, there's two that are on just for

Just two for trial?

Is that how it works?

4365

is just on for disposition, as well as 0506, right?
MR. JUNK: Right.
THE COURT:

And then you've got two that are set for

trial, 0315 MR. JUNK:

Right. And -

THE COURT: - and 0420.
3
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MR. JUNK:

- 0420.

And part - maybe I can just

explain —
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
clearer.

All right.
- a little bit, maybe make it a little

We did file both of the informations on 315 and 420.

They have four counts, but we've separated those counts.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JUNK:

Two on — and it may not be clear because

we have as one and two, and then one and two, and we probably
should have had them as —
THE COURT: Three and four?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

- three and four, but So it looks like the counts are the same

on both of these cases, right?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
building.

They are.
And the only difference, I guess, is the

One is the building at address 205, and the other is

207, right?
MR. JUNK:

Exactly.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

Adjacent buildings.

Okay.
They are next to each other.

happening, we did originally file four counts.

And what is

Two of the

counts, the counts dealing with the window and glass and the
visible signs, there has been a civil claim brought by
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1

Mr. Edwards against the city asking that this ordinance is

2

unconstitutional.

3

THE COURT: Right.

4

MR. JUNK:

And that is being litigated, and we agreed

5

that we're willing to, in a sense, sit back and see what

6

happens before we move forward.

7

THE COURT:

8

But the resolution of that case is not

going to resolve the second page, right?

9

MR. JUNK:

Right.

Those — the registration and the

10

providing a building plan, there's no claim in the civil case

11

that deals with those — that portion of it, and our theory was

12

we had asked is why — if we're waiting on the other two, why do

13

we have to wait on the two that are not part of that particular

14

lawsuit.

15

resolution on that part of the particular case.

16

We feel that we still want to move forward and have a

We made that motion to Judge Taylor, and that's why

17

we actually separated the information, because we wanted to

18

make it clear how we were actually proceeding.

19

same case — that is true, as Mr. Knowlton indicates — but they

20

are quite different in how they're proceeding.

21
22

THE COURT:

Okay.

I notice, too, you'd filed a

demand for a jury trial on this.

23 I

MR. KNOWLTON:

24 |

THE COURT:

25

MR. JUNK:

So they are the

That's been resolved.

Oh, okay.
We amended those to -
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THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

Infractions .
- infractions and so that...
All right.

Anything else you wanted to

say?
MR. KNOWLTON :

Well, the concernL I have, Judge, is

just that it seems to me that if the city prevails today, then
they may ask the Court to impose a sentence on Mr. Edwards for
two iseparate buildings , for violations on two separate

buildings •
THE COURT: Right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

And then it comes back to the same

court down the road, or maybe a different court, and then the
court has to hear allegations regarding the same building,
violations of ordinance or building codes from the city.

And

then they ask the — that court is asked to impose sentence on
Mr. Edwards again for the very same buildings.
THE COURT:

But the problem is is the civil matter

doesn't resolve the second page at all.

I mean even if we sit

back and wait for you to resolve the questions as to the
constitutionality —
MR. KNOWLTON:

Oh, I agree it's different.

THE COURT: - then we still end up having to try the
second page, don't we?
MR. KNOWLTON:

They're different subject matters.

It's just that I'm suggesting, Your Honor, that maybe it seems

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unusual that we would cut up sentencing —
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. KNOWLTON:

- in the event there is - that the

court would find against us.
THE COURT:

Well, I guess my thinking is it's not

going to make any difference, because if I wait, you're still
going to be back here to try page 2 of the information,
regardless of what happens on your civil suit, right?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Well, I think so.

I'm inclined to just go ahead and deny

your motion to continue, and let's try the second page, I
guess, of the information on these two. Okay?
MR. KNOWLTON:

That's my request, and that's your

decision.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

So we're just going to try page 2, right?

MR. JUNK: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

On each building?

Right, On each building.

And the two

cases we're looking at are 0315 and 0420.
All right.
MR. JUNK:

Is the city ready to proceed, then?
We are.

MR. KNOWLTON:

I'll call Wayne Glover.

We would like to exclude any witnesses
7
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not testifying.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is there more than one

witness for the city?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

We may call Mike (inaudible).
All right.

Let's have your other witness

come up and be sworn and excluded, then.
I assume that applies to the defense, too. Any other
witnesses for the defense?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Just Denise, and I won't be calling

her.
THE COURT:

Just witnesses, then. And so the

allegation is the two counts on page 2, failing to register a
vacant building in violation of the OMC Chapter 8,
Section 16-8, and failure to provide a vacant-building plan in
violation of that same section.
MR. JUNK:

Is that correct?

That is correct.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, let me ask you.

Do you

want, to try both buildings at the same time or do you —
MR. JUNK: Yes.
THE COURT: - want to try these separately?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

I think they're both The same evidence?
They're just - it's the same

evidence there.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any objection to that,
8
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Mr. Knowlton?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

That's all right.
So it's the same allegation, and

the only difference, one applies to a building located at 205,
and the other is 207. All right.

Go ahead.

(Whereupon the witnesses were sworn.)
THE COURT: All right, sir.

If you want to have a

seat up here.
WAYNE GLOVER,
having been first duly sworn, called
at the instance of the plaintiff, testified
upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

State your name and your occupation.

A

My name is Wayne Glover.

I'm the manager of building

services for Ogden City.
Q

And what — as that particular role at Ogden City,

what does that entail?
A

Generally that involves the development building and

business licensing activities of Ogden City.
Q

And as part of one of your roles, have you been given

the - I guess the burden or the role of monitoring vacant
buildings in Ogden City A

Yes, sir.
9
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Q

— based on the vacant-building ordinance?

A

Yes, sir, I have.

Q

And what is it that you do in that particular,

specific role?
A

When we become aware that a building is vacant and

meets the definition in the ordinance, we then notify the owner
that they are obligated to come forward and register the vacant
building in accordance with that ordinance.
Q

Okay.

And what do they need to do in order to

register a building?
A

Generally come in, make application for the

registration, identify those things that are outlined in the
ordinance for property location, the time that the building
became vacant, their ownership relationship, for example, and
then submit a vacant-building plan that relates to that
building, what it is that they intend to do with the structure
in the future, and to pay a registration fee of a hundred
dollars for commercial buildings.
Q

What's that?

A

The rate's a hundred dollar fee for commercial

buildings.
Q

All right.

Now, are you familiar with buildings that

are located on 205 and 207, and I believe 209, 25th Street?
A

Yes, sir, I am.

Q

And do those particular buildings have some specific
10
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name that is used or something that...
A

I equate the name El Buracho to the building known as

205 25th, and the other building at 207 through 211 I refer to
as the Helena Hotel.
Q

Okay.

Now, what does this have reference to?

A

Pardon me?

Q

What do these names have reference to?

A

Well, I think the El Buracho, in my recollection, was

the name of a tavern that was located there in the past.
Q

Okay.

A

The Helena is the name of the hotel, and it's

emblazoned on the face of the building.
Q

All right. And are you familiar with the individual

that is the owner of those particular buildings?
A

I'm familiar with the person who alleges he's the

owner of building, yes, sir.
Q

Okay.

And that is?

MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, I'm going to object, your Honor,

as to who alleges they're the owner.

He either has some

foundation for that, or he doesn't.
THE COURT: Maybe you can rephrase the question —
MR. JUNK: Okay.
THE COURT: - or the MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

All right.
The answer is a little...
11
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1

Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

Have you had contact with somebody, an

2

agent or somebody, who has expressed responsibility for those

3

buildings?

nj

I"
4
5
6

A
Q
A

Yes, sir, I have.
And who is that individual?
Bruce Edwards.

7

Q

And -

8
9
10
11
12
13

THE COURT: Go ahead.
answer?
Q

[

I'm sorry.

What was his

I don't know if I heard it.
(BY MR. JUNK)

Okay.

Go ahead.

What was your

answer?
A

The - the person that you refer to is someone I call

Bruce Edwards.

14

Q

All right.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And you've talked with Mr. Edwards on occasions about

17

That's the individual seated here?

the vacant building?

18

A

Yes, sir, I have.

19

Q

And also about other related type matters dealing

20

with the buildings?

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

Okay.

Now, at some point did you — do you have a

23

regular process that when you find that there is a vacant

24

building of notifying the owner of the ordinance and what needs

25

to be done in order to bring the building into compliance?
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

And what is it that you do?

A

One of my field staff inspects the building, verifies

that it —
MR. KNOWLTON:
what you do.
Q

I'm going to object.

The question is

He's talking about this witness.

(BY MR. JUNK)

Okay.

What do you do in your role as

a supervisor?
A

I have one of my staff go investigate and verify the

building is vacant and prepare then a letter of notification.
Q

Okay.

El Buracho?

Now, have you also observed the Helena and the

Are these buildings located at 205 and then 207

through 211?
A

Have I observed that?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes, sir, I have.

Q

You've gone and have done some field viewing

yourself?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And was it — did you determine whether or not they

were vacant?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Object.

It's leading, your Honor.

Well, I don't know that it suggests the

answer.
MR. JUNK:

Yeah.

I don't know that it does.
13
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THE COURT:

I think it's probably an appropriate

question.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Did you determine that the buildings

were vacant?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

I didn't - that wasn't what I asked.
Okay.

I think he asked him whether he

determined whether they were vacant.
MR. JUNK:

Or not.

MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, how would he make that

determination unless he —
THE COURT:

Well, I guess we need to find out.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Well, maybe I'm premature.

All right.

Go ahead and answer the

question.
Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

Did you make a determination about

these buildings?
A

Yes, sir, I did.

Q

What was your determination?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Do we have a foundation when?

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JUNK:
Q

Okay.

(BY MR. JUNK)

Approximately when did you go - have

you been around the — these two buildings, or do some
investigation of these two buildings?
A

Recollection, we started in September of 2001 on
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another action regarding those two buildings.
MR. KNOWLTON:
responding.

Judge, I don't think the witness is

The question is when did you go.

THE COURT: Right.

Q

MR. KNOWLTON:

He said we started looking.

(BY MR. JUNK)

Okay.

Just couch it in terms of when

you actually did, Mr. Glover, go to that building.
A

I don't recall the exact dates.

Q

Right.

A

The first time would have been probably late fall of

2001.

But a time frame.

That would be November, thereabouts.
Q

Okay.

A

Without referring to the file regarding the action

that we had, I couldn't tell you the exact date.
Q

All right.

But have you been there more than the

time that you went in this November period?
A

Yes, sir, I have.

Q

When else have you been?

A

Could I refer to my file?

Q

If it will help you, yes.

A

I would suspect that it would have been sometime

after - between January 9th and January 13th, 2002.
Q

And you indicated that you made a determination about

the buildings.
A

What was your determination?

This building is not occupied.
15
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Q

What did you make that - what did you base that on?

A

I've been inside of those buildings, both of them.

No one is there.

The building is partially constructed.

Both

the El Buracho and the Helena, the last time that I was
physically inside the building, were under construction, had
been renovated, and there was no indication that anyone was
there.
Q

Okay.

When you say had been renovated, what do you

mean by that?
A

There was — there was work that had been going on

construction-wise.

There had been framing, for example, in

both of those buildings, and some structural elements added to
the building at 205, which is the El Buracho.
Q

All right.

But was it in a — what you would consider

a habitable condition?
A

They were not finished at that time.

No, sir, they

were not habitable buildings.
Q

Okay.

Now, you were — after — you were explaining

the process. After you or another individual from your office
views the property and makes a determination that the buildings
are vacant, what then is the next step in that process?
A

Once a determination has been made, my staff is

responsible for obtaining pictures of the building, making an
inspection to verify that that is the case, and then preparing
a letter of notification to the owner.
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1

Q

2

the owner?

3

A

I did not, no, sir.

4

Q

I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's

5

Okay.

Did you prepare a letter of notification to

Exhibits No. 1 and No. 3. Are you familiar with those —

6

A

Yes, sir.

7

Q

- particular exhibits?

8

A

Yes, sir.

9

Q

What do those exhibits represent?

10

A

These represent the letters of notification to the

11
12
13
14
15

owners of vacant buildings.
Q

Okay.

Now, is that - in this particular case, is

that something that you would have written?
A

No, sir.

These are letters that the staff prepares

for me.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

I have signed the original letter, yes, the standard

18
19
20
21 |

But are they signed by you?

letter that they fill in, the blanks, if you will.
Q

Okay.

And was this particular letter sent out on

the two vacant buildings, the 205 and the 207?
A

Yes, sir.

These letters read — one is addressed to

22

the owner regarding 207 25th.

23

owner of building known as 205 25th.

Another is addressed to the

24 I

Q

Okay.

And what date were those letters sent out?

25

A

The dates of these letters 17
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MR. KNOWLTON:

Your Honor, can I voir dire with this

witness?
THE COURT:

Okay.

Go ahead.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Did you mail these letters?

A

Did I mail them?

Q

Did you mail either of these letters?

A

I didn't personally mail them, no, sir.

Q

All right.

You didn't put them in an envelope, and

you didn't put a stamp on the envelope?
A

I did not, no, sir.

Q

And you didn't put the envelope in the mail?

A

I did not, no, sir.

Q

And you didn't see it done?

A

No, sir.

Q

And did you actually sign each one of these letters,

I did not see that.

or is it just a stamp signature?
A

It's a — a letter that I had signed in — I guess it's

a facsimile signature.
Q

So this isn't a — you didn't actually sign it.

You

just signed a form letter —
A

Yes, sir.

Q

- and they've used of that letter to go to different

places, different people?
18
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A

Yes, sir, that is the case.

Q

So you have never prepared — you nothing to do with

either one of these letters as far as —
A

Other than directing their preparation —

Q

Oh, I see.

A

— no, sir.

Q

You didn't prepare either of these letters; you

I did not personally prepare them.

didn't sign either of these letters; you didn't do anything to
deliver either of these letters?
A

I did not personally, no, sir.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you.

That's all.

Go ahead, Mr. Junk.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's

Exhibit No. 2 for identification.

Are you familiar with what

that represents?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And what does that represent?

A

A letter signed by Bruce Edwards acknowledging

receipt MR. KNOWLTON:

Now, just a moment, Judge. Well, if

we've got to use this as an exhibit, may I also voir dire on
this?
THE COURT:

Sure, go ahead.
1
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Are you familiar with the signature of Bruce Edwards?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

How many times have you seen his signature?

A

Three or four.

Q

When?

A

Once when he came in to file a notice that he was

I've seen his signature.

objecting to signs at the Ogden City Mall.
Q

So how long ago was that?

A

Must have been about the first part of January of

this year.
Q

So how many other times have you observed him sign

his name?

Did you see him sign his name in January of this

year?
A

Yes, sir, he signed it in front of me.

Q

And how many other times have you observed

Mr. Edwards sign his name?
A

Well, the three requests for information records

that — in the last three weeks.
Q

Did you see him sign those?

A

Yes, sir, I did.

Q

So in the last three weeks you've seen him sign his

name.

So did you see him sign his name to the document before

you?
20
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A

I'm sorry?

Q

Did you see him sign his name to the document before

A

I don't recall, sir.

Q

Did he deliver it to you?

A

Did he deliver it?

Q

Yes, sir,

A

Yes, sir, he did.

Q

He handed that document to you?

A

Yes, he did.

you?

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

That's all.

Go ahead, Mr. Junk.

MR. JUNK: Okay.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

And maybe you could just - what is that letter?

A

Well, the letter is — is a letter addressed to me,

signed by Bruce Edwards, that indicates that
"I have received your letter of
January 9th, 2002, on January 13th, 2002.
Please be informed that the ordinance
regulating vacant buildings is defective."
Q

Okay.

Then he goes on with —

A

Definitions about signs and the First Amendment

issues, yes, sir.
2
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Q

Okay.

He delivered this particular letter to you?

A

Yes, sir, he did.
MR. JUNK:

At this point, your Honor, I'm going to

move to admit Exhibits 1 through 3.
MR. KNOWLTON:
January 9 letters.

Object to the two letters, the

That's insufficient foundation.

I don't

know that they're described by Bruce's letter in sufficient
detail that you can say these are the same letters that
counsel - 1 and 2 —
THE COURT:

P-l and P-2?

When were they dated?

Is

there a date on the letters?
MR. KNOWLTON:

They're both dated January 9.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JUNK:

And Mr. Edward's letter specifically

indicates receipt of the letter on January 9th.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, no.

It specifically says, "I

received your letter of January 9th.'' It doesn't say which
letter.

And this is addressed to Ogden City, "Dear

Mr. Glover."
THE COURT:

Right.

But didn't he say that these were

prepared at his direction —
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well -

THE COURT: - even though he didn't actually type the
letters, 1 and 2?
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MR. KNOWLTON:

- this is his staff.

He thinks his

staff prepared and sent out these letters.
THE COURT:

Well, I thought I heard him say that

these were prepared at his direction.
Didn't you?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

That is what I said.

THE COURT: That's what he said. I'm going to allow
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 at this point.

Even though he may not

have prepared the letters, they clearly were done at his
direction.

And then the letter P-3 is a letter from the

defendant back to Mr. Glover, so...
All right.
MR. JUNK:

Those exhibits are admitted.
Okay.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 received)
Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

Now, you are familiar with the records

of Ogden City when an individual actually registers an
abandoned building?

Are you familiar with those records?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And has Mr. Edwards filed any type of registration or

the registration that is requested in the ordinance for
building 205 A

No, sir.

Q

- 25th

A

No.

Q

Has he filed a registration that is indicated in the

Street?
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ordinance for the buildings from 207 through 211, the Helena?
A

No, sir.

Q

And with that, the ordinance also indicates that a

plan must be submitted?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And has Mr. Edwards filed a plan for 205 25th?

A

No, sir.

Q

And has he filed a plan for 207 through 211?

A

No, sir.

Q

Have you had discussion with Mr. Edwards after he

dropped off this letter about submitting - registering or
submitting a plan?
A

He and I have about that several times, yes, sir.

Q

And when you say you've talked to him on several

times, approximately how many times have you talked with
Mr. Edwards about that?
A

At least two.

Q

Okay.

And on those occasions, have you indicated

that he needed to continue to register his buildings?
A

That was the substance of our conversations, yes,

Q

And how did he respond to those?

sir.

MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, could we have a foundation as

to the time of these two discussions?
THE COURT: All right.

Go ahead.
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1

Q

You indicated that at least on two

(BY MR. JUNK)

2

occasions you have talked withL Mr. Edwards about the

3

registration of the buildings.

4

A

Yes »

5

Q

Can you give an approximate time frame for those two

6

discussions?

7

A

One would have been probably somewhere aft<^r

8

January 13th.

9

1/15/2002 f" with my initials, at which time — I reca.11 the

My notes on the Exhibit 2 indicate "Received

10

conversation.

11

building registered?'' The second occasion was in the last week

12

or two, as Mr. Edwards was requesting information or records

13

from my office. Again I asked him, "Bruce, when are going to

14

get your building registered?7'

15
16
17

Q

"Bruce, what do we have to do to get your

And how did he respond to each of those

different requests?
A

"No." The word no.

18

MR. KNOWLTON:

19

THE WITNESS: "No."

20

MR. JUNK:

21

All right.

I believe that's all the

questions I have.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KNOWLTON:

24
25

I'm sorry?

All right. Any cross?
Yes, please.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
25
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1

Q

Mr. Glover, how long have you worked for Ogden City?

2

A

Pardon me, sir?

3

Q

How long have you worked for Ogden City?

4

A

Almost twenty-five years now.

5

Q

Okay.

6

Twenty-five years ago, was there a business at

205 25th Street called the El Buracho?

7

A

I have no idea, sir.

8

Q

Do you remember a business actually operating at

9

I don't — I —

205 25th Street.

10

A

Vaguely remember a tavern there, yes, sir.

11

Q

Well, I mean do you know?

12
13
14
15

Did you ever walk in there

and see if there was some actual —
A

No.

I've never been in that building when it was

doing business.
Q

So you don't know whether there ever was, during your

16 j tenure anyway, an actual operating business at 205 25th Street?
17
18

A
building.

I have seen some folks operating a business in that
The owner of the building used to sit out in front

19 I of the door.

That's all I know.

20

Q

When?

When did you see this business in operation?

21

A

Pardon me?

22

Q

When?

23

A

I did not see a business in operation.

24

I — I assumed there was one.

25

people going outside the door.

I just said

There was a gentlemen there,
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Q

Oh, all right.

So you don't know what it was, but

that was the name that was on the building.
A

Yes, sir.

That was the name of the business that was

there, yes.
Q

Twenty-five years ago.

It was called El Buracho?

A

El Buracho, yes.

Q

Now, was there ever an actual hotel, in your

recollection, at 207 25th Street?
A

I don't recall one, sir.

Q

There's a sign on the structure that says "Helena" or

"Helena Hotel"?
A

Yes, sir.

It's a historic sign is on it.

Q

You don't, in your tenure at least, you don't

remember there ever being a business operating there by that
name?
A

Not that I can recall, sir.

Q

Okay.

A

Not that I can recall.

Q

You haven't seen any other businesses operated at

Or any other name, for that matter?

either of these locations, have you?
A

Not at - 207-211 I don't recall.

Q

Have you checked the registration on these two

buildings to see who actually owns these two buildings?
A

Yes, sir, we have.

Q

I mean have you gone over to the county assessor's
27
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office, the county recorder's office?
A

We have access to those records, yes, sir.

Q

When I look at your letters, they're both addressed

to Westland Development, LLC — a limited liability company, I
suppose — and an address in Layton.

Is that your understanding

of the ownership of these two buildings?
A

Yes, sir.

According to records we derived from Weber

County that is it.
Q

Have you checked with the Secretary of State and

ascertained who the owners or members of the LLC are, Westland
Development Corporation?
A

No, sir, I have not.

Q

You don't know who they are, they being the owners?

A

That's the address.

Q

You talked with Mr. Bruce Edwards.

I think the

question was put to you by Mr. Junk: "Who have you talked with
who represented responsibility for this building?" You said
Bruce Edwards.
A

Yes, sir.

Q

So Bruce Edwards obviously was not an LLC.

real, living person, I assume.

He's a

Yes?

A

That would be a fair assumption, yes.

Q

The owners of these two buildings happen to be legal

fictions called a limited liability corporation, in both
instances, to your knowledge, Westland Development, LLC, of
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1
2

Layton.
MR. JUNK:

Your Honor, at this time, I guess I would

3

ask if I could just interrupt.

I would just ask the Court to

4

take judicial notice that one of the cases that we have for

5

disposition today is a zoning case dealing with both — or at

6 I least 207 7
8
9

MR. KNOWLTON:
interrupt to MR. JUNK:

Well, I just -

10

MR. KNOWLTON:

11

MR. JUNK:

12

MR. KNOWLTON:

13
14
15

- he's going to have to do it during

his opening.
MR. JUNK:

Well, I'm just asking the Court to take

judicial notice that Mr. Edwards has pled guilty —
MR. KNOWLTON:

17

MR. JUNK:

18

MR. KNOWLTON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. JUNK:

21

MR. KNOWLTON:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KNOWLTON:

25

- introduce evidence -

No. All I'm asking is the Court -

16

24

Your Honor, if counsel wants to

Judge, he's out of -

- to Counsel's out of order at this point.

Okay.

Why don't you hold off -

Okay.
If he wants to -

Let's just finish the cross.
If the Court to judicially note

something —
THE COURT: All right.
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MR. KNOWLTON:

- he's asked the Court to take

evidence —
MR. JUNK:

Well, I think -

MR. KNOWLTON:

His turn to take evidence is when I'm

not cross-examining.
MR. JUNK:

Then I will object in that this isn't

irrelevant because we have — the ownership of these particular
buildings has already been determined on other cases that have
been before the court.

Mr. Edwards has pled guilty —

MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

Well, that's -

— to zoning violations at both of these

properties as the owner, and therefore I would ask —
MR. KNOWLTON:

Your Honor, counsel's not objecting to

any question —
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

Let's -

- that's pending before this witness.

Okay.

I'm objecting in the — I'm

objecting —
THE COURT:

I'm not sure it makes any difference at

this point.
MR. JUNK:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Well, he's -

I mean what I have - what I have so far

by way of evidence is that the defendant claims responsibility
for the buildings.

I don't care who they're registered to or
30
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1

OGDEN, UTAH; THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002; 11:30 A.M.

2

HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G

4

THE CLERK:

This is the time set for disposition on

5

Ogden City vs. Bruce Edwards, case number 011904365, case

6

number 021900506, and the time set for trial on case number

7

021900315 and case number 021900420.

8
9

THE COURT:

All right.

behalf of Mr. Edwards?

10

MR. KNOWLTON:

11

THE COURT:

12

Yes, I am, Judge.

All right. Are you ready to proceed,

then?

13

MR. KNOWLTON:

14

before we do, if I can.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. KNOWLTON:

17

Mr. Knowlton, you're here on

Well, I want address a small item

Okay.
Judge, we're here on an information.

I've just apparently been given two pages of an amended

18 | information.

On the first page there's an allegation of

19

violating zoning ordinances regarding windows and glass

20

exterior doors and railings being painted, et cetera.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. KNOWLTON:

23

THE COURT:

24 |

MR. KNOWLTON:

25

Which case number are you looking at?
I'm looking at 021900315.

All right.
And there's a count 1 and a count 2 on

the first page —
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:

- one dealing with windows and glass,

two dealing with unlawful signs visible from the adjacent
street.

On the second page, there are two more counts,

numbered 1 and 2, and counsel tells me there's yet two other
counts that bring us here today, although I haven't seen that.
MR. JUNK:

Well, it's on there, a different case.

There's two different cases.
MR. KNOWLTON:

They're both -

We were here before, Judge Taylor, and

we agreed to continue the trial as to counts 1 and 2 on the
first page of the criminal number I just gave you. And one of
the reasons we agreed to continue that, Judge, was because
there are some issues in litigation, I suppose, between
Mr. Edwards and the city dealing with the constitutionality of
the ordinances in question, and that specifically deals with
some sign ordinances that the city has, and I think that
relates in a similar way to count 1 as well.
And as I rethought this, this — obviously that's been
continued until after the signage litigation and the
constitutional issues are resolved.

I don't know if it makes

any sense for us to be proceeding to trial on the other counts
at the same criminal information.

They're not necessarily the

same, but it seems to me, instead of piecemealing this out, if
Mr. Edwards were convicted today of a couple of counts of
failure to register a vacant building and failure to make
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what name they're in at this point.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Okay.

THE COURT: All the evidence I have from Mr. Glover
is that the defendant told him he was responsible for the
buildings.

So go ahead.

MR. KNOWLTON: I appreciate that.
Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Thank you.

I think you said that you observed

these two buildings on at least two occasions.

You actually

personally went down and looked at them?
A

Yes, sir, I have.

Q

All right. And you told Mr. Junk that the first time

you went down and made a personal observation would have been
in the fall of I guess last year, November of 2001?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

So what did you do?

Just walk down and look at it

from the sidewalk?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

A

I could see through the windows.

What was your observation?
It didn't look like

there was anybody there.
Q

I see.

So November — do you know what day of

November that was?
A

No, sir, I don't recall.

Q

Do you know how long you were there?

A

Five, ten minutes maybe.
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Q

Why were you there?

A

Why was I there?

Q

Yeah.

I mean did you make a special trip to go down

and look at these buildings?
A

Well, part of it is — was the prelude to the actual

ordinance itself —
Q

I see.

So —

A

— and trying to get some background on the numbers of

buildings perhaps that we would be affecting by the ordinance.
Q

In November of last year there wasn't even an

ordinance in effect, not at least a —
A

No, sir.

Q

— building ordinance?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

So you went down there, and you looked at the

building, and you looked in some windows, you didn't see
anything.

Is that your testimony?

A

Yes, sir, I think it would be.

Q

How long were you there?

A

About that, yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

Five or ten minutes?

And then your next observation was January 9th

or 13th, sometime between the 9th and the 13th of this year?
Yes?
A

Yes.

Q

How long were you there that time?
32
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A

About the same, and I walked past probably five, ten

minutes maybe.
Q

Five to ten minutes.

I mean, so what?

You just

went — you didn't go inside the building on either occasion?
A

No, sir.

The buildings were locked.

Q

Did you check to see if the doors were locked?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

And you looked in the building on — do you

know what day it would have been between the 9th and the 13th?
A

No, sir.

I don't recall the exact date. I

unfortunately don't keep — keep a journal, so...
Q

All right.

So it could have been — it could have

been any one of those dates?
A

Yes, sir, it could have.

Q

Could have been the 13th?

A

Could have been, yes, sir.

Q

Well, why do you think it would the 9th or — through

the 13th?
A

Yes?

Could it have been the 14th?
No.

I'm referring to or relying on the letter from

Mr. Edwards and my notes therein, so that was about the time
frame that we would have been involved.
Q

I see. So on one of these days you were there for

five minutes.

You didn't enter the premises, and you just

looked in the window and you didn't see anybody there?
A

Yes, sir, that's true.
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Q

Okay.

And that could have been anytime — no sooner

than the 9th, I guess you would say, or later than the 13th?
A

Yes, sir, that's right, about right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I think that's all I have for you,

Mr. Glover.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. JUNK:

Any other redirect?

I just have...
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. JUNK:
Q

Now, between the period of time of November of 2001,

the time that you first have testified looking through or
looking at the building, up to then the January 9th through
13th, when you looked at the building on those two occasions,
what would be the differences that you observed in the
buildings from the two different times?
A

I don't suspect there would have been any real

difference, sir.

They would have looked substantially the same

on both occasions.
Q

Is that what you're saying —
MR. KNOWLTON:

Your Honor, he's just speculating if

he's saying he suspects.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

If he knows, he can tell us.

If he

doesn't know...
Q

(BY MR. JUNK) From what you recollect and what you
34
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observed, was there a difference?
A

No, sir.

Q

The buildings were in the same condition on November

that they were in January?
A

Yes, sir.
MR. JUNK:

That's all the questions I have.

THE COURT: All right. Any other questions?
MR. KNOWLTON: No.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Glover, you can step
down.

Thank you.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

Thank you, sir.

Did you want to call your next witness?
Yes.

If I can just confer with Mr. Glover

for just one second.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Off-the-record discussion.)
MICHAEL MCDONALD,
having been first duly sworn, called
at the instance of the plaintiff, testified
upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

State your name and your occupation.

A

Michael McDonald, building inspector for Ogden City.

Q

And, Mr. McDonald, are you familiar with the
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buildings located at 205 and at 207 25th Street?
A

Yes.

Q

And were you — did you do some inspecting of those

particular buildings at some time?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And from those - from those inspections, did you also

send out — or at the direction of Wayne Glover did you send out
letters to the individuals that were listed as owners on it?
A

Yes. My — I was to make the initial inspection, go

through Weber County, find the ownership through Weber County,
generate letters, and then mail those letters out.
MR. JUNK:

And, your Honor, if I could approach.

THE COURT: All right.
Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

I'm going to show — I'm going to show

you what's been marked as City's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 3 for
identification.
A

Are you familiar with those letters?

Yes, I am.

These are the letters that we generate

and have — that are sent out, and this is a copy of the
abstract of ownership from Weber County.
Q

Okay.

Are you the one that actually generated

those letters?
A

Yes. I generated those letters and sent — and mailed

those out.
Q

Okay.

And those were for the properties listed as

the guardian on those?
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A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

And did you actually physically go inspect

those — that property?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And did you generate some type of notification or

something that you do, or notice of inspection?
A

Yes.

Q

I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's

Exhibit No. 4 for identification.

Are you familiar with that

particular document?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

And what does that represent?

A

That represents that on January 9th that I went by

207 25th and did a vacant-building inspection, determining
whether it was vacant, if there were any violations to the
ordinance that we have.
Q

And in looking at that building, did you determine

whether or not it was vacant?
A

From all indications, yes, it appeared to be vacant.

Q

What did you observe?

A

There was no activity.

in the window.

Did you —
The doors were locked.

Signs

Just nobody appeared to be in there, about,

around, or anything of that nature.
Q

Okay.

That was for the 207 that you've indicated.

Did you also look at 205, which is sometimes termed El Buracho?
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A

Yes, I believe I did go by that, probably — it should

have been around the same time.

I would have done both

buildings at the same time.
Q

Okay.

Did you see any activity or anything going on

in that building?
A

At the time I went by, I did not.

Q

Okay.

Did you make a determination of whether or not

they were vacant?

A

I made the determj^ation tJB^MiSXJSSJ^

Q

Okay.

-

And t h a t was — based on t h a t i s what then

generated the l e t t e r ?
A

Correct.
MR. JUNK:

witness, your Honor.

That's all the questions I have of this
I will move to admit Exhibit No. 4.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

[Unintelligible.]

You bet.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 received)
///

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Mr. McDonald, let me ask you about Exhibit 4. And

you say that this is a work order or this inspection report,
you only went down looked at this building, at least one of the
buildings?
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A

207 25 th is the communication on this piece

Correct.

of paper.
Q

So this doesn't say both, though; it says you went on

the job address and inspected 205 25 th Street.
A

207 25 th .

Q

I'm sorry.

A

Yes.

Q

And then it's dated, the date you did it, I guess

207 25 th Street.

J a n u arx*$**,f*LA

Yes.

Q

— of this year.

there?
A

What time of the day was it you were

Can you tell from this report?
Yeah, it would have been between the hours of 12:00

and 1:00 that I was down around the area.
Q

What day of the week was that?

Do you know?

A

I don't.

Q

And so you looked at that business, and you — and you

deemed it to be commercial property, apparently.
check mark you used.
because of what?
A

That's the

And then you thought it was vacant

Because the door was locked?

Yes, the doors were locked.

There's was no

indication of any activity in there.
Q

What do you mean?

You looked in the windows and

couldn't see anybody?
A

Well, the areas that could look through, yeah, that's
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what I did.

I mean I'd go by and look in and see if there's

any kind of counter tops, personnel secretaries.
Q

So you looked inside the windows.

There were some

signs in the windows that obscured much of the —
A

Yes.

Q

— vision; is that right?

A

Yes.

Q

And so that you couldn't look into every room?

A

No.

Q

But where the windows were not covered or had a sign,

No, I couldn't.

you were able to peek in and didn't see anybody inside?
A

No, I did not.

Q

So based on that — of course this is during the lunch

hour, too —
A

Yes.

Q

— when people typically go to lunch.

A

I guess it would be.

Q

Between 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock during the working day,

it wouldn't be surprising if they locked the door
[unintelligible]?
A

Well, I would hope they would hang a sign on the

window stating "Out for lunch.

Be back at 1:00 o'clock."

I

mean...
Q

Did you ever actually go inside the building?

A

No, sir, I did not.
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Q

You've never been inside that building?

A

No.

Q

Now, do you have another work order for building 205?

A

I would assume that there would be, but I'm not sure

I've never been in that building.

where that would be at this time.
Q

So the exhibit you've got there only talks about 207?

A

Right.

Q

That's the Helena Hotel.

A

Correct.

Q

Counsel asked you if you'd looked at 205 that same

day, and if you did, I'd assume you'd made out a work order for
the separate address, right?
A

I normally would have, yes, but where they were owned

by the same owner, I might not have made a work order for that.
Q

So you don't know if you made a work order for that

A

No.

Q

— or whether you inspected the other one or not?

A

Correct.

one —

it.

Well, I did — I did look — I did look at

I walked down the sidewalk.

I looked at it and made the

same determination of it too.
Q

What was that?

You just couldn't see anybody inside?

A

Correct, and it appeared to be vacant to me.

Q

How many windows were you able to look in?

A

I don't recall at this time.

There would have a
41 I
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1

couple at least.

I would have gone into, you know, one window

2

per building at least and peered in one of them.

3

Q

So you'd have looked on the ground floor on this?

4

A

Correct.

5

Q

All of these are multistoried buildings?

6

A

Yes.

7

MR. KNOWLTON:

8

THE COURT: Anything else?

9

MR. JUNK: Yes.

10

Okay.

That's all.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

11 I BY MR. JUNK:
12

Q

13

looked in?

14

A

15

Well, what did you see in the buildings when you

Just vacant, open space, some lumber.

that, nothing.

Other than

No —

16

Q

When you say lumber, what do you mean by that?

17

A

There was just some plyboard, lumber, boards laying

18

around.

I didn't see anything that would indicate that there

19

was anything businesslike going in that.

20

Q

Were there finished rooms, or...

21 J

A

Not that I could tell from where I was looking.

22

just looked like an open area.

23

MR. JUNK:

All right.

It

That's all the questions I

24 J have.
25

THE COURT: Anything else?
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1

MR. KNOWLTON: No.

2

THE COURT: All right, sir, you can step down.

3

Anything else from the city?

4

MR. JUNK:

5

MR. KNOWLTON:

No, your Honor.

We'd rest at this time.

Judge, we'd move to dismiss both

6

counts for failure of any evidence on the city to show beyond a

7

reasonable doubt at this point that either of these buildings

8

were empty or vacant under the definition provided under the

9

ordinance on the dates in question.

10

The dates in question, of course, are alleged in the

11

information of January 1st through the 12th. We have this last

12

witness.

13

he said he looked in the windows, didn't see any people or

14

activity.

15

the ordinance requires.

16

He said he went to 207 and filled out a report, and

I don't know that that's really the same thing as
The ordinance defines vacant

as:

"A, empty, B, not occupied on a regular

17

basis by an occupant, or, C, not used by a

18

person on a regular basis for the usual and

19

customary purposes for which a building was

20

designed and lawfully permitted."

21

And then he says that he thought he looked into 205

22

and then went to 207, where he filled out his report.

When he

23

looked in there, and he says he couldn't see all of it, but he

24

looked in places where he could because there were — the view

25

was obstructed by signs. And during the lunch hour on this
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day, the 9th, he didn't see any persons or activity.
I don't know that the Court could conclude, based
on — beyond a reasonable doubt on that evidence alone.

That's

the only evidence really we have except for Mr. Glover whose
testified that he went down there during that time, either the
9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, or 13th. And it could well have been the
13th as easy as the 9th from his testimony, and that would be on
the day after the information, which is the 1st through the
12th.
So based on the testimony of Mr. McDonald, I don't
see how this Court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the cursory inspection during the lunch hour would
establish empty or vacant by that definition beyond a
reasonable doubt.
THE COURT: Any response?
MR. JUNK:

Well, your Honor, if we did rely

completely on Mr. McDonald I may tend to agree with
Mr. Knowlton, but I think if you look at Mr. Glover's
testimony, he's actually been into the property and gave a
description on the property.

He also gave a description from

November and then tied that up up into January.

And he had

indicated, yes, it was somewhere between the 9th and 13th, but
he also testified that the property had not changed during that
period of time.
So the Court can make the obvious inference that if
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he inspects it before the filing of the information, and
inspects it either right during the time frame of when we filed
or just barely after, he's been in the property, looked at
before, looked at it after, then I think the inference is there
that it has been the same throughout that period of time.
We use those same inferences all the time as far as,
you know, testing machinery, if it's functioning on a date in
November and a date in January, then the inference obviously is
that it's the same and functioning the same during the interim.
So that would be our argument on this particular.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

But in response, Judge, Mr. Glover

says that he didn't inspect the building on those two
occasions, that he didn't go inside.

He says, "I was down

there in the fall, in November of 2001, before there even was
an ordinance passed.

I was there for five minutes, and I just

looked in the windows, and I didn't see anybody from the
sidewalk," is my recollection.
And then he says on January 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, one of
those days, he doesn't know which, he just knows it was before
Bruce's letter, which is dated the 13th. He says, "I was there
for five minutes and made a - on the sidewalk looking into the
windows on the ground floor."

He does not inspect inside on

either of those occasions. That's the essence of his testimony,
at least is my recollection.
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THE COURT:

All right.

Well, my understanding from

the testimony of Mr. Glover was that he was there between the
9th and the 13th of this year.

He testified the buildings were

not occupied, that there was no one there in either one of the
buildings.

In fact, he said in one of the buildings it

appeared that there was some partial construction going on, and
that it was his opinion it was not habitable, which means there
couldn't have been anybody there, at least in his opinion.
Then you had Mr. McDonald saying in his opinion — he
was there on the 9th — he said the buildings appeared to be
vacant.

There was no one there.

doors were locked.
open space.

There was no activity.

The

It appeared to be that there was a lot of

There was lumber, plywood inside, but no

activities.
I think based on that, I'll deny your motion.
MR. KNOWLTON:

All right.

I'd call Bruce Edwards to

the stand.
THE COURT: All right.
BRUCE EDWARDS,
having been first duly sworn, called
at the instance of the defendant, testified
upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Tell us your name, please.
46
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A

Bruce Edwards.

Q

Where do you live, Mr. Edwards?

A

4695 Birch Creek, South Ogden.

Q

Now, do you have any connection with these properties

that we're talking about, 205 25th Street?
A

I do.

Q

Who's the owner of these properties?

A

Westland Development.

Q

That is an LLC, is it not?

A

It is.

Q

And if I recall, your parents were — and/or your

mother or both your parents were members of that LLC.
A

That is correct.

Q

They're both now deceased?

A

They are.

Q

You have been in control and/or management of these

two properties, at least during the times talked about in the
information, January 1st through January 12th of this year; is
that right?
A

That is correct.

Q

Okay.

205 25th Street.

Let me talk about — let's talk about
That's the first of these two buildings.

Is

that the corner?
A

It is.

Q

These are — are they adjoining buildings?
47
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

A

They're adjacent to each other.

3

Q

Can you access one from the other?

4

A

You can.

5

Q

So they're really one as far as being contiguous

6

properties?

7

A

They are in that — in that context.

8

Q

What's the history on 205?

9

there?

10

A

2

They are adjoining,

yes.

Was there - what is

205 is a brick, two-story building that was built in

11 I 1896.
12 I

Q

Well, wait.

Is this on the historic register in

13

Ogden?

14

A

Yes, it is.

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

The building has been — was originally built as a bar

17
18
19

Keep going.

on the main level and a brothel on the upstairs.
Q

A brothel.

You mean a brothel as in a home of ill

repute?

20

A

That is correct.

21

Q

Okay.

22

What was the year of construction of this

property?

23

A

The El Buracho was built in 1896.

24 [

Q

1896.

25

Okay.

And during your recollection, has

either - has there been a bar operating on that business?
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1

A

I have never — I have never seen a business occupied

2

in the El Buracho doing business on — a retail business on a

3

day-to-day basis.

4

Q

All right.

How about the other building?

Describe

the other building for me, 207 25th Street.

5
6

A

207 is a three-story brick building that was built in

7

1906.

It's on the National Historic Register.

It's commonly

8

referred — historically referred to as the Helena Hotel.

9

Q

And do you know what that building was designed for?

10

A

Storage of property and people.

11

Q

Okay.

And let's talk about - let's talk about

12

January 1st through the 9th.

13

during that period of time?

Were these properties vacant

14

A

No, they were not.

15

Q

What use was being made by the owners of this

property at 205 25th Street?

16
17

A

18

205 25th Street, there is all kinds of personal -

storage of personal property.

19

Q

There is building materials.

Let me stop you there for a minute.

First of all,

20

during the dates between January 9th and January 12th of this

21

year, and relating to 205 only, was that premises empty during

22

that time frame?

23

A

No, it was not.

24

Q

I mean empty meaning no people, no property in it.

25

A

No.

I

That - that property has never been empty in the
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last three or four years.
Q

I don't care about that.

During those days —

A

But during those days, no, it was not empty.

Q

So what was inside of it?

A

There was — January there — I probably had moved —

I'm building a deck on my house, and so I'm — I had the
materials was being stored for the deck.

There is restaurant

equipment for the property across the street.

The historic own

a basis in the El Buracho.
Q

On what floors?

A

On the main level.

Q

All right. What else?

A

There is refrigerators and a fry — restaurant

equipment.

There is my son's toys and things like — and

clothing that he's grown out of I have stored there.
Q

So were you using it for storage?

A

Yes.

Q

And is that a legal use of that property, to your

knowledge?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

24
25

Go ahead.

Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

22
23

It calls - I'll object.

Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

To your knowledge, storage is a

legal use of that property?
A

Yes.
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Q

All right.

Now, how about upstairs?

What would have

been upstairs during 1 through 12 of January?
A

In the 205 25th Street?

Q

Yeah.

A

Probably just a few tools.

On the corner.
There's a — there's a

table that I plan on using in an addition to my house that I'm
doing.
Q

A table.

A

A table.

It's a — kind of a breakfast table that has

a — the built-in chairs.
Q

Were you working on it?

A

Excuse me?

Q

Were you working on it?

A

No.

Q

Was it being stored there?

A

Just stored there.

Q

All right.

A

Actually, there's — there wasn't a whole lot on the

second floor.
Q

All right.

A

There's — oh.

There's a huge amount of HVAC

equipment stored on the building.
Q

What is HVAC?

A

Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.

Q

Who put it there?
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1

A

Who put it there?

I did.

2

Q

And what is that material?

3

A

Material to be used for heating and air conditioning

4

and ventilation for that building, for the Helena Hotel, and

5

for other projects I'm involved in.

6

Q

7

knowledge?

8

A

It would be.

9

Q

Okay.

10

Is that a lawful use of this property, to your

Now, let me read you this definition, and I'm

going to talk to 205 only.

11

A

Okay.

12

Q

Tell me if this property was not occupied on a

13

regular basis by an occupant during January 1st through

14

January 12th.

15

A

It was.

16

Q

Was it occupied on a regular basis?

17

A

It was.

18

Q

Who was the occupant?

19

A

Myself.

20

Q

Okay.

21
22
23

With what regularity were you in

205 25th Street between January 1st through 12th of this year?
A

My recollection, at that period of time I was — I was

there every day.

24

Q

Including weekends?

25

A

Including weekends.
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Q

And what were you doing there on a daily basis?

A

A number of things.

I have an — on 205 25th Street,

I was there taking stuff there from — and cleaning out my
garage at my — at my house and storing stuff there.
Q

You mean delivering things from the home and your

garage to be stored at that premises?
A

That is correct.

Q

Okay.

A

And approximate — during that time period, I was

What else?

placing signs in my windows on the main level.
Q

And you put quite a number of signs in, didn't you,

during that time?
A

I did.

There was probably about 25 signs that was

placed on 205 25th Street.
Q

These were signs of a commercial nature, or not?

A

No.

They were signs that I had put up to — to my

frustration —
Q

What did the signs say?
MR. JUNK:

Well, I don't know that that's really

relevant to —
MR. KNOWLTON:

It's relevant to whether it's vacant

or not, and there's a definition of vacant

meaning whether it's

occupied or being used on a regular basis THE COURT:

Right.

MR. KNOWLTON:

But isn't -

- for legal, customary purposes.
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THE COURT:

But isn't that the basis for the other

two — I don't know what — whether something's on the sign makes
any difference.

He put up signs.

That's probably enough,

isn't it, to —
Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Well, was the building used for

the purpose —
A

Yes.

Q

This is not necessarily a commercial sign?

A

No.

They — they were noncommercial speech, political

signs.
Q

Okay.

Messages of your own to the community?

A

That is correct.

Q

All right.

Was there anything unlawful about that

activity, to your knowledge, at that time?
A

At that time there was not.

Q

Okay.

Was it a purposeful action and use of this

property on your part?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

All right.

Now, let me ask you this — let me just

read this to you.
"...not used by a person on a regular
basis for the usual and customary purposes for
which a building is designed and lawfully
permitted."
Does that meet the definition of your building at
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205 25th Street. during these time frames?

Were they being used

on <a regular basis?

A

Was it used — yes , it was used <on a regular basis.

Q

All right.

Now, you told me that this building was

designed as a brothel.

A

Yes.

Q

That/ s not a lawfully permitted function .in Ogden,

Utah, in 2002, I assume.
A

Unfortunately not.

Q

All right.

But to your knowledge, placing signs on

it was lawfully permitted?
A

That was correct.

Q

All right.

Storing tools in it was lawfully

permitted?
A

That is correct.

Q

Moving materials in and out of it for storage

purposes was a lawful purpose, to your knowledge?
A

That is correct.

Q

Okay.

Now, let's go to 207.

That's the adjacent

hotel building.
A

That is correct.

Q

I assume, then — if you know, do you know what that

building was designed to do?
A

To store people and their possessions.

Q

Okay.

Do you know if it was — did you ever see it
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i

operate as a hotel?
A

No.

Q

That was before your time?

A

Yeah.

It was — yeah, it had closed down before I

think we had even moved to the state.
Between the dates January 1st through January 12th,

Q

was this building, 207, empty?
A

It was not.

Q

Why not?

A

^Cause I had an office located on the second floor.

Q

Tell me about the office on the second floor.

A

I have a couch, a desk, a little refrigerator, a

drafting table, pictures, files.
Q

How much space is occupied by that office?

A

Oh, it's approximately 400 square feet.

Q

Is there anything illegal about having an office on

25th Street at this location?
A

For my purpose, I — there's —

Q

Is an office space a permitted use in that area of

the city?
A

It is.

Q

Okay.

A

I do.

Q

And was it there throughout January 1st through 12th?

A

It was.

Did you have office equipment in it?
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1

Q

What else was there?

A

I have a wood shop.

Q

Where's the wood shop?

A

Downstairs on the main level.

Q

And what materials or equipment made up your wood

shop?
A

I have a planer, table saws, a jointer, chop saws,

all kind — all kinds of power tools.
Q

Okay.

Were they in use by you during that time

frame?
A

Probably not.

Q

Okay.

I mean was — you're talking about wood-shop

equipment?
A

Wood-shop equipment.

It's actually a room dedicated

for doing woodwork.
Q

I mean do you — have you been doing woodwork in that

location?
A

I have.

Q

Maybe not during the 1st through the 12th -

A

Yes.

Q

— but at times before that?

A

I have. And in times subsequent to that, I have.

Q

Oh.

A

It is.

Q

And a personal activity that you're engaged in?

That's a personal hobby of yours?
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A

That is correct.

Q

Is there something illegal about conducting a

wood-shop activity at 25th Street?
A

Not to my knowledge.

Q

So if I'd have looked through the windows on the 1st

through the 12th, what would I have seen on the first floor?
A

On the 207?

Q

207 we're talking about.

A

You would have seen a huge amount of restaurant

equipment on the west side of the building.
Q

That would be storage, again?

A

Storage.

Q

Okay.

A

Probably a couple of commercial refrigerators.

Q

Storage?

A

Maybe a motorcycle.

A lot of boxes of personal

property that belongs to me.
Q

Okay.

A

And...

Q

Now, would it be fair to say that 207, during the

time frames that we're talking about here, was not empty?
A

No, 207 was not empty.

Q

All right.

Was it occupied on a regular basis by an

occupant?
A

It was.
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Q

Who was that occupant?

A

That would have been myself.

Q

Okay.

Was it being used by a person on a regular

basis?
A

It was.

Q

How regular were you using that property, 207,

between the 1st and the 12th?
A

Approximately every day.

Q

Okay.

And was it being used for the usual and

customary purposes for which this building was designed and/or
built?
A

It was.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Storage of persons or property?

All right.

Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover?

Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover?
A

Excuse me?

Q

Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover?

A

I do.

Q

Did you pick up a couple of letters that were sent to

Sorry, I didn't hear you.

you from his office dated January 9th?
A

I did.

Q

Okay.

I'll just ask you to take a look.

I've got correct copies of those documents.

I think

Do you know when

they received - when they were received by you?
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1

A

I received them I believe about the 14th.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

Yeah.

4

Q

If they were mailed the 9th, would you have received

5

They are dated the 9th.

them at that address in Layton on the 9th?

6

A

No, I would have not.

7

Q

So it would almost certainly be some day later than

8

the 9th?

9

A

That is correct.

10

Q

So you think it was the 13th?

11

say —

12

A

13? I - I think I said the 14th, but...

13

Q

All right.

14

A

Approximately the 14th.

15

Q

And then apparently you responded to that with a

16

Did you

letter that you delivered to Mr. Glover?

17

A

I did.

18

Q

Okay.

19

I'm sorry.

Have you registered either of these buildings

as being vacant under the Ogden City ordinances?

20

A

I have not.

21

Q

Tell me why not, Mr. Edwards.

22

A

Well, for a number of reasons.

The first reason is,

23

in reading the definition of vacant

24

it is my belief and opinion that the buildings do not meet that

25

criteria.

pursuant to the ordinance,
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1

Q

2
3

What about vacant?
MR. JUNK:

Well, are you going to - I'll object to

that, him commenting on his testimony.

4

MR. KNOWLTON:

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6
7

Q

I will withdraw it.

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Let me ask you this question, Mr.

Edwards.

8 I

A

Okay.

9

Q

Are these buildings leased to anybody for any reason?

10

A

They are currently.

11 I

Q

When were they leased?

12

A

Both buildings have been leased, I believe, since

13
14

about the first part of July.
Q

15

This summer?
MR. JUNK:

Well, then I'll object to anything about a

16 I lease.
17 J
18

Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON) Okay. Have they been used in the -

well, let me — for what purpose are they being leased?

19 I

MR. JUNK:

20

MR. KNOWLTON:

21

24
25

I don't -

Well, I think I'm entitled to relate

it back.

22
23

Well, I'll object to that, too.

THE COURT: We want to tie it back to January?
Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Have you ever leased these

buildings in the past?
A

I have not.
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I

Q

Okay.

A

Well, I have to modify that.

Q

All right.

I have.

Have you received income from them in the

past?
A

I have.

Q

Tell me about it. What was -

A

Approximately twice a year some movie company comes

into Ogden, and they want to shoot down on 25th Street, and
almost inevitably I end up leasing the buildings to some movie
company, television series.
Q

All right.

And with what regularity has that

happened to either of these buildings in the past?
A

Approximately twice a year I enter into some kind of

agreement with a movie company.

Sometimes I get paid;

sometimes I don't.
Q

So there has been at least this use that you have put

them to?
A

That is correct.

Q

All right. And is there a use being made to them

A

Yes.

now?
They are currently leased to a television

series called "Everwood."
Q

For how long?

A

Currently there is twelve months still pending on one

lease with the company, one of - their lease either expiring
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this month or it expires next month, and they just renewed
their lease about three weeks ago.
Q

How much is this paying them?
MR. JUNK:

Object.

I don't see what relevance this

really has to us.
MR. KNOWLTON:
your Honor.

Well, it certainly has some relevance,

It shows the purpose for which the owner is making

use of his property.
THE COURT: Well, but the key question is in January
of this year whether or not they were vacant.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, I think if he was holding the

property in readiness for leasehold purposes and leasing
purposes.
THE COURT:

But he didn't lease them till July.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

What?

He didn't lease them till July.

MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, then they're not leased all the

time.
THE COURT:
question.

So why would - I guess that's the

Why is what he did with them in July relevant to

what is being charged in January?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Oh, yes.

I'll withdraw that.

It's

not really that important.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I think that's all I have for
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1

Mr. Edwards.

2

THE COURT:

Let me ask you before we go any :further.

3

I have the Roy City court calendar at 1:30, and I need to be

4

there at 1:15.

5

MR. JUNK:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. KNOWLTON:

That' s why I tried to get you to

continue it.

10
11

Could we\ finish this trial on another

day?

8
9

And, you know, I''ve got an —

THE COURT:

Well, I know.

We got about two-thirds of

the way through, so...

12

MR. JUNK:

I have an adoption at 1:30 -

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

MR. JUNK:

15

MR. KNOWLTON:

16

THE COURT:

— unless it's canceled.
[Unintelligible.]

Yeah, if we could, and we can finish, and

17

that will give you a chance to talk to your attorney, and then

18

do the cross.

19
20

MR. KNOWLTON:

THE COURT:

25

Are you?

Well, I've got all afternoon,

or we could do it at the end of the city calendar.

23
24

I haven't read my book, but I think

I'm pretty open.

21
22

Can we do it tomorrow?

MR. KNOWLTON:

The afternoon I think would be my

choice.
MR. JUNK:

Huh?
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THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

Bad choice?
I think we — how about like 10:00? Can we

do it at 10:00?
THE COURT:

How long is the city calendar?

THE CLERK:

There's not very many.

THE COURT:

It's not very many?

Do you want to shoot for 10:00 or 10:30 tomorrow
morning?
Are you okay with that, Mr. Edwards?
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

10:00 *o clock?

10:00 o'clock tomorrow?
Yes. All right.

Well, we'll see you

tomorrow morning, then, at 10:00 o'clock.
(Whereupon a recess was taken, to be resumed
on Friday, October 18, 2002, at 10:00 a.m.)

-cOGDEN, UTAH - OCTOBER 18, 2002 - 10:15 A.M.
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1

HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

Bruce Edwards. We have, I think, two

4

cases we were trying, and I think Mr. Edwards was on the

5

witness stand when we took a recess yesterday.

6

Do you want him to come back up, please?

7

MR. KNOWLTON: Yes.

8

Bruce, step right up.

9

THE COURT:

10

0315. All right.

All right. And this is on case 0420 and

Go ahead, if you're ready, then.

11

BRUCE EDWARDS,

12

having been previously duly sworn, called

13

at the instance of the defendant, testified

14

further upon his oath as follows:

15

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)

16

BY MR. KNOWLTON:

17

Q

Mr. Edwards, let me just — yesterday I asked you

18

about some notices that were sent from Ogden City to Westland

19

Development, two letters dated March [sic]

20

received them or ever saw them, and I believe you stated you

21

had.

9th.

I asked if you

22

A

I did.

23

Q

And the question I had was when you would have seen

24
25

That is correct.

them for the first time.
A

I received those on January 13th or 14th.
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Q

Okay, And that would be consistent with the date of

January 9, I suppose —

1

A

That is correct.

Q

— a couple of days mailing.

let me j ust ask you this.

Okay.

If I were to —

Did you receive any not.Lee from the

city aft er that concerning registration of th:Is bu.ilding, or
registration of any vacant building?
A

After that?

Q

Yes, sir, after that.

A

Not in writing.

Q

Okay.

I'm just looking at the provision of the

ordinance that suggests that there's ten days.

You have ten

days to comply after given the written notification?
A

Yes, there is.

Q

Did you — when would this ten days have come up?

A

It would have had to come up at — no sooner than

January 19th.
Q

So if you got it the 9th, the date it was actually

dated, then you'd have had the ten days up to the 19th to
register.

Is that what you're saying?

A

That would be correct.

Q

Okay.

If you got it the 14th, you'd have until the

24th A

That's -

Q

- with the ordinance?
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1

A

Yeah.

That — that should be logically correct.

2

Q

Okay.

Let me show you a couple of photographs that I

3

will mark.

4

handle that, but let me proceed just for a second.

5

testified yesterday that you occupied both of these buildings.

Counsel has indicated there may be another way to
You

6

A

That is correct.

7

Q

And I think you indicated there is an office.

8

You

maintain an office in these buildings?

9

A

Yes, I do.

10

Q

Which floor is your office on?

11

A

The second floor of the Helena Hotel.

12

Q

Could someone observe that from the sidewalk looking

13

in one of the windows?

14

A

No, they would not be able to.

15

Q

Okay.

16

And then I think you indicate that there is

some materials that you have stored in both buildings?

17

A

There is.

18

Q

And a wood shop?

19

A

There is.

20

Q

Where is the wood shop?

21

A

The wood shop is in the - the south portion of the

22

Helena.

The Helena's kind of shaped like the state of Utah -

23

Q

All right.

24

A

- and it's - so it's in that little top square kind

25

of section of the -
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Q

Can someone observe that shop from the outside street

level?
A

No, they would not be able to.

Q

With what regularity did you occupy these buildings?

A

I am generally down there at least six days —

Q

Let me be more specific.

Between the 1st and the 12th

of January of this year, with what regularity were you actually
there, if at all, on these premises?
A

My best recollection — recollection between

January 1st and January 12th is I was there every day.
Q

How long would you be on a daily basis during that

time frame?
A

Probably no less than an hour or two on Sundays, and

as long as maybe eight to ten hours on other days.
Q

Do you take your son with you there from time to

time?
A

I do.

Q

How old is he?

A

He would have been four in January.

Q

Did he use this building as you do?

A

No, not as I do, but he has —

Q

I see some toys in these pictures.

A

He has toys and things like that that are available

there.
Q

Let me show you Exhibits 5 and 6.

Tell me what these
69
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photographs — tell me what they are.
A

Exhibit No, 5 is pictures of the interior of the

El Buracho, or 201 - or 205 25th Street, and these pictures
were taken in September but reasonably reflect the property
that was — was in the building during January.
Q

All right.

So they reasonably and accurately depict

the condition of the building in January of this year?
A

Yes, they do.
MR. KNOWLTON:

We'd move the admission of 5 and 6,

Judge.
MR. JUNK:

When were those pictures taken?

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

September.

September.
I have no objection.

THE COURT: All right.

We'll admit D-5.

(Defendant's Exhibit 5 received)
Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

And apparently it shows your desk,

does it not, on one of them?
A

Yeah.

For the admission number 6, the top center

picture is a picture of my office and the bottom left — the
right-hand corner picture is a picture of my office.
a toolbox with miscellaneous, you know.
and there's tools and things in there.

It shows

There's a chop saw,
It shows a picture of

my son's little Jeep, pictures of plumbing supplies and
hardware and stuff that I've stored in the building.
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Q

How about the other ones (inaudible) Exhibit 5?

A

Well, I already described this one, but —

Q

Oh.

A

Well, no I didn't.

This - No. 5 is of the

El Buracho, and it shows, you know, we use a claw-footed
bathtub when they have special events out on 25th Street for —
like the street — for putting soda drinks and that kind of
stuff in, fill it full of ice and drinks.
Q

Say that again.

A

There is a claw-footed bathtub in the one picture

that's used for special events on 25th Street, like the Street
Festival, where we fill it full of ice and put drinks and
things in it.
Q

So do you participate in that?

A

I have participated in numerous activities.

This

year the Street Festival was not held down on 25th Street, and
the thing stopped at Grant.
Q

Okay.

A

And it shows a — there's a — a wok and an ice-cream

machine and some other restaurant equipment, and a snow blower
and exercise equipment in storage.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I think that's all I have.

Just a

moment, Judge.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

That's all I have.
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JUNK:

3

I'll cross.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

4

BY MR. JUNK:

5

Q

6

All right. Any cross?

Now, if I understand you right, Bruce, from the

pictures you've just submitted, they were taken in September?

7

A

That is correct.

8

Q

And you're saying that the property would have been

9
10

in the same general condition in September that it was back in
January?

11

A

That is correct.

12

Q

Now, just for the record, you don't live at these

13

buildings, do you?

14

A

I do not.

15

Q

You have a residence somewhere else?

16

A

I do.

17

Q

Now, how long have your — have you had an interest or

18

your family had the ownership of this property?

19

A

Six, maybe seven years.

20

Q

Okay.

21

And, if I understand, the buildings are just

located at the corner of the courthouse parking lot, just a —

22

A

They are.

23

Q

That would be the back of it.

24

A

They are.

25

Q

So just not too far from here. And when - let's see.
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When you purchased those — I guess I'm a little familiar with
this — you had purchased them, and your intent was to build a
bed-and-breakfast and a restaurant?
A

I'm going to say that — that's incorrect.

Q

Okay.

At some point you had that plan to build a

bed-and-breakfast and restaurant, did you not?
A

Yeah, but they — they were never purchased.

Q

For that, or — okay.

A

[Unintelligible.]

Q

But that was your — at some point that was your

But that was —

intent, was it not, to build a bed-and-breakfast and a
restaurant in those building?
A

That is correct.

Q

And how is it that they were going — this

bed-and-breakfast and restaurant were to be laid out in that —
these two buildings?
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, I'm going to object as to the
relevance.

I don't know what difference it makes what he

intended at some remote point in time.

The question is whether

or not these buildings were vacant on the dates charged,
January 1st —
MR. JUNK:

Well, I think -

MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

- through 12th.

But I think it goes into the customary use

and purpose of the buildings.
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1

MR. KNOWLTON:

2

THE COURT:

3

Q

Not his intent.

I'll allow it.

(BY MR. JUNK)

Okay.

Go ahead.

How is it that you had planned

4

to lay out the bed-and-breakfast and the restaurant in those

5

buildings?

6 !

A

How was my intent to lay them out?

7

Q

Yeah.

Did you have some kind of plan where the

8

restaurant would be and where the bed-and-breakfast rooms would

9

be and how you'd —

10

A

Okay.

The El Buracho was going to be possibly a

11

restaurant, and the second and third floor of the Helena were

12

going to be the bed-and-breakfast.

13
14

Q

Okay.

Now, you had some partners or something that

you were going to do that with?

Is that -

15

A

No.

16

Q

Now, if we walk through the — if we went and walked

17

through the El Buracho — that's 205 — today, what would we see?

18

Essentially what — are any of the pictures there?

19

A

20

today.

21

stored inside the El Buracho and the Helena.

22
23

Q

Those pictures would reasonably reflect what's there
In addition, there is property owned by "Everwood"

Okay.

And "Everwood" is the movie that you've leased

with after; is that right?

24

A

That is correct.

25

Q

And apparently they have changed the front of the
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building?
A

They have signs that have been attached to the — both

buildings.
Q

Okay.

But other than the "Everwood" property —

you've got some of that.

You've got the other things that

would be in these pictures.

What exactly would be there?

A

What exactly would be there?

Q

Yeah.

Well, let me just ask you.

What would be

there different today than would have been in, say, January,
besides the "Everwood" property?
A

Besides the "Everwood" property?

quite a bit.
building.

Quite — actually

There — I have moved a lot of things out of the

I rented a house that I have in Ogden to an

individual, and I furnished that house with property that was
located in the building, including two children's bedroom sets,
a master - master bedroom set, some couches, living-room
furniture, tables and chairs.
Q

Okay.

A

So all of that property came out of mostly the

El Buracho, and some of it came out of the Helena.

In

addition, I have moved stuff into the building, some
construction material, some doors that I purchased, and some
property from my parents' estate.
Q

Okay.

Now, you indicated that there was some duct

work or something in —
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1

A

HVAC.

2

Q

HVAC.

3

A

It's located on the roof of the building.

4

Q

Okay.

A

No.

And where is that located at?

So that's not on the interior of the building?

5
6
7

There is some — there is a huge amount of an

HVAC located in the interior of the Helena.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Okay?

10
11
12

So when you talk about the El Buracho, so, you

know , I'm trying to —
Q

All right.

So there's some on the — the exterior,

the roof of the —

13

A

Of the El Buracho.

14

Q

— El Buracho.

15

A

And on the interior of the Helena.

16

Q

And what is the use for that?

17

A

Heating, air conditioning, ventilation.

18

Q

And are you going to use it in those particular

19

buildings ?

20

A

21

The majority of it will probably be used in those

buildings , but I have used a few pieces for other things.

22

Q

When would they be used in those buildings?

23

A

When will they be used in those buildings?

24

Q

Yeah.

25

I mean what would be the purpose for their use

in those buildings?
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A

Oh.

The purpose of the use in those buildings is to

provide ventilation for the heating and air conditioning
system.
Q

Okay.

When you renovate the buildings?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, you indicate also there was a wood shop.

A

That is correct.

Q

Now, what is the — is that wood shop used?

A

It has been.

Q

And when was it used?

A

It's been used for...

Q

Well, let met ask you.

Was it used, I guess, when

you were renovating the building yourself?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

But that has stopped, has it not?

Now, if I understand it correct, you don't

have any business license or you're not licensed to do any
business in that — in either of those buildings, are you?
A

I do not.

Q

And have there ever been any business licenses for

either of those buildings during your ownership tenure?
A

There hasn't.

Q

And I understand there's not any building permits at

this point that you have with the city to do building or
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construction at this time.
A

There has been no construction going on in the

building for some time.
Q

But I'm just saying there's —

A

And there — and there are no construction permits

outstanding.
Q

Okay.

Have you ever had a construction permit for

that building?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Okay.

A

Four or five years ago.

Q

Okay.

When was that?

And have you applied to the city for any

certificate of occupancy?
A

No.

Q

Do you know what zone those particular buildings are

located in?
A

I do, but - I think C2 or - CBDC2 or something like

that.
Q

How about CBDI?

A

Okay.

Q

Are you familiar with the permitted uses in the CBDI?

A

I have read them.

Q

Okay.

Is a warehouse or storage a permitted use?

MR. KNOWLTON:
as to the relevancy.

Judge, let me interpose an objection

We're not charged with violating any
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zoning ordinances here.
THE COURT:

Well, the question is whether or not the

building's vacant or not —
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well -

THE COURT: - and I think what he's saying is he's
storing equipment there.
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

The question is -

Well, also, though -

MR. KNOWLTON:

- what is permitted use, if this

witness knows.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JUNK:
vacant,

But also, if you look at the definition of

it says lawful use, and I guess my argument would be is

that if it's not a permitted use in that zone, then that would
not be a lawful use.
MR. KNOWLTON:

No.

It says designed and lawfully

permitted.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JUNK:

Well, okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:

It doesn't say permitted within that

zoning area.
THE COURT:
Q

I'll overrule the objection.

(BY MR. JUNK)

Go ahead.

Isn't it true that warehousing or

storage is not a permitted use in that particular zone?
A

Not - I don't - I don't believe that the definition
79
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1

of warehousing

— okay.

2

Q

Well, I'm just asking -

3

A

My — my personal —

4

Q

The question was, is —

5

A

My personal property is not warehousing.

I mean I'm

6

not — I'm not opening — I don't have a warehouse open to the

7

public.

8

Q

So —
But it's true that that — those are not permitted

9 J uses; is that correct?
10

A

Not to my knowledge.

11

Q

Okay.

12
13

And you have never applied for a nonconforming

use permit with the city, have you?
A

I have not.

14

MR. JUNK:

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

Q

Your Honor, if I could approach.

(BY MR. JUNK)

I'm going to show you what's been

17

marked as City's Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11. At least are you

18

familiar what — what the pictures — there's four pictures in

19

each it looks like. Are you familiar with what the pictures at

20

least represent?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And what are — maybe you could go through.

23

A

Okay.

24
25

The - do you want - do you want me to go

through each picture?
Q

No.

Just a - are they generally pictures of
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different angles of the —
A

Well, the -

Q

— building and the property?

A

Well, the top two pictures most reasonably depict a

piece of property that was commonly referred to as the
Bamberger Building.
Q

Okay.

A

Okay?

Which identified the rear of the property.

Q

Okay.

That wouldn't have relevance to this, would

A

It would not.

Q

Okay.

it?

Why don't you just put a — take your pen and

cross through that, then.
A

Which?

The two pictures?

Q

The pictures that deal with the Bamberger.

A

Okay.

The bottom two pictures are of the exterior of

the El Buracho.
Q

Okay.

Go on.

A

The top left-hand picture is an exterior picture of

Lincoln, off of Lincoln of the El Buracho.

The right-hand

picture is a picture of the interior of the El Buracho showing
the - at least three of the dressers that I had - that were
used in furnishing this house that I had previously referred
to.
Q

So if I understand, then, they would have been there
81
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during the January period of time but wouldn't be there now.
A

Yeah.

They would not be there currently.

Q

And it appears at least there's a date on these

pictures, is there not?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

A

Okay?

It says February 21st.

Then the bottom - or the bottom left-hand

picture shows some windows and doors and, again, the — one of
the dressers that I have in the building.

And the right-hand

side basically shows — mostly it shows a part of a cooler on
the left that's sometimes been used for special events down on
the street, and a sign that downtown Ogden procured and had
available when they were displaying the women — they put up a
display and had it in the El Buracho, the women of 25th Street.
The top left-hand picture shows the exterior windows
from, you know, probably about the curb.

The top right-hand

picture shows the west side of the Helena.

The bottom

left-hand pictures shows the second and third floor, primarily
in the transom windows of the Helena.

The right bottom picture

shows one window of the Helena.
Left top picture shows another window of the Helena
Hotel.

The bottom right picture is of the Helena.

pretty good view of the mountains.

It has a

It refers to a sign that —

again, the sign that downtown Ogden and a display that downtown
Ogden put together of women of 25th Street and notorious
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25th Street, talking about Fanny Dawson.
The left picture, again, is property that downtown
Ogden was storing in my building that they use at the rodeos
and stuff like that they - they had displayed for Pioneer Day
this year in front of the Eccles Building.
Q

Okay.

A

And the bottom right-hand picture really doesn't show

much except a sign.
Q

Okay.

But what — can that be looking in one of your

windows up?
A

Yeah.

That - that would — and I — I think that that

picture was taken of the El Buracho.
Q

Okay.

Would these — these would be fair and accurate

representations of the building around the February 21st period
of time?
A

I do not — no.

Q

They're not?

A

A number of those pictures would not represent.

Q

In what way would they not?

A

Okay.

Q

Okay.

A

This picture here would not be representative of

what - what that looked like on — on the - in January, nor
would this picture, nor this picture.
Q

And why?

83
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

A

Because on — at that point in time there were — these

windows were obscured from being able to take those pictures.
Q

Okay.

So other than those three pictures that you've

pointed out, and the ones we've crossed out, they would be fair
representations of what the buildings looked like in January?
A

Of the exterior.
THE COURT:

Let's see.

I don't think you ever

offered Exhibit 6, did you, Mr. Knowlton?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I don't recall.

I know you offered 5.

MR. KNOWLTON:

I've -

Oh, I thought I offered -

THE COURT: - got it up here.
MR. KNOWLTON:

- them both at the same time, two

exhibits.
THE COURT:

I didn't ever indicate.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I'll move it's admission at this time.

All right.

Did you have any objection to

six?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
All right.

Which was six?

The pictures?

Well, there's two sets of pictures.
Oh. No.
There's Exhibit 5 and then Exhibit 6.

We'll admit Exhibit 6, then.
(Defendant's Exhibit 6 received)

MR. JUNK:

Your Honor, I'm going to move to admit
84
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Exhibits 9, 1C , 11, and 12!, which will be the pictures but for
tfere not
the ones that Mr. Edwards has indicated that i
representativej of the property at the time in January.
THE COURT:

Did you get to look at those,

Mr. Knowlton?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I ]have no objection.

All right.

We'll admit 9, 10, 11, and

12, except for the ones that he said did not accurately
reflect, and I don't know how you want to identify those,
but...
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

I think he's withdrawing them.

Yes, I am.
Okay.

So you withdraw the ones that he

indicated do not accurately represent the condition in January?
MR. JUNK:

And at this time, your Honor, I feel — I'm

going to ask that — my opinion is the best evidence of this
particular building, because it's so close, is to go look at it
at this time.

I think it's - Mr. Edwards has submitted

pictures that were taken in September, and indicating that the
building is very close to what it was in the condition in
January.

And so I'm asking that we just walk over and take a

look at it.
THE COURT: All right.

What's the defense position

on that?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Oh, I oppose it. Gosh, we're in
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October.

It's the middle of October.

It's remote in time

January 1 through 12.
THE COURT:

Well, I guess the real question is

whether or not it now looks the same as it did in January.
That's the issue.
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

Let's not.

Let's not.

Well, he just submitted - I find it kind

of funny that they've just submitted pictures that were taken
in September and want to tell that it's in the same condition,
but now they want to say that it's too remote in time.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I don't want to waste the time. I

don't want to spend the rest of the day on this case, Judge. I
guess that's my concern.
MR. JUNK:

Well, my opinion is —

THE COURT: All right.
evidence?

Why don't we finish the

I'll take your motion under advisement, and let's go

ahead and finish the testimony.
MR. JUNK:

Okay.

I'll just move to admit these

pictures, then.
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

That's 9, 10, 11, and 12?
Correct.
All right. And you had no objection to

any of those, Mr. Knowlton?
MR. KNOWLTON:

No, I haven't any objection.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12 received)
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1
2

THE COURT: All right. Any other questions that you
have?

3
4

MR. JUNK:
Q

Yeah.

(BY MR. JUNK)

So but for the things that you have

5

indicated, then the pictures that were taken in February would

6

be consistent with what was in January, as at least the way it

7

looked and things of that nature?

8 J

A

Try that one more time because -

9

Q

All right.

10

A

— you...

11

Q

Apparently these pictures were taken in February.

12 I

A

Okay.

13

Q

And you've already indicated that some of them were

14

not consistent with the way the building looked in January.

15

A

That is correct.

16

Q

But for what you've had excluded, these pictures

17 I would be fair and accurate of the condition of the building in
18
^

January?
Cw

* did11'*1 s e e which ones you had excluded.

20

Q

Well, the ones that you pointed out as excluding.

21

A

Okay.

22
23

would be true.

Now, on the exterior of the building, that
That would be correct.

MR. JUNK:

I don't believe I have any further

24 I questions of this witness.
25 J

THE COURT: All right. Any other questions,
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1

Mr. Knowlton?

2
3
4

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Mr. Edwards, in January, January 1 through 12, was

5

there any apparent commercial activity that you were making use

6

of this building for?

7

A

No, there was not.

8

Q

[Unintelligible] restaurant or a hotel or a buffet or

9
10

a bar or any business with an obvious commercial function and
purpose, was there?

11 |

A

No, there was not.

12

Q

Were you conducting any kind of profession or

13

occupation that required licensing by Ogden City in that

14

building during that time?

15

A

I did not.

16

Q

Were you nevertheless occupying the building during

17

those days, 1 through 12 of January?

18

A

I did.

19

Q

Was this use personal or professional or commercial?

20

A

I used it for my own benefit and work that I needed

21

to do at other properties and stuff like that.

I—

22

occasionally I had the equipment, resources there.

23

Q

You didn't have a dental office in there, did you?

24

A

No.

25

If I needed - if I needed to have a board planed

or I needed to do — to have a piece of plyboard cut to exact
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1
2

dimensions, or something like that.
Q

Were you engaging in any occupation that you are

3

aware of requires a license from the city to engage in in your

4

own property on that day?

5

A

Absolutely not.

6

Q

Now, you're storing your property, your own personal

7

property, in your own real property.

8

special license, to your knowledge, from Ogden City?

9
10
11

A

Does that require some

I've never — I have no knowledge of Ogden City or any

other city that requires any kind of license like that.
Q

Were you storing goods for other parties as in

12 I warehousing?
13

A

No.

14 J

Q

So all of the property that was stored and/or kept in

15
16
17

the premises from 1 through 12 January was your property?
A

There's a motorcycle in the property the belongs to a

friend of mine, but...

18

Q

Did you — did you charge somebody for that?

19

A

I did not.

20

of storage.

21

Q

It's not a business you are engaged in?

22

A

It's not a business I'm engaged in.

23
24
25

I have never charged anybody for any kind

It's some place

to keep it out of the snow.
Q

Were you engaged in the business of storing goods for

third parties for consideration?
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1

A

I am not.

2

Q

All right,

3

A

I've never received any consideration from any party

4
5
6

for any storage in any brick building.
Q

Were these — were your buildings vacant from

January 1st through 12th?

7

A

They were not.

8

Q

Under any definition?

9

A

I — under any definition that I — under Black's

10

Dictionary,

Law

which says empty is — or vacant —
Well, I don't care what Black's

11

Q

says.

But you were

12

there.

13

A

I did.

14

Q

Your child occupied them?

15

A

He goes down there routinely.

16

Q

You did it on a regular basis from January 1st

You occupied them?

12 t h ?

17

through

18

A

I

19

Q

If not a daily basis?

20

A

My recollection is I was there every day.

21

Q

It was consistent and regular and usual?

22

A

It is.

23

Q

And the use that you were making of your buildings

24
25

did.

during this time frame was the use designed by you, was it?
A

It is.
90
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q

And the use that you have made you had designed the

building to accommodate, had you not?
A

I don't know if I — where I designed it, but it -

it - it Q

It's the use you made of your own property?

A

Yeah.

It's the use I made of my own property, and

I'm not sure I can say I designed the use, but —
Q

All right.

A

- but it's suits the purpose of that use.

Q

I mean is there some special, unique use originally

designed for these buildings that your use was inconsistent
with, in your opinion?
A

Absolutely not.

In fact, I believe the definition of

a hotel is to store people and their property.
Q

And the definition of a brothel is where you can have

sex for a fee.
MR. JUNK:

I'll object to that.

THE KNOWLTON:
Q

I mean -

It's argumentative, yes. Thank you.

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

You weren't there to design the

original use?
A

No.

Q

Did you even know what the original use of the

property was designed to be?
A

In the case of the El Burocho, a brothel.

In the

case of the Helena, for storage of property and persons.
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I

MR. KNOWLTON:

I think that's all I have,

Mr. Edwards.
THE COURT:

All right.

Anything else?

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. JUNK:
Q
building.

Now, you're familiar with the history of the
Have there ever been — besides the brothel and the

Helena, have there ever been any other businesses in those
buildings?
A

I want you to repeat that again because I'm —

Q

All right.

A

What I think you said is —

Q

The history.

Has there ever been a recognized —

besides what you're using it for, besides the Helena and the
El Buracho —
A

Okay.

Q

— since those periods, when was the last time there

was a business in — where people were coming and going?
A

In either business, or —

Q

In either one.

A

Okay.

The last time either property has been used

where a business license has been issued, based upon the
history that I know of those buildings, was in the early 1970s.
Q

Okay.

A

Okay.

So it's been thirty-plus years since the
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properties have had a recognized, retail, functionable
business.
Q

But during that time period, the Helena —
I believe you answered my question.

Now, I

understand you — you've now contracted with this movie company
for a year to use the front fagade of your building?
A

That is correct.

Q

Now, on your block, there are businesses, are there

not, that have regular customers?
A

There are. And there are other buildings that are in

the same category as mine which do not have regular customers
and are not considered vacant.
Q

Well, you've got, what, restaurants on your block?

A

Correct.

Q

Pawnshops?

A

No pawnshops on my block.

Q

Okay.

A

A block down.

A block down or something?

MR. JUNK:

All right.

That's all the questions I

have.
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Just so the record is straight, these are historic

buildings registered with some registry?
A

Yeah.

Both buildings are on the National Historic

Register and on the State Historic Register.
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(

1
2

Q

What that means to you is that you can't actually

change the outside of the building?

3

A

No.

I — you cannot modify the exterior of those

4

buildings.

5

demolished —

6

Q

Okay.

7

A%

— and the city told me that that is not a

8

possibility.

9

Q

I even petitioned to have the El Buracho

Because they're historic buildings, whatever that

10

means, legally you understand that to be you cannot destroy,

11

level them, raze them, or modify the exterior?

12

A

That is correct.

13

Q

And the interior, however, are you as the owner at

14
15

liberty to do that?
A

Yeah.

I mean subject to —

There's - there's very little said by the

16

State Historical Society about what you can do on the interior

17

of the buildings.

18

Q

So there's no historical limits about the interiors?

19

A

There's very few historical limits.

You're — you're

20

pretty much given a free rein on the interior, but they — they

21

have a lot to tell you what — you know, what happens with the

22

exterior.

23

MR. KNOWLTON:

Thank you.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. JUNK: I don't have anything.

All right.

That's all.

Anything else?
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THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, you can step down.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

That's all that we have.

So the defense rests.

Any rebuttal?
MR. JUNK:

Yes.

I will recall -

THE COURT: Mr. Glover?
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

Mr. Glover.

Thank you.

Come on up, sir.

Let's see. And I think

Mr. Glover testified yesterday.
MR. JUNK: Yes.
THE COURT:

You understand, sir, you're still under

oath?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: All right.

Go ahead.

WAYNE GLOVER,
having been previously duly sworn, called
at the instance of the plaintiff in rebuttal,
testified upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

Mr. Glover, you're familiar with the zone that these

two buildings are located in?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And what zone are they located in?

A

My check tells me it's in the central business
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district, the intensive zone.
Q

Okay.

And you're familiar with the permitted uses in

that zone?
A

I have read them, yes, sir.

Q

And is storage or warehousing, is that a permitted

use?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, I'm going to object.

argumentative and speculative.

It's

And if the ordinance, the

zoning ordinance, is relevant, the best evidence is the zoning
ordinance, not his recollection.
THE COURT:
at this point.

Well, I do think it's relevant, though,

I'm going to allow the testimony.

Go ahead.

Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

Is that a permitted use?

A

I don't recall that from the list, sir. Without

referring to it directly, but I don't recall it being there.
Q

Well, if I submit to you, I guess this - I'm going to

show you what's been marked as City's Exhibit No. 12 for
identification, and what does that represent?
A

This is a list of the permitted and conditional uses

in the central business district zone.
Q

And did you review that recently?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And you're looking at it now.

Does it indicate that

warehousing or storage is a permitted use?
A

I don't see that use listed here, sir.
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Q

If someone does not have a permitted use but they

want to use a property in an un-permitted way, is there a
method to apply to do that through the city?
A

I guess you could change the ordinance.

Q

Can you ask for a non-permitted use permit?

A

No, I'm not aware that there's anything like that,

Q

Okay.

sir.
Now, for Mr. Edwards to occupy his buildings,

would he have to apply to the city for some certification of
occupancy?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, I'm going to object unless

there's some expertise this witness has that he's not shared
with us at this point.

I mean he says, "I'm in charge of

buildings and inspections" —
THE COURT: All right. Maybe you can just lay a
foundation —
MR. JUNK:

Okay.

THE COURT: — as to whether or not he knows about
that.
Q

(BY MR. JUNK)

What is your title, again?

A

Pardon me?

Q

What is your title at Ogden City?

A

I'm a manager of building services.

Q

And as a manager, are you familiar with the building

and occupational laws and ordinances of the city?
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A

Yes, sir.

permits.

The building process generally, building

Business licensing, that's also a function under my

division,
Q

And you're the —

A

And a building official. And as part of that, we

operate the development services counter for Ogden City, where
all the development issues come in, where people apply for
permits, land uses, subdivisions, all of those kinds of things.
Q

And you're the — the manager or the lead individual

for Ogden City of these particular subjects that you've
indicated?
A

For building permits and business licenses, yes, sir.

Q

And for a building such as the two that we're talking

about, the El Buracho and Helena if someone were to desire to
do a building and get a permit, they would do it through your
office?
A

Yes, sir.

You'd apply to me for a building permit.

Q

And also, if you wanted some type of occupancy or

certification of occupancy, would they apply to you also?
A

Well, indirectly.

What it would involve pretty

typically is application for a business license and/or
remodeling permit or building permit for that matter, at the
end of which, then, we would somehow wind up with a certificate
of occupancy.

That's one of the charges that I have, is to

issue certificates of occupancy.
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Q

And is there a certificate of occupancy for either of

these buildings at this time?
MR. KNOWLTON:
your Honor.

I'm going to object.

It's irrelevant,

This is prior crimes, prior wrongs. We're not

charged here with violating city ordinances.
THE COURT:

Well, but it seems to me the reason it's

relevant is the question of whether or not the building is
vacant.

And Mr. Edwards' contention is that it's being

occupied and that he's using it for storage.

So for that

reason I think it is relevant, and because he's saying it's
being occupied.
Q

So I'll overrule the objection.

(BY MR. JUNK)

I'll ask you again.

Is there a

certificate of occupancy for either of these buildings?
A

I have no record of one, sir.

Q

And you've checked your records?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And is there any ongoing permits for building in

either of these buildings?
A

There's no permit for remodeling in either one of

those two buildings.
MR. JUNK:

That's all the questions I have of this

witness.
THE COURT: Any cross?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Yeah.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

Does Ogden City not have people that are engaged in

zoning administration?
A

Do they have?

Q

Yeah.

Does Ogden City hire people that actually

specialize in things like zoning, what uses are permitted in
what areas?
A

Yes, sir, they do.

Q

Is that your office that administers zoning in Ogden

City?
A

Not in my office, sir.

It's on the counter where —

where I have my office.
Q

I'm sorry.

I can't hear you.

A

It's at the counter where I have my office.

Q

So my question, is that your office, is that your —

A

No, sir, it's not —

Q

— responsibility?

A

— my office.

Q

It's not your responsibility?

A

No, sir.

Q

And it's not one of the sub-responsibilities of your

office?
A

Well, actually it is, sir.

Q

I'm sorry.

You have - you have some administrative

supervision jurisdiction over zoning?
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A

Yes, sir, we do.

Q

Well -

A

We look at those land-use issues as a condition to —

Q

What — I wasn't finished —
MR. JUNK:

Q

I'm going to object.

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)
MR. JUNK:

He was answering.

MR. KNOWLTON:
Q

- with my question.

Just a moment, Mr. Junk.

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

You have to let me finish my

question, and then I'll let you finish your answer.

Thank you.

So let me try again.

23
24
25 |

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Do you handle zoning in your office?

A

No, sir, I do not.

Q

Who does?

A

Greg Montgomery.

Q

And what is his job?

A

He's a manager of planning, the planning division.

Q

I see.

A

In the planning division?

Q

Yes, sir.

A

No.

Q

Do you have experience in the zoning or

Now, have you worked in that office before?

administration or enforcement of zoning in Ogden City?
A

Yes, sir, I do.
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Q

What does that experience consist of?

A

Originally I was a housing and zoning inspector for

Ogden City.
Q

And how long ago was that?

A

Started in 1982.

Q

And how long did you work in zoning as an inspector?

A

Well, the zoning function was transferred — the

zoning enforcement was transferred to the planning division
probably in 1994, something like that.
Q

How long did you work in zoning inspection?

That was

my question.
A

1984 to about 1994, sir.

Q

About ten years?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

Now, you are familiar with the permitted use

in the central business district?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

And the storage of personal property is not a

permitted use of real property in the central business
district?
A

Not from the list that I've seen here, sir.

Q

Is my office, 427 27th Street, in the central

business district?
A

I don't recall, sir.

I would have to look the

address up on the map.
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Q

So storing my personal property, old library books,

old law books, that's not a permitted use in the central
business district, if I'm in the central business district.

Is

that what you're telling me?
A

That's what it says here, sir.

Q

Oh.

Does it say there that the storing of personal

property is forbidden?
A

No, sir.

It doesn't say —

Q

What does —

A

- that's it's -

Q

- it say?

A

- permitted.

Q

It just gives a list of items that are permitted.

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

So it doesn't actually forbid storing old law

books?
A

It doesn't say it's not permitted because there are

only two choices.
Q

Okay.

Is storage — storage of personal property

permitted in a residential area?
A

I'd have to go back and look at the zoning for that

specific use.
Q

Do you store personal property in your own garage?

A

Oh, yes, sir.

Q

Is that permitted use in a residential area?
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1

A

I don't know the answer to that, sir.

2

Q

Well, do you think you can run a business of storing

3

people's property in a residential area?

4

A

Storing people's property?

5

Q

Yeah.

6

Do you think you can run a commercial

warehouse storage facility out of your home in Ogden?

7

A

Probably not.

8

Q

That probably would be a violation of the zoning

9

ordinance for a residential area, would it not?

10

A

I would make that assumption, yes, sir.

11

Q

That probably would not forbid you from storing old

12

tools and bicycles and kids' toys and your own personal

13

property in your own garage, however.

14

statement, Mr. Glover?

Would that be a fair

15

A

It sounds like a fair statement, counsel.

16

Q

Okay.

Now, do you know if Mr. Edwards has been in

17 | the business of storing people's goods in either of these
18

buildings during the dates of January 1st through 12th of this

19

year?

20

A

Do you mind repeating the question?

21

Q

Well, do you have any reason to believe Mr. Edwards

22

was engaged in business, a business, a commercial business, of

23

storing goods between January 1st and January 12th?

24 J

A

No, sir.

I don't have any [unintelligible].

25

Q

But you're telling me storing his own goods in his
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1

own building during those dates would require a license from

2

Ogden City?

3

A

4

No, sir.

What I'm saying is it's not one of the

permitted uses outlined in the ordinance.

5

Q

You're saying that these buildings cannot be used for

6

anything other than the permitted uses outlined in the

7

ordinance?

8 I

A

That's my understanding of the ordinance, yes, sir.

9 |

Q

So I can't even keep my own personal property in my

10

own law office if I'm in the downtown business district?

Is

11 J that what you're telling me?
12

A

No, sir.

13 I

Q

You just don't know?

14

A

No, sir.

15

I'm not telling you that at all.

What I'm saying is the permitted uses, the

question you asked specifically is not on the list.

16

Q

I see.

17

A

That's what I'm testifying to.

18

Q

So working in your own building at a desk —

19 J
20

MR. JUNK:
Honor.

Well, he answered the question, your

I'm going to object to asking that again.

21

MR. KNOWLTON:

22

THE COURT:

23

No, I wasn't asking it again.

Go ahead and ask your question.

Go

ahead.

24 I

Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Sitting in a building owned by -

25 | the person's own building, sitting at a desk in their building
!
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doing paperwork is not a permitted use in the central business
district — is that what you're telling me? — under Ogden zoning
ordinances?
A

No, sir.

I don't think I said that at all.

Q

Well, that's my question.

in - well, just tell me.

Didn't you tell me that

Is it or is it not legal to sit in

your own building and do paperwork at a desk in the central
business district?
A

I'm not aware that's illegal, no, sir.

Q

I mean I assume if he's not plotting to overthrow the

government, it probably would be perfectly legitimate and legal
behavior.

Yes?

A

I would assume that's legal behavior, yes, sir.

Q

Okay.

A

I don't know that there's anything illegal about it,

if that's your question.
Q

Do you need a license to do that in Ogden, Utah, to

sit at a desk and do paperwork on your real estate and real
property holdings?

Is that a licensed activity where he has to

;

have a permit?
A
22

No, sir.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I think that's all I have for

23 i Mr. Glover.
24

THE COURT: All right. Any other questions?

25

MR. JUNK:

Yes, I have.
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1

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. JUNK:

3

Q

4
5
6
7
8
9

Mr. Glover, you had testified yesterday that you went

over to the property on — sometime in November?
A

I don't recall it exactly.

As I recall, the dates

were in January, but I —
Q

Well, one time before January and then January.

Did

you also go over sometime in February?
A

It's possible, yes, sir.

I don't recall the

10

dates but there was another — another action that may — was

11

about that time, yes, sir.

12

Q

And did you take some photographs of the property?

13 I

A

I didn't personally press the button on a camera, but

14
15

I was present when the photos were taken, yes.
Q

I'm showing you what has been collectively marked as

16 j City's Exhibit 13. Are you familiar with those particulars?
17

A

Yes, sir.

18

Q

And were you there when those pictures were taken?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And what do those pictures represent?

21

A

These are pictures of the property that we're — that

22

we're here for today that — that show the condition inside

23 I through the windows, taken from the sidewalk.
24 I

Q

Okay.

And these pictures were taken on what date?

25 j

A

The note says "2-21-02," sir.

I would assume that'd
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be the 22nd [sic]
Q

of February of this year.

And are - those particular photographs, how would you

relate those to the property that you observed in January?

Do

you see any differences in those photos versus what you
observed —
A

I think they're substantially the same.

Q

And were you able to look through the windows and see

when those pictures were taken?
A

On this date we could, yes, sir.

Q

And would you have been able to look through the

windows also on — in the January date that you had gone through
and at least see substantially the same properties on the —
A

That's my recollection, yes, sir.
MR. JUNK:

Your Honor, I'm just going to move to

admit Exhibit 13.
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:

I don't even know what it is.

Can we reserve on this till I cross?

Go ahead.
Okay.

I think that's all.

Go ahead.

All right.
RECROSS EXAMINATION

23

BY MR. KNOWLTON:

24

Q

Did you take these photographs?

25

A

I was present when they were taken, yes, sir. My
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1

staff and I took those pictures that day.

2

Q

Well, somebody wrote "2-21-02."

3

A

Yes, sir.

4

Q

Who wrote that?

5

A

That would have been Lee Evans, the inspector who

6

Is that your writing?

accompanied me on that day.

7

Q

You didn't write this?

8

A

No, sir, I did not write that.

9

Q

And you didn't take the photographs?

10

A

Not personally, no, sir.

11

Q

And you're saying that you looked in these windows on

or about January — February 21st?

12
13 I

A

Yes, sir.

14 I

Q

And this what you saw?

15

A

Yes, sir.

That's a pictorial representation of what

16 j we saw.
17

Q

18

So this would have been, what, about a month and a

half after the end of the violation that he's charged with in

19 I this case?
20

A

Yes, sir.

21

Q

So is there any way you can tell me, Mr. Glover,

22

whether or not this was the condition of the property between

23

January the 1st and January the 12th of this year?

24

A

25

I think I testified yesterday that - that I had seen

similar things in that area on the January.
i
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Q

How would you — I thought he — I thought he had signs

in the windows earlier in January.

In fact he was charged with

having signs in his windows in January, was he not?
city charged him; it's one of the charges.

I mean the

In fact, it's not

before us today, but in the same information.

Were there not

signs on his building in January?
A

There were some signs there, yes, sir.

Q

And those signs obscured the ability to look into the

building.
A
signs.
Q

It's one of the violations, in fact. Yes?
Not totally, no, sir.

You could see around the

They weren't totally covered.
So your guess is that this is a little bit like what

must have been there in January?
A

Yes, sir, that's my recollection.

That is my

recollection, yes, sir.
Q

Are you familiar with the zoning - I mean this

ordinance giving the registration of vacant buildings?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And this is your department.

This is what you do for

a living, is enforce this regulation, this ordinance.

Yes?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And it's a new one, as I suppose that it came in -

what, December of last year —
A

Roughly, yes.

Q

- it was passed?
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A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

So we've only had, what, six to eight months — ten

months to deal with it at all.

This is probably the first

prosecution under the ordinance, likely.
A

Yes, sir, I think it is.

Q

Okay.

This thing, as I read it, this all falls in

16-8 (b) dash whatever, right?
A

Yeah.

Q

And as I look under 16-8 (b)-3, it really says that

you give a notice.

You mail a notice, and the city sends a

notification to the owner of the vacant property.

And then

they have ten days to register the building, right?
A

Yeah.

Q

(Reading)
"The owner of the building shall, within
ten days of notification, register such building
as a vacant building and submit a vacant-building
plan, unless a stay is granted under subsection E
of this section."
That's literally what it says.

A

Yes, that's exactly what it says.

Q

Okay.

So you sent notices to Mr. Edwards, or the

owner of the property, Westland Development, January the 9th,
two notices, one for each building?
A

Yes, sir.
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Q

You caused your staff to send those out?

A

Yes, sir, I did.

Q

You believe, because of your ordinary office

procedures, it probably got mailed, although you didn't see
that?
A

I did not see it get mailed personally.

Q

Bruce said he got it, so that's a safe bet it was

mailed by your office.
A

That's kind of the bet I would make, yes, sir.

Q

It's not likely he would have received it at the

address in Layton on the same day it was mailed, not by the
U.S. post office.

Yes?

A

Not — not the same day as mailed, no, sir.

Q

He might get it the next day or even a couple of days

later?
A

Typically, yes, sir.

Q

So the 10th of January would probably be the earliest

he would have got it, unless that was a Sunday — I don't
remember — right?
A

I'm not familiar with the process of the post office.

Q

All right.

A

I assume there'd be some delay getting —

Q

So let's say — let me just - I didn't mean to cut you

A

You bet.

off.
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Q

1

Let's just say — and Bruce tells me the 9th was a

2

Wednesday — but let's just say he gets it the following day,

3

the 10th of January.

4

before he's out of compliance, right?

Under the ordinance, he's got ten days

5

A

Yes, sir.

"%

Q

From the day he gets it.

7

20th of January before he's violated any law, isn't he?

9

A

Could happen, yes, sir.

Q

What do mean could happen?

10
11

MR. JUNK:

I'll object to that. Mr. Knowlton can

MR. KNOWLTON:
with this.

MR. JUNK:

15

MR. KNOWLTON:

16

THE COURT:

I want this witness to help me

Now You discussed this department.

I'll allow him to answer the question -

go ahead — if he can.

18
19

No.

I think this is —

14

17

Isn't that what it says?

argue what the law says.

12
13

So he's good to go till the

Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

He has ten days from the date he

gets notice, yes or no?

20

A

Yes, sir.

21

Q

And that's the way the statute — the State ordinance

22

reads, and that's the way you construe it?

23

A

Yes, sir.

24

Q

That's the way your department, I assume, enforces

25

it.

So if he's got ten days from the date he gets notice, and
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he gets notice the following day, on the 10th, one-day delivery
by the post office from Ogden to Layton, then he's not in
violation of anybody's ordinance until ten days has expired.
If you count the next days, that would be the 20th.

The 20th of

January would be the first day he'd be in violation if he fails
to register.
MR. JUNK:

Again I'm going to object, because I think

that's for the Court to interpret the actual law.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

No.

No, I think it's -

He can answer the question, if he can.

I

don't know if he has —
Q

(BY MR. KNOWLTON)

Mr. Glover?

Is that what you understand,

Does he have ten days to comply [unintelligible] —

A

Well, yes, sir [unintelligible].

Q

What's the earliest, in your opinion, that

Mr. Edwards could have gotten notice, or the owner could have
gotten notice of your notice?
A

Well, based on the letter he provided me, the 13th of

January was the date he effectively got notice.
Q

Okay.

So he'd have till the 23rd of January before

he's in violation of the ordinance.
A

Yes?

Yes, sir, that's correct.
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I think that's all I have.

All right. Any other questions,

Mr. Junk?
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FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JUNK:
Q

But he never did comply with the ten days, did he, as

far as coming in and actually registering in that leeway time
that you had given him?
A

No, sir.

Q

Never has registered at all, has he?

A

No, sir, he has not.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. KNOWLTON: No.
THE COURT: All right.

Did you have any objection to

that exhibit P-13, the photographs?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Could I have just a moment, Judge?

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:

Go ahead.

Oh, I do object to 13. These were

these were the photographs, if I remember, that Mr. Junk
manually removed from the ones that were admitted and he
removed them because Mr. Edwards said that they did not fairly
and accurately depict the building on the dates in question,
January 1 through 12. And I don't know that this witness has
told us anything different.

He didn't even take the

photographs, and I think he said —
THE COURT:
photographs.

It doesn't matter whether he took the

The question is whether they reflect the

condition of the building, right?
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MR. JUNK:

And he indicated that they were

essentially — or consistent with what he observed in January,
consistent with what he observed in February.
THE COURT:

I'll allow Exhibit 13.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 received)
THE COURT:

Any other questions for Mr. Glover?

MR. JUNK: No.
THE COURT:

Did you have any other questions of

Mr. Glover?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

No, not of this witness.

All right, sir, you can step down.

THE WITNESS:

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

Any other testimony?

MR. JUNK:

Not at this time, no.

THE COURT: All right.

Did you want to argue the

case, since you've rested.
MR. JUNK:

Yeah.

I guess I'd renew my motion to go

look at the...
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

And you're objecting to that?

Yes.

I think it's a waste of time.

I appreciate the offer.

I think I have a

pretty good picture of what this looks like just from the
photographs, so I'll deny the motion at this time, Mr. Junk.
MR. JUNK:

Okay.
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1

THE COURT: All right. Any argument on the matter?

2

MR. JUNK:

Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, the first

3

issue that I will address is I believe that Mr. Knowlton is

4

making a point about the ordinance that does allow that once a

5

violation has been noted that a notice will be given and given

6

ten days to cure that particular problem by registering and

7 I presenting a plan.
8

A letter was sent out in this particular case, and

9

it's true that we did give him ten days.

In this case, though,

10

Mr. Edwards did not ever come in and cure that particular

11

problem that we had given him notification of, and therefore we

12

have, then, cited him for the period of time when the actual

13

inspections were taken.

14

Now, the ordinance was still established.

He did not

15

have it registered; he has not presented a plan.

We did comply

16

with the ordinance in giving him the ten days to come in and

17

comply with that, and he has failed to do that, and so he is —

18 j in my opinion and argument, is that he was in violation.

He's

19

never cured that particular problem, and therefore we can go

20

forward.

21 j

I think there's not any — obviously there's no

22

defense that he's made about registering or presenting a plan.

23

He's not said that he has complied with that.

His whole

24 | defense is is whether or not this is particularly a vacant
25

building.

And my argument is is that in fact it is a vacant

!
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building.
The definition of vacant,
is, A, it's empty.
in it.

at least in the ordinance,

Well, I guess there are clutter and things

I mean there's no — there's no argument that he is

storing things, but I don't know — I don't know if that is what
is intended on empty, but I think it's the other two that I'll
focus on more.
B, it says not occupied on a regular basis by an
occupant.

Well, we've already found that there is not any

occupational certificate for this property.
business.

There's no ongoing

It's true that Mr. Edwards may go into the property

occasionally to check on things, but he doesn't have any
building permits, so there's no building going on in that
property.

He doesn't live in that property.

And so my

argument is is that although he may visit the property, he may
even sit at a desk, that he does not occupy that property under
the definition of this particular ordinance, and this
building — these two buildings should both be declared as
vacant.
Further, the third section indicates not used by a
person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes
for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted.

And I

think this is clear, that he is again maybe there on a regular
basis, but it's not for the usual and customary purpose for
these particular buildings and what is set up in the zoning
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ordinances of the City of Ogden for that area.
A storage or warehouse is not a permitted use. And
maybe the — he has indicated again that there's no business
license.

There hasn't been a business license for that

property since the seventies.

He's in fact leased the front of

the property out for a year, which indicates to me there's not
an intent for the next year to even use this particular
property for any type of business. And there's not any zoning
or building permits that have been issued to renovate or to use
this particular property in the future for what I would
consider as the customary or lawful use.
So, again, I think the Court should determine that
these buildings are vacant, and therefore Mr. Edwards does need
to comply with the ordinance by presenting a plan and also
register those buildings with the city and comply with the
ordinance.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Junk.

Mr. Knowlton?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, Mr. Edwards has probably been

over here with the city more times than anybody I've ever
known.

And I don't know that the history is important, but I

suppose it has something to do with it.
Bruce has used of his property in ways other people
have not.

I suppose one the uses he's made is the he's used

his windows to hold signs to make statements about Ogden City
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that are not particularly complimentary.

That's for another

day, obviously, and that's not the issue that we have here for
today.

The question that we're dealing with is whether or not

he has failed under the Ogden ordinance to register a building,
and then if it's a vacant building, to register and submit a
plan, put a plan together.

And then, obviously,

[unintelligible].
I guess the first problem, the easy problem, that I
see as far as the defense is concerned, is that if you take the
city at its word, you pull out 16-8 (b)-3 — this is their
ordinance, a brand-new ordinance.

It was brand new since in

December, and this is their first enforcement case. And then
it says except as provided in subsection B of this section,
which is the one just below it that deals with single-family
dwellings, not applicable here.
"Whenever a building is vacant for more
than 90 days, or whenever any building is
vacant and such building or premises thereof
contains one or more public-nuisance violations
as defined herein, then the owner of the building
shall, within ten days of notification, register
such building as a vacant building and submit a
vacant-building plan, unless a stay is granted
under subsection E of this section,"
which goes down and describes how you could do that.
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Now, if I hear the testimony of Mr. Wayne Glover, he
says - and I don't think there's much dispute about this - he
says his staff sent out a letter January 9, and he says
Mr. Edwards obviously got it January the 13th because he came
in that same day and handed in a letter responding to this, and
I don't think [unintelligible].
Now, if I read the ordinance and take the city at its
word, Bruce is good for ten days from the 13th. There's no
crime that Bruce could have committed until the expiration of
thirteen [sic]

days.

And so the earliest that he could have

been guilty of any criminal offense under the city's own
ordinance would be ten days from the 13th of January.

That

gets us to the 23rd of January of this year.
Now, that would be nice if we were charged through
January 23rd as another date, but we're not. And I think in a
criminal case we have a right the hold the city's feet to the
fire.

They haven't even asked to amend their own information,

and their own information says that Bruce committed the offense
from January 1st through January 12th, 2002.

You know, we're

just outside by ten days the limit, the time frame, under which
they seek the criminal conviction.
And so I don't know how you can do it, and I don't
know how you can say, well, since there's no evidence that he
actually did within the ten days or thereafter, somehow he's
retroactively guilty back to some time before he even got the
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He got the notice on the 13th. That's a day after the

1

notice.

2

12th, the day after the information [unintelligible]. So I

3

don't see how any court can find a criminal violation by

4

Mr. Edwards or any other person under the city's ordinance if

5

you read the ordinance.

6
7

Now, that's just the simple solution to the problem.
The real concern I have is that this building is not vacant.

8 ! Mr. Junk obviously has this thinking that he says, if it's a
9 | comraercial building and it's a commercial property, and if it's
10

located in a commercial section of the city, ipso facto it has

11 I to be used for commercial purposes.
12 I

Now, that just defies common sense and the law of

13 I property.

You know, there's a lot of limitations on owning

14 I property, but one of the bundle of rights that an owner of
15 I property has is the right to choose, within the legal
16 | framework, what use he can make of his own property.

And just

17 I because a commercial use is a permitted use — like running a
18 J hotel or a restaurant or a bar or a nightclub, but not a
19 J brothel — doesn't mean that that owner has to exclusively use
20
21 J

the property for that purpose.
Now, maybe the city would like it. Maybe it would

22 j helpful tax-wise if we did, but there's no law anywhere that I
23

can - know of that compels the owner of commercial property to

24 I use it for a commercial purpose. And, of course, there is no
25 j licensing requirement for an owner to use his property unless
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he uses for a purpose the law requires be licensed, like
practicing law or dentistry or running a bakery or whatever
else.
Now, that gets you to the definition of vacant

under

this statute, and the property need not be registered, is not
liable to be registered, unless it's vacant.

Now, they say,

"Well, he doesn't live there." And you say, "Well, is
residence the same thing as occupancy," and I think the Court
knows better than that.
I go down to my office every day — but not every day,
most days.

I don't live in my office.

nights in my office.

I don't spend the

But I don't think anybody would argue

that I don't make — I don't occupy it on a regular basis.
Bruce doesn't have to live in his property in order to make use
of his property on a regular basis.
Now, we have Wayne Glover from the city, and we have
the assistant who've come in and said on two occasions they've
gone to the outside of the building, and they've looked in and
they've seen nobody.

Once, I guess Mr. McDougal (sic)

was during the lunch hour.
see anybody.

"I looked in the window.

said that
I didn't

I assumed the place was vacant." And then

Mr. Glover told us on two occasions he goes down, and he spends
five minutes looking around some signs and doesn't see anybody,
and that's the basis for his conclusion that it's vacant.
Now, I don't know what the city's got besides those
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two witnesses to bring to this court evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that this property is vacant under the
definition of the ordinance.
Now, Bruce's testimony is largely uncontradicted.

He

says, "I know I have a right, if I wanted to ask for it, to
build a commercial facility there.

I also use it for a

purpose — for my purposes as I have designed it" — it's his
property - "and I have designed it to be used as an office
where I go down on a daily basis, some days as long as ten
hours, and other days as short as maybe twenty minutes. And I
do about the same thing Mr. Knowlton does when he's at his
desk; I do my paperwork, and I do the work that's associated
with owning this building and owning some other property, and
other paperwork that I have to do as part of my everyday
functions, and what it is I do for a living and what it is I
want to do as a hobby.
"And I use the property while I'm there and have my
son play with his toys.

i
And then, while I'm there, in the past }

and still, I have a wood shop, with equipment to operate a wood
shop, and materials to make with the wood shop as a hobby and
on a personal basis."
And then he says, Judge, in addition to all that —
what is one man's junk is another man's treasure — he says, "I
store a lot of my personal property there." Now, I guess we
spent a lot of time with, gosh, running a warehouse is not a
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permitted use down there.

Storage, you know, commercial

storage is not permitted down there.

But I don't think anybody

is seriously suggesting to this Court that storing your own
personal property, even your own real property, is a use for
which is excluded in a downtown business district.
That's no different than me keeping old law books
that out of date out in the library that I haven't bothered to
throw away.

That's like saying I can't keep personal property

stored in my garage at home. Well, that's nonsense, and I
don't know how anybody argues that.
So you look at this definition of vacant,

and you

say, "Is it empty?" Well, even the photographs that the city's
brought us show this property is not empty.

And then you say,

"Is it not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant?" And
you say, "Well, what is the contradiction to the testimony of
Bruce?"

He wasn't seen on two occasions of five minutes each

by Mr. Glover.

That's their testimony, and then on two

occasions — or, yeah, just one occasion in each building by his
associate, when he goes down on the lunch hour — Bruce wasn't
seen inside the building.

On the strength of that, they

conclude, and urge the Court to conclude, this building is
vacant.
And of course, in spite of that, Mr. Edwards has
testified under oath to this Court that he's there on a daily
basis every day, probably if not ten hours on most days, at
125
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

least for a period of time that is regular.

It's a regular

basis by the occupant of the building.
And we're not getting charged here, Judge, with
occupying a building contrary to a certificate of occupancy.
That's something for another day if Ogden City's concerned
about that.

That's a separate crime, and that's not one that

we're facing here.
And then, of course, this other question.
guess is the one of the city's best arguments, is C.

This, I
They say:

"not used by a person on a regular basis
for the usual and customary purposes for which
a building is designed and lawfully permitted."
Now, you say, wait.

You can't say it's not being

used by Bruce on the regular basis.
daily basis.

He's clearly using it on a

That is regular basis, a multi-daily basis.

So

it's used on a regular basis, and it is in use for the usual
and customary purposes for which the building was designed, and
that's for what Bruce has designed it.

It's his property.

It's his choice to make a decision what use should be made of
it.
He has designed this building to his own needs for
the storage of his own property, for the maintenance of his own
office, and for the running of his own hobby shop, this wood
shop, all of which are lawfully permitted.

And the only time

they're not lawfully permitted is if he wants to do them
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commercially.

If he wants a license to run a wood shop and do

work for other people, he'd probably have to be licensed.

And,

on the other hand, if he wants to practice law from that
office, I suppose he'd better have a license for that too.
But he has designed his building.

This doesn't say

for the purpose for which it is historically or originally or
once upon a time designed and lawfully permitted.

If that's

true, then this one building on the corner can only be used for
a brothel.

It's an illegal purpose, no less than the

[unintelligible] Building, because that's a bar, and that's
another purpose, and you have to have special licensing to run
it.

And even the owner of the building can't use his property

for a bar unless he has special permits.
Anyway, I ask your Honor to take a look at that, and
I think if you do, in addition to the evidence, you will fairly
conclude with me that there is no evidence that the city's
presented, and it's certainly not beyond a reasonable doubt —
that's the criminal standard — by which Mr. Edwards can be
convicted of this crime.
Now, you can go through Section 16-8(b), and you look
for the penalty section without success. At least I looked
without success.

The only penalty section I could find is whenj

you turn over to Section 16-12-1, and that talks about remedies
and penalties.

Now, the city doesn't have any remedies, and of

course they've chosen to proceed criminally.

And this one
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says, subsection (a), misdemeanor:
"Any person who fails to comply with any
of the provisions of this title is guilty of a
Class B misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished as provided in Title I,
Chapter 4, of this code."
It seems to me it's an all or nothing.

So Bruce is

either guilty of a misdemeanor, if they have presented evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to this Court's satisfaction, or he's
not guilty, and interestingly he's not even charged with a
Class B misdemeanor in this case.

It's been mis-charged.

There is nothing in here I find that says "or such lesser
penalty as the city may elect."
And I don't know that coming in and saying we've
decided to charge him with an infraction as a necessary lesser
included crime that the city can convict somebody of, as
opposed to a Class B, which is what the ordinance says a
violation shall comprise. And I suppose if that's the case,
then the city can simply say, "Well, we're going to convict you
or charge you with some lesser offense, really because we just
don't want to go to the trouble of giving you the right to have
a jury trial that you would be entitled to if we applied the
law as written."

That's an unusual feature.

And so I don't see how, as alleged, the city has
established a crime at all under their very own ordinance.

So
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that's unique to me, and I'll leave it up your Honor's
consideration, because I don't know how that will play.
Those are my observations, Judge.

I just think, number

one, within the ten days, the time frame that they've alleged,
they haven't proven guilt, couldn't prove guilt; secondly, that
they have not shown and could not show beyond a reasonable
doubt the matter that is before this Court [unintelligible],
and therefore that Mr. Edwards is under the provisions of this
registration act. And then three, it's a misdemeanor, it's a
Class B misdemeanor, and that's not what the information
charges.

I would urge you to dismiss it.
THE COURT: Mr. Knowlton, have you looked at

Exhibits 8 and 9?

Somebody's put plywood across the windows.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

Where?

On Exhibits 8 and 9.

I guess that's the

building we're talking about, isn't it, or one of them?
MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I don't [unintelligible].

I guess I'm curious to know how you —

what you think — what's the significance of somebody putting
plywood across the windows on the question of whether or not
the building is vacant.
MR. KNOWLTON:
that.

I think we entered submissions of

What if you put up plywood across your living-room

window?

Because the window's broken and you don't want to pay

to fix it — that'd be a good reason — or because you don't want
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1

somebody to stick boards through it if you're doing work in the

2

area, or because —

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. KNOWLTON:

5
6

[Unintelligible.]
- [unintelligible] take shots at you.

There's a million reasons.
THE COURT:

So you don't think it has any

7 J significance?
8 |
9

MR. KNOWLTON:

Oh, I don't think so.

Counsel can

certainly argue it, but there's no evidence before the Court on

10 I why that plywood was put there or how long it's been there or
11 | what reason it was.

I can think of numerous reasons why you'd

12 | do it, legitimately do it.
13 j

THE COURT: All right.

14 J

Any response?

15

MR. JUNK:

Thank you.

Yes, just a couple of things, your Honor.

16 I First, as far as Mr. Knowlton's last argument, I believe that
17 j that has been addressed by the Court of Appeals, where they
18 I have indicated that the prosecutor does have the authority to
19 j charge a crime as an infraction on these type of situations.
20

believe the case is McDonald.
>•

21
22

•"—'•"

I

I'd be glad to provide
i*

Mr. Knowlton with a copy of that.
And then just a — I think it is important to look and |

23

see the boarding up of the windows.

In fact, one of the

24

ordinance — provisions in the ordinance is that you can't

25 j obscure windows, and one of the things that you can't obscure
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1

them with is the plywood.

2

that it is a vacant building.

3

I think that is relevant to indicate

My argument is, your Honor, Mr. Knowlton can make,

4

you know, a flowery argument about Mr. Edwards coming down to

5

the property and some of the storage and doing these things,

6

but I — my opinion is is that does not take this building out

7

of a vacant status. And as you look at — sure, he can do all

8

those things, but still, under this ordinance, this is a vacant

9

building, and the purposes of the particular ordinance is to

10

then take it from that vacant status into the traditional

11

status.

12

And although despite Mr. Edwards' going to the

13 j property and maybe even sitting at this desk or — well, anyway.
14

And the purpose of the plan on these things are so that the

15

plywood in front is taken away.

16

will that plywood or these opaque windows, when will they be

17

restored to actual windows?

You can have a plan.

When

When will these other problems —

18 | when you look in from outside, you see the accumulation of this |
19

personal property.

One of the things is that you can't have

20 | rubbish or things within your vacant building.
21

Now, again, Mr. Knowlton says one person's junk is

22

another person's treasures, but the purpose of the ordinance is

23

to say that when people walk by these buildings that that

24

accumulation isn't visible.

25

these type of things — it's even anticipated that people would

And so just because you accumulate

\
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have those type of things inside these buildings — but that
does not take it away from the vacant status.
And I think if you look at the overall thought
process and the traditional use and the things that — what
Mr. Edwards is trying to bootstrap into saying that this isn't
a vacant building, our argument is is that the Court will find
that it is vacant.
And as I've already argued about the ten days, yes,
we did give him notice.

We complied with that.

didn't — he never came in.
charged.

But he

Yes, he would have not been

We were asking him not to charge him, and we were

giving him the ten days.

But then when he didn't comply with

that, then we did charge him, that it was actually inspected.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Judge, may I just make an observation

on the information with respect to your question?
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KNOWLTON:

This charge of the windows and glass

exterior doors on the building being painted or otherwise
obscured by plywood.

One of the allegations that we're not

trying today was held for a determination [unintelligible].
THE COURT:

That's the two that we're not trying,

right?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Yeah.

That's the first of those two.

THE COURT: Okay.
All right.

Well, I appreciate the arguments,
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counsel.

Let me address this question about the allegation,

and the violation is alleged to have occurred between
January 1st and January 12th, and what I see is a situation
where the city sends notice to the defendant — I think it was
about the 13th — telling him essentially that you've got ten
days to correct the problem, and you've got ten days to
register the building or file a building plan, and if you don't
do that, then you're going to be in violation.

And that's how

I read that, is to say, if you correct the problem, there's not
going to be a prosecution here.

But if you don't do that, then

we find that you're in violation of the ordinance.

So I'll

deny the motion to dismiss on the question of the date on the
information being January 1 through January 12.
On the elements of the offense, there's no dispute
that he failed to register the building, in either case, and
there's no question that he failed to provide a building plan.
And the only issue here is whether or not the building is
vacant.

Mr. Edwards' contention here is that the buildings are

not vacant, that he stores equipment and tools inside the
building, and that he occupies the building because he comes
down there every day on a regular basis.

He also claims that

he has an office on the second floor, and he has some woodwork
or a wood shop that he has there inside at least one of the
buildings.
That evidence, of course, is countered by Mr. Glover,
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07

who says he never applied for a business license; he never
applied for a building permit; he has no certificate of
occupancy; and storage is not a permitted use for either one of
these buildings.
In addition to that, we have testimony from — well,
we also have testimony from Mike McDonald, who said he went
there on the 9th of January.
buildings were vacant.

As far as he was concerned, both

No one was there.

evidence of any activity.

There was no

The doors were locked.

It appeared

to just be open space where there was lumber and plywood
stored.
And I think again that was consistent with
Mr. Glover's testimony when he said he went down there in
November of 2001 and again during the period of January 9th
through 13th. He said no one was there.

It was not occupied.

It appeared that there was some partial construction going on,
but in his opinion the buildings were not habitable.
And also we have this evidence about the plywood.

I

just thought that was significant* that — on the question of
whether or not the building,is*^vacant or not, that somebody
would put up plywood over the windows on a least one of the
buildings.

It certainly suggests to me that the building is

not being occupied. I can't imagine any kind of business going
on if you put plywood over the windows.

So I thought that

evidence was significant.
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I'm going to find in this matter, Mr. Edwards, that
the city has proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt on
both cases, the cases ending in 0315 and 0420, on the two
counts of failing to register a vacant building, and also the
count involving failing to provide a building plan for that
particular building.

So I'll enter convictions on both of

those counts on both cases.
Now, did we want to do sentencing at this time also?
MR. KNOWLTON:

It's up to you, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, it's actually up to Mr. Edwards.
He has the right to be sentenced in not less than two days or
more than forty-five.

Do you want to waive that time?

MR. EDWARDS: Sure.
THE COURT: All right.

Anything you want to say

about sentencing?
MR. KNOWLTON:

No, but I think you've heard probably

more than you needed to, Judge.
criminal.

Mr. Edwards is not a typical

It's hard for me to view this as typically criminal

behavior.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KNOWLTON:

I don't know what else to tell you.

can certainly see a number of reasons why [unintelligible] —
THE COURT:

These are infractions.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

- [unintelligible] city requested.

Right. As I understand it, the maximum
13
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1

penalty would be $750 plus an 85 percent surcharge on each

2

count?

3
4

MR. KNOWLTON:
scenario.

5
6

I think that is the worst-case

THE COURT: All right.

Did you have any

recommendation or suggestion as far as sentencing?

7

MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, I think this is minimal. I

8

think the criminal intent you're talking about is quite

9

minimal.

10
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything that Mr. Edwards wants to

say?

12

MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, let me just go on to say one

13

other thing.

14

these under the ordinance, and I think it's $25 on a first

15

offense —

The city itself has recommended disposition on

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. KNOWLTON:

18

Isn't that not right, Mr. Junk?

19

MR. JUNK:

20
21
22
23
24
25

- unless I'm misinformed.

You'd have to point that out to me,

Mr. Knowlton.
MR. KNOWLTON:

The bail schedule under 16-12-3,

failure to register or re-register a vacant building.
MR. JUNK:

I think that's - that would be on the

civil deals, charges on a civil penalty.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Initial penalty, $25, standard
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1 I penalty, $100.

2

That's the importance the city attaches to it.

3

THE COURT:

4

All right.

Anything else you wanted to

add or say?

5

MR. KNOWLTON: No.

6

THE COURT: All right.

7

And anything Mr. Edwards

wants to say?

8

MR. EDWARDS:

9 I

THE COURT:

10

MR. EDWARDS:

11
12

Yes, your Honor, I do.

Okay.

Go ahead.

Your Honor, I was in this court back in j

October of last year.

The city had several charges for zoning

violations against me.

Our first court had fifteen charges on

i
!

j

13
the El Buracho and fifteen charges on the Helena. We went to
14 | court on Tuesday morning, and Mr. Junk came to court and says,
15 I "Your Honor, I forgot my [unintelligible] today."
16 |

That day I worked on preparing for the next day's

17

trial, and Tuesday there was a city council meeting.

Mr. Junk

18

contacted my attorney, Mr. Knowlton, and said, "Mr. Knowlton,

19 j we would like your client to take down the signs that he has
20
21 j

attacking - against the city administration."
I have been in a dispute with Ogden City for

22

three-plus years.

The city administration has told me many,

23

many things that they've never been — that they've never

24

followed up with.

25

and have treated me like I'm some kind of cockroach from a

They have sent people down to meet with me
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1

third-world country that they're going to grind in the ground.

2

Wednesday morning Mr. Junk approached me and says,

3

"Mr. Edwards, the city would like for you to take your signs

4

down for six months." And I said, "No, that's not going to

5

happen."

6

resolved."

7

"Okay."

8

resolving these problems, I'm prepared to take my signs down

9

for sixty days."

He says, "Well, we're committed to get these problems
And we talked for a few minutes, and I said,

I said, "If the city's resolved to - or committed to

I said, "If you can't solve the problems in

10 j sixty days, you cannot solve the problems in six months."
11

Mr. Junk called the mayor, came back and says, "Okay,

12 I we have a deal.

You take the signs down."

You know, so he

13

made part of the plea bargaining — a plea bargain, take —

14

taking the signs down that I had attacking the administration,

15

signs that said "Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity,"

16

signs that said "Ogden City Administration Is Incompetent,"

17

"Why Would Anybody Do Business in Ogden?"

18

Prior to this, just — I had said — I had to go to the

19

mayor's office and try to meet with the mayor, and his

20

secretary said that he didn't want to meet with me.

21

a letter to the mayor that said, you know, based upon how I had

22

been treated in Ogden City and what I know about how the city

23

does business, why would anybody want to do business in this

24

town?

25

discuss this.

So I sent

You will have thirty days to contact me if you'd like to
Otherwise, I will launch an advertising
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campaign, you know, to let other — I think — it was my position
it was patriotic duty to let other people know how Ogden City
conducts its business.
Well, I entered into an agreement with Mr. Junk to
take the signs down.

Mr. Junk entered into an agreement that

the city was committed to resolve the problems.

In the sixty

days that followed that agreement, not one person from the city
met with me or dealt with me.
said, "I am available.
phone.

I went to the city council. I

Here is my home phone.

Here's my cell

I am willing to meet with anybody at any time."
Downtown Ogden contacted the mayor's office and said, j

"Bruce is willing to buy lunch.

Let's meet with Bruce, and

let's see what we can — let's see what problems we can get
resolved."
And these problems include Ogden City going outside
Utah state law and doing activities that are illegal. You
know, one example — I've got hundreds of examples, but I don't
want to waste the Court's time.

I do want to supply one

example of the way Ogden City does business.
I also am involved in the property across the street
from the El Buracho, commonly referred to as Pancho's. For
several years at the Street Festival, Ogden City would locate
their Port-A-Potties right next to where I was doing business.
I approached special events and talked to Carolyn Bachman and
said, "Would you please remove your Port-A-Potties from next to
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my business?" And Carolyn Bachman said, "We own the sidewalks,
and we can do whatever we want to on those sidewalks." They
were never removed.
The next year, Carolyn Bachman — or special events
placed their Port-A-Potties again right next to where I'm doing
business.

So after about the second or third time that

happened, I just decided it is not worth doing business in
Ogden.

So I got out and subleased the business.
The next year, the city placed their Port-A-Potties

right next to where - a business by the name of Grandma's
Tacos & Burritos were.

They contacted me on Friday of the

Street Festival and said, "Bruce, you need to get this resolved
for us." So I went to the city administration, said, "Look,
you know, we've been here before.
unprofessional."

This is extremely

I spent two hours in the city administration

office trying to get someone to deal with it.
went to the health department.

Nobody did.

I

I said, "You know, this has got

to be a health-code violation." And they said — the — the
administrator of the health department said, "Yeah.

There is a

law, a Utah state law, that says that you cannot have
Port-A-Potties within 100 feet of food establishment."
I then took that ordinance to the city.

I said, "Now

look, you know, remove these Port-A-Potties from next to this
business."

They again were not removed.

I went to the Street

Festival the next day, took pictures of where the
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1

Port-a-Potties were located next to food vendors, and the —

2

Ogden City has the Utah State Chili Cook-Off rights. And from

3

where they were preparing chili, the Port-A-Pot- — from where

4

the guy was cooking his chili, the Port-A-Potties were four

5

feet away.

6

So back on track with - with the - so nobody met with

7 I me from Ogden City in that sixty-day period of time.

I knocked

8

on doors.

I made telephone calls. Nobody was interested in

9

trying to resolve any of the problems that the city had.

I

10

entered into that relationship in good faith.

Ogden City

11

entered into an agreement in this court, made with me, that

12 I said, you know, you take your signs down, we're going to get
13 I some of these problems resolved.
On December 31st, I put my signs back up. On

14 I

15 j December 9th, the city passed this ordinance that says you
16 | cannot have signs in a vacant building.

Okay.

Now, the — the

17 | city — on January 2nd, Ogden Police Department contacted me
18 j about the signs being — being up.

I contacted the police and

19 i half a dozen attorneys and got legal opinions from them,
20 I including the ACLU, and the - I was told by the police
21 | department and I was told by Mr. Glover's department that they
22 j were forcibly going to go in my building and remove those
23

signs.

24 I
25

Now, it's my opinion that the building is not vacant,
has not been vacant, and I don't believe the city has acted in

j
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good faith relative to any business or any dealings that I have
had with this city.

They have always told me one thing, and

they have always done something different.

That's all, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Edwards.

Does the city want to be heard, Mr. Junk?
MR. JUNK:

Yes, your Honor.

I think that the long

sort of history with the city is not the issue in this
particular case.

In this case, all we're asking Mr. Edwards to

do is register his building and present us with a plan.
Therefore, based on the two convictions, I'm asking that the
Court would issue a $750 fine on each case, and then indicating
that there would be some waiver or reduction of that fee if he
would comply with ordinance and present us with a registration
and with the plan.
THE COURT: All right.

On the case ending in 0315,

I'm going to impose a fine of $750 on count 1, also $750 on
count 2, for a total of $1,500.

On the case that ends in 0420,

it will be the same sentence, $750 on count 1, $750 on count 2.
The total fine will be $3,000.
Mr. Edwards, I'm willing to suspend half of that if
you will take care of the problem, say within thirty days, if
you'll register the building and also provide a building plan.
So thirty days from today would be November 18th of 2002.
And I assume, counsel, you've told Mr. Edwards that
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he has the right to appeal.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Yes.

And I was just going to ask if

your Honor would grant a stay on the payment of the fine, if we
could have thirty days to explore that possibility.
THE COURT:

All right. Well, let's see.

Maybe what I

should do is set that — the situation about complying, then,
out sixty days.

Right?

It would give him a stay for thirty

days, and then give him another thirty days.
Is the city all right with that?

That would give him

sixty days.
MR. KNOWLTON:

And also if it could be stayed pending

appeal, if he decides to do that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KNOWLTON:
THE COURT:

I think you have to do that.

Well, I guess I need to just - rather

than say yes or no, I guess I need to know whether or not he's
going to appeal.

I guess — you've got thirty days to decide,

so. . .
But let's change that to sixty days, then, in which
to comply.

So he's got thirty days to appeal.

We'll go out

sixty days, then, and that'll be December 18th. And like I
say, I'll suspend half of that fine on the condition that he
comply with registering the building and also filing a building
plan.

Okay?
MR. KNOWLTON:

Okay.
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*****

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. KNOWLTON:

3 |

THE COURT: All right.

4

THE CLERK:

I've still got the other two cases.

5

THE COURT:

Oh, that's the other thing we need to

6

talk about.

Will that work?
Thank you.

Do we want to set those for trial, or...

7

MR. JUNK:

8

THE COURT:

9 1

MR. JUNK:

What we're We've got two other cases.
What we were are doing is we're waiting to

10

set at least one of those for trial until after we have a

11

ruling on the civil case.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JUNK:

14

THE COURT:

15

All right.
— set up for disposition.
That's the case ending in 4365 involving

waste material or junk and the land use?

16
17

So we're just —

MR. JUNK:

Actually that one we've been continuing.

Bruce has that completed all but providing a tarp over the

18 | back.
19

MR. EDWARDS:

20 I

MR. JUNK:

21

Well, I have the tarp.

Okay.

And I assume you'll have that

within thirty days?

22 j

MR. EDWARDS: Yeah.

23 |

MR. JUNK:

24 |

THE COURT: All right.

25

Okay.
How about case 0506?

That's

windows and glass.
144
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:

Right.

We think we need to just —

Do you want to continue those, then?
Yeah.

Maybe we could put it on that —

that December date, that's sixty days away.

At that point we

could see if he —
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

What's that?

MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:

Put it on for what?

Put it on for what?

For disposition.

That's the one that — we

were waiting to get a determination from the civil case to what
sort of date to set for trial.
MR. KNOWLTON:

Well, I don't know that that's going

to be signed within thirty days.
MR. JUNK:

I said sixty.

MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:
trial.

I would be shocked.

Or even sixty.

Well, at least we would have a date for a

Then we could set a date for trial after that.

I just

want to —
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I think it's going to be a lot
longer than that.
MR. JUNK:

To set a trial date?

MR. EDWARDS: Well, I mean I think it's going to be
thirty to sixty days before the motion for summary judgments.
MR. JUNK:

Well, at least just like to monitor, and

since we'll be coming back on the December date, I'd like to at
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least put them on for those dates for disposition.
THE COURT: All right.

So you want to put them on

the calendar on December — was it 18th?
MR. JUNK: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

At 2:00 o'clock.

Can you meet

that?
MR. KNOWLTON:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
MR. JUNK:
THE COURT:
calendar?

Yeah, that's fine.

What day is that?
That would be a Wednesday, December 18th
Could we do it the 10th?
Do it at 10:00 o'clock on the city

Sure.
THE CLERK:

And that's just for disposition?

MR. KNOWLTON:

Report.

THE COURT: A report?

All right.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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